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Despite the importance of updating, which I define as a process in which actors 
revisit and potentially revise their current understanding of and response to an evolving 
situation, we know relatively little about what updating looks like and when and how 
updating occurs. To address this gap in the literature, I use an inductive approach to study 
how emergency department (ED) healthcare providers make sense of a patient‟s 
symptoms and update their understanding as that patient‟s symptoms change over time. I 
study updating of in two research contexts – the field (the ED) and the medical 
simulation lab – and draw on qualitative data consisting of non-participant observations 
and archival video footage to develop theory around how updating is accomplished.  
In the ED, I find that updating is indeed part of everyday work but is also a more 
problematic process than is often suggested. Healthcare providers recognize the 
challenges associated with updating and engage in proactive behaviors – including 
revisiting the patient‟s trajectory of care, surfacing expectations, and communicating 
richly – to facilitate updating. My data suggest that a specific type of social interaction – 
bids for attention – helps to shape updating. I develop theory around bids for attention 
and responses to those bids, which I then elaborate and refine in my lab study.
 xiii 
 In the lab, I compare and contrast the performance of 24 teams of ED healthcare 
providers participating in simulation training. I find that effective updating occurs the 
majority (67%) of the time but with significant variation in performance. My lab study 
confirms that social interactions are important for updating but also shows that updating 
can emerge as healthcare providers interact with the physical or cognitive environment. I 
discover that updating can be accomplished through a variety of pathways, ranging from 
an individual acting alone to collective action. Last, I identify important qualitative 
differences in how high and low-performing teams interact with each other and highlight 
the need for a more nuanced examination of the building blocks of social interaction 






Organizations today face environments that are ever more competitive, dynamic, 
and uncertain (D'Aveni, 1994: 70-71; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
1999). As a result, work within organizations is becoming increasingly complex, fast-
paced, and interdependent (Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007; Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & 
Plamondon, 2000). Successful performance often depends on the ability of individuals to 
update and revise their understanding of evolving situations in a timely manner in order 
to prevent or minimize error (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). For example, traders 
need to update their understanding of a volatile financial market and take appropriate 
action in order to avoid significant losses for their clients, and, similarly, product 
managers need to update their understanding of a changing product market in order to 
avoid launching products that fail to meet customers‟ needs. However, despite the 
importance of updating, we know that it is difficult for people to change their original 
understanding of a situation, even in the face of mounting evidence that their 
understanding is mistaken (e.g., Klayman, 1995; Rudolph, 2003; Staw & Ross, 1987). 
I define updating as a process through which actors revisit and potentially revise 
their current understanding of and response to an evolving situation. There are two main 
gaps in the literature related to updating. First, while previous research has identified
numerous barriers to updating (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Staw & Ross, 1987), little is 
known about how individuals organize to overcome these barriers. Second, the research
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related to how updating is accomplished paints updating as a predominantly individual, 
cognitive, and acontextual process, which overlooks that updating cannot be isolated 
from the situational particulars of the context in which it occurs. My dissertation aims to 
fill these gaps by develop a rich understanding of updating, paying special attention to the 
situationally embedded nature of updating. I study how updating is accomplished by 
individuals engaged in complex interdependent work in order to answer my research 
questions: “What does updating look like?” and “When and how does updating occur?”  
Understanding how individuals organize – or “assemble ongoing interdependent actions 
into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes” (Weick, 1979: 3) – to overcome 
barriers to updating is particularly relevant for complex and interdependent work, where 
single actors are not able to accomplish their work by themselves.  
To answer my research questions, I conduct two studies: the first study develops a 
theory of updating as it occurs “in the wild” and the second study elaborates and refines 
my theory of updating. For both studies, I study updating in a healthcare context, where 
effective updating is critical but frequently does not occur. Healthcare providers must be 
able to update their understanding of a patient‟s medical condition in order to avoid errors 
in diagnosis, which can cause significant harm to patients (Kuhn, 2002). Despite the 
importance of effective updating, diagnostic errors commonly occur and are the second 
leading cause of adverse events in hospitals (Leape et al., 1991). 
The first study is set in the Children‟s Hospital emergency department (ED) and 
the second study is set in the Children‟s Hospital medical simulation lab. The first study 
uses data from non-participant observations and archival video footage of patient care in 
the critical care area of the Children‟s Hospital ED. Observing ED healthcare providers 
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as they update their understanding of a patient's changing medical condition provides 
insight into different patterns of updating – or what updating looks like – and the 
conditions that promote updating – or when and how updating occurs. The second study 
uses data from archival video footage from the simulation lab. In the simulation lab, 
teams of healthcare providers – including physicians, mid-level providers, and nurses – in 
the Children‟s Hospital medical simulation lab care for simulated patients in crisis. The 
ED observations allow me to generate a rich and nuanced understanding of the process of 
updating and the conditions that promote updating and the simulation lab observations 
allow me to elaborate and refine my understanding of updating. In particular, the 
simulation lab setting enables me to link conditions that promote updating with 
performance outcomes. Theoretically, my findings will contribute to a diverse set of 
literatures including adaptation, sensemaking, and the coordination of interdependent 
work. Practically, my findings identify factors that enable healthcare professionals to 
detect and correct medical error. 
In this chapter, I have emphasized the importance of updating. I have briefly 
outlined the purpose of this dissertation and how I plan to accomplish my research. In 
Chapter 2, I review the current literature as it relates to updating to provide some 
background for my study. In Chapter 3, I introduce the research design and methods that 
I use in my dissertation. In Chapter 4, I present the findings from my field study and, in 
Chapter 5, I present the findings from my lab study. I end with Chapter 6, which 




My literature review is organized in three sections. First, I further clarify what I 
mean by the term updating. Second, I make the case for why the study of updating is 
important from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Third, I outline what is 
known about updating, highlighting that there are two largely opposing perspectives 
within the organizational literature: on the one hand, literature related to cognition and 
commitment suggests that the barriers to updating are often insurmountable; on the other 
hand, literature related to the study of complex and dynamic organizations assumes that 
updating can and does occur as part of everyday work.  
Defining Terms: What Updating Is and Is Not 
As I defined it in the previous chapter, updating is a process through which actors 
revisit and potentially revise their current understanding of and response to an evolving 
situation. I want to unpack the components of that definition. First, I want to highlight the 
processual aspect of updating. Second, I use the word actors in the definition because 
updating is a process that can conceivably occur at many levels of analysis. In my 
dissertation, I focus on the updating process of individuals working in groups but, for 
example, updating could also be studied at the purely individual level, the purely social 
level, or the organizational level. 
Third, during updating, actors revisit and potentially revise their current 
understanding of and response to a situation. Updating is a process of re-calibration, of 
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re-evaluation, and of re-activating sensemaking. Phrased differently, updating is not 
naive sensemaking but instead the process of making sense again of a situation that the 
actor has already made sense of. If sensemaking is the process of asking and answering 
the question, “What‟s the story?” and “Now what?” (Weick et al., 2005), then updating is 
the process of asking and answering the question, “Does the sense that I have made still 
make sense?” Additionally, updating does not require a change in understanding, for it 
may be that the actor‟s current understanding of a situation is still the most plausible 
explanation. In updating, it is the revisiting and the potential for revising that are 
important. As a final note, when examining the conditions that promote updating, it is 
also important to keep in mind that the conditions that influence revisiting may differ 
from those that influence revising. 
While updating can be triggered by unconscious processes or external events, I 
am most interested in what happens after updating has been triggered. The idea that 
cognition and action have both automatic and active components is well-established (see 
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000 for review). Louis and Sutton (1991) 
describe the transition from automatic thinking (which they call “habits of mind”) to 
active thinking as “switching cognitive gears.” I focus on the cognitive and conscious 
aspects of updating (i.e. with the use of the word „understanding‟ in the definition) 
because I want to emphasize that updating represents a transition from more automatic 
thinking to more active thinking.  
It may seem, initially, that updating is not meaningfully distinct from the larger 
construct of sensemaking. Sensemaking occurs when “people organize to make sense of 
equivocal inputs and enact this sense back into the world to make that world more 
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orderly” (Weick et al., 2005: 410). Sensemaking combines thinking and action: “How do 
I know what I think until I see what I say?” is a question that captures the iterative 
relationship between thinking and action (Weick, 1995) and draws attention to the 
retrospective nature of sensemaking. Put another way, people act their way into knowing 
rather than knowing first and then acting. Sensemaking involves constructing a plausible 
story about events and acting to test that story. It is important to note that sensemaking is 
not linear and, therefore, constructing a plausible story may occur as a result of acting 
rather than as an impetus for action.  
Sensemaking is theorized to be an adaptive process without a discrete beginning 
or ending (Weick, 1995: 43). However, because sensemaking is effortful, it is reasonable 
to assume that the intensity of sensemaking may ebb and flow, depending on the 
demands of the environment, a particular task, and the skill of the sensemaker. In fact, 
sensemaking scholars describe various occasions for sensemaking or triggers for 
sensemaking, such as surprise (Louis, 1980), environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982), or 
cosmology episodes (Weick, 1993). The assumption that sensemaking is ongoing rests on 
the premise that sensemakers are able to continue to make sense again once they have 
made sense in the first place.  
However, individuals are not dispassionate or impartial sensemakers. Rather, 
individuals become invested in their own understanding of a situation: they act to bolster 
their interpretation of events and discredit alternate interpretations (Klayman, 1995; 
Nickerson, 1998) and they have trouble noticing cues in the environment that would 
suggest that a situation has changed or that their understanding is mistaken despite 
mounting evidence to the contrary (Davies, 1997; Rudolph, 2003; Staw & Ross, 1989). 
 7 
First notions about what is happening are difficult to change. With rare exceptions 
(Weick, 1993), initial sensemaking may be surprisingly – even inappropriately – 
enduring. Nisbett and Ross find that, “People tend to persevere in their beliefs well 
beyond the point at which logical and evidential considerations can sustain them” (1980: 
192). Therefore, the process of updating seems worthy of specific consideration as the 
conditions under which updating is more or less likely to occur are underspecified. 
The fourth part of the definition of updating that I want to emphasize is the 
phrase, current understanding of and response to. Cognition and action are reciprocally 
and inextricably linked. I use the phrase “understanding of” because updating is, from an 
epistemological standpoint, a constructionist not objectivist construct. That is to say, in 
updating meaning is constructed not discovered (Crotty, 1998). Many organizational 
scholars pay credence to the notion that individuals socially construct their reality (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1966). Social constructionist scholars believe that an individual‟s 
understanding of the world is an interpretation, which can be influenced not only by the 
individual but also by others and by the world itself.  I use the phrase “response to” in 
order to highlight that social constructionists also believe that individuals have an active 
role in shaping their environment just as the individual‟s environment has an active role 
in shaping them (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).  
Likewise, I use the word current to highlight that understandings themselves 
change over time. The actor‟s current understanding may range from a vague notion of “I 
don‟t know what is going on here but something is wrong” to a more developed 
hypothesis such as “I think that x is the cause of the patient‟s symptoms.” Updating can 
result in the realization that an actor‟s current understanding is no longer appropriate or 
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plausible, either because the situation has changed or because their previous 
understanding had been in error (i.e. they had been on the wrong path and need to modify 
a course of action). In this way, updating can be seen as closely linked to error detection 
and recovery. Actions can become mistaken rather than begin as mistakes (Paget, 1988). 
When individuals update, they are able to detect and mitigate (or even correct) errors 
early in their unfolding by noticing, interpreting, and responding to cues that their current 
understanding may not reflect the current situation. 
Fifth, I include the phrase evolving situation to emphasize that the context for 
sensemaking is itself changing over time. If we take the idea of recursive interaction 
between the environment and the actor seriously, then the context or environment for 
sensemaking is constantly changing and updating becomes a necessary adaptive 
capability. Classically, organizational scholars use the term environment to refer to that 
which is outside of the boundary of the organization. Yet, environment is a relative term 
– what environment means depends on the level of analysis. Rather than get entangled in 
various definitions of environment, I conceive of the environment more broadly; 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2002) defines environment as “the 
circumstances, objects, or conditions by which one is surrounded.” The relevant 
environment for my dissertation research, given that I am interested in how individuals 
engaged in complex, fast-paced, and interdependent work update their understanding of 
an evolving situation, will be the circumstances, objects, or conditions that surround 
individuals at work or – more concretely – the things that individuals can hear and see 
and touch, the people with whom they interact, the tasks they must accomplish, etc.  
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The phrase updating is not new in the organizational literature. There are two 
previous usages of the term updating that I want to incorporate into my discussion of 
updating. First, the construct of mindful updating (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, in particular 
see pp. 44-46 and pp. 118-119) or ongoing updating (Weick et al., 2005, see pp. 414 and 
418)  appears in the sensemaking literature. But, while the idea of updating is implicit in 
sensemaking, updating is rarely defined or empirically studied. For example, Weick et al. 
(2005: 414) include ongoing updating as part of their model of sensemaking (see Figure 
2.1) although updating is not defined. Note that in Figure 2.1 updating is located at the 
interface between the environment (ecological change) and the actor (enactment).  
Weick and Sutcliffe write,  
…mindfulness is essentially a preoccupation with updating. …The power of a 
mindful orientation is that it redirects attention from the expected to the irrelevant, 
from the confirming to the disconfirming, from the pleasant to the unpleasant, 
from the more certain to the less certain, from the explicit to the implicit, from the 
factual to the probably, and from the consensual to the contested” (2001: 44).  
 
They suggest that there are three main ways in which updating occurs: “Whenever people 
update their understanding of what is happening, they essentially rework the ways they 
label and categorize what they see. They do at least three things: reexamine discarded 
information, monitor how categories affect expectations, and remove dated distinctions” 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001: 44). While updating is seen as desirable and even necessary, it 
is less clear how updating is actually triggered and accomplished. My definition of 
updating is in keeping with the idea that updating is part of sensemaking but extends 
previous research by emphasizing that updating represents a reactivation of sensemaking 
and acknowledges that updating may be more difficult to accomplish than is usually 
theorized in the sensemaking literature.   
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Second, the construct of Bayesian updating is discussed in the literature on 
decision making (Nelson, 2005; O'Flaherty & Komaki, 1992). Bayes‟ rule or theorem, 
which relates the conditional and marginal probability distributions of random variables 
and can be used to infer or update the degree of belief in light of new information (i.e. 
based on experience or a posteriori) (Joyce, 2003). Because definitions of terms can be 
further refined by explicitly stating not only what a term includes but also what it does 
not include, I want to be clear that I am not using updating in a Bayesian sense.  
There are several important distinctions between Bayesian updating and my use 
of the term updating. To begin, Bayesian updating is a prospective process and is used to 
predict how people will act in the future. In contrast, updating, as I define it, is part of a 
retrospective sensemaking process and, therefore, used to understand how people are 
acting or have acted. Next, Bayesian updating involves rational calculus i.e. presumes 
that individuals calculate probabilities and act on them. In contrast, updating as part of 
sensemaking does not necessarily involve estimations of risk or probability. Last, 
Bayesian updating requires repeated trials and learning. Whereas Bayesian updating 
assumes learning, updating may or may not result in learning. The repeated trials 
component of Bayesian updating implies a more static setting i.e. for the trials to be 
repeated the basic framework needs to be held constant. However, I am interested in 
updating in dynamic settings where the framework itself is changing.  
Last, I want to sketch out how my research on updating differs from Rudolph‟s 
(2003) research on fixation error. There are many similarities between my research and 
Rudolph‟s research and the constructs of updating and fixation error are in some ways 
two sides of the same coin. Whereas I define updating as an adaptive process in which 
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actors revisit and potentially revise their understanding of and response to an evolving 
situation, Rudolph defines fixation error as “the process of clinging to a single presumed 
diagnosis despite mounting cues that one is on the wrong track” (2003: v). Fixation error 
can be thought of as a failure of updating (in some cases a failure to revisit the original 
diagnosis at all and in other cases a failure to revise the diagnosis despite revisiting it). 
Our work differs on the two dimensions that I have identified as gaps in the literature 
around updating. Whereas Rudolph studies the factors that cause healthcare providers to 
persist with an erroneous diagnosis, I study the conditions that enable healthcare 
providers to update their understanding. And whereas Rudolph‟s research is focused on 
the individual, on cognition, and on fixation error in the laboratory setting, my research 
has a broader focus and examines how individuals organize to update their understanding 
“in the wild” as they perform their complex interdependent everyday work. Having 
defined updating and distinguished it from related concepts, I now turn to a discussion of 
why updating is important.  
The Case for Studying Updating 
Updating is a fundamental but poorly understood aspect of organizing. 
Organizational life is dynamic and requires actors to detect and respond to changes both 
within and outside of the organization (Weick, 1979). As work becomes more complex, 
fast-paced, and interdependent (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Howard, 
1995), the ability for individuals to update and revise their understanding of evolving 
situations in a timely manner is necessary in order to prevent or minimize error (Griffin et 
al., 2007; Pulakos et al., 2000; Weick et al., 2005). Yet, despite the importance of 
updating, we know very little about how updating occurs.  
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There is a tension in the organizational literature: on the one hand, there is a 
significant body of research – ranging from literature on the limitations of cognition 
(March & Simon, 1958; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) to literatures on commitment 
(Salancik, 1977a; Staw & Ross, 1987) to literatures on error (Perrow, 1986; Reason, 
1990; Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1996) – that suggests that updating is very difficult to 
accomplish. In this research, there is surprisingly little investigation of how individuals 
might organize to overcome these barriers to updating. On the other hand, there are 
streams of research – such as sensemaking (Weick, 1995) or high reliability or resilient 
organizing (Roberts, 1990; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007; Wreathall, 2006), coordination (Bechky, 2006; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; 
Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Yan, 2006), and knowledge-in-
practice (Brown & Duguid, 1996; Orlikowski, 2002) – that implicitly assume that 
updating can and does occur as part of everyday work.  
The different perspectives on updating reveal two important gaps in the literature: 
first, little is known about how updating is accomplished and, second, the literature that 
does exist primarily frames updating as an individual, cognitive, and acontexual process, 
which overlooks that updating should not be isolated from the situational particulars of 
the context in which it occurs. By studying updating in the context of complex and 
interdependent work and asking process and mechanisms questions – i.e. “What does 
updating look like” and “When and how does updating occur?” – I aim to fill these gaps. 
Building theory related to process (Mohr, 1982) requires studying events as they unfold 
over time, discerning what conditions are necessary in order for a certain outcome to 
occur, and being mindful of interdependence. Asking mechanisms questions  (Elster, 
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1998; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998) provides insight into understanding boundary 
conditions (Anderson et al., 2006) and I am interested in the boundary conditions of 
updating, such as: What patterns of updating are there? When does updating include 
revisiting and revising? (vs. just revisiting), How does updating occur as part of everyday 
work?, When does updating occurs?, and What conditions make updating more or less 
likely to occur?. 
Updating and the Organizational Literature 
As previously mentioned, the literature related to updating falls into two broad 
and largely opposing camps: updating is difficult vs. updating is part of everyday work. I 
begin by reviewing a wide range of relevant literatures that suggests that updating is 
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.  
“Updating is difficult” perspective 
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion draws all things 
else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and 
weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and 
despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this 
great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may 
remain inviolate. 
(Francis Bacon cited in Nisbett & Ross, 1980: 167) 
 
Many different streams of research suggest that updating is difficult. First 
impressions or theories are “sticky” or difficult to change. For example, the belief 
persistence literature suggests that first impressions (Asch, 1946) or initial beliefs tend to 
persist (Tutin, 1993). The social theory persistence literature suggests that individuals 
develop social theories – or beliefs about “how and in what way variables in the social 
environment are related” (Anderson & Sechler, 1986: 24) as a way to organize 
knowledge, explain events, and make future predictions (see Anderson & Lindsay, 1998 
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for review). In fact, social theories can persist even when the evidence to support them is 
unequivocally discredited (Davies, 1997; Schul & Burnstein, 1985). The explanations 
literature, which is closely intertwined with the social theory literature, is similar in many 
ways to the sensemaking perspective. Although used often in discussion of complex 
decisions (such as jury deliberation), the explanation literature considers how individuals 
create meaning and understanding from often confusing and contradictory pieces of 
information (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Explanations, like social theories, 
“provide a sense of mechanism” (Keil, 2006: 228) but also “reflect an attempt to 
communicate an understanding” (Keil, 2006: 229).  
Explanations can seem innocuous but they are unexpectedly powerful: the act of 
creating an explanation influences future cognition and future actions (Koehler, 1991). 
For example, Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980) found that merely asking subjects to 
create an explanation – even when the subjects were then told that the evidence on which 
they‟d based their explanation was completely false – was sufficient to cause the 
subject‟s social theories to persist despite the evidential discrediting. Why are 
explanations so powerful? One hypothesis is that once a particular perspective or frame 
has been created, it limits what else can be noticed. Koehler writes that after an 
explanation has been developed, “…a certain inertia sets in, which makes it more 
difficult to consider alternative hypotheses impartially. In other words, the initial 
impression seems to persist despite the person‟s efforts to ignore it while trying to give 
fair consideration to an alternative view” (1991: 503). This mechanisms is in keeping 
with prior work on other types of cognitive biases, such as anchoring (Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982).  
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First impressions, interpretations, or theories can lead to distortions in information 
processing that contribute to difficulty updating. It is often challenging for individuals to 
find and process new information that might alter their first impressions or beliefs. There 
are many cognitive biases that have been described that contribute to difficulty updating, 
among them the confirmation bias, in which individuals privilege information that 
confirms their hypothesis and disregard information that disconfirms their hypothesis. 
Klayman describes confirmation bias as the “general tendency for people to believe too 
much in their favored hypothesis” (1995: 385). Confirmation bias is thought to be a 
collection of related phenomenon, perhaps with varying mechanisms, that share the 
common themes of a strong bias toward thinking about positive information rather than 
negative information (i.e. people are more likely to test for features that support rather 
than disconfirm their hypothesis) and a failure to consider alternate hypotheses 
(Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998). Because confirmation bias is a bias of how people 
collect and consider new information, confirmation bias may exert a stronger influence 
on the revisiting aspect of updating rather than the revising aspect. A possible implication 
of this research on confirmation bias for updating is that it is important to pay attention to 
the range of hypotheses that are developed, the type of information that is sought out to 
evaluate the hypotheses, and the strategies that individuals use to overcome the 
confirmation bias. 
Once impressions are acted upon, it becomes even more difficult for individuals 
to alter their interpretation of a situation. Actions start people on trajectories of behavior 
and cognition that are difficult to change. Actions – particularly if visible to others, 
difficult to undo and chosen freely – constrain future actions and beliefs (Kline & Peters, 
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1991; Salancik, 1977a). Actions influence not only the sensemaking of the actor but also 
others who observe the action (Weick, 1995: 12). Salancik writes,  
The power of commitment in shaping attitudes stems from the fact that 
individuals adjust their attitudes to fit the situations to which they are committed. 
It is what makes the behavior self-sustaining. You act. You believe that your 
action was valuable, worthwhile, and desirable. You act again, renewing the 
belief. In time, without realizing it, you have made a myth; your sense of veracity 
and value has been merged into a pattern of action. (1977b: 70-71). 
 
Thus, an important implication of the behavioral commitment literature for updating is 
that acting on interpretations can make it even more difficult for an individual to consider 
alternate hypotheses and potentially revise their working understanding of a situation. As 
such, it is important to pay attention to how trajectories of action and cognition unfold 
and, more specifically, how various characteristics of action (i.e. how public, revocable, 
or volitional) influence that trajectory, as certain types of action may be more likely to 
constrain subsequent cognition and action.   
The literature on escalation of commitment (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976; Staw & 
Ross, 1987; Whyte, 1986) extends the research on behavioral commitment and studies 
extreme cases of action constraining future behavior and cognition in which actors 
continue to devote resources to a failing course of action. The concept of escalation of 
commitment was introduced by Staw (1976) to explain the counterintuitive experimental 
finding that individuals participating in a simulated business case allocated more research 
& development funds to failing business divisions than successful business divisions, 
particularly if they felt responsible for the failure of the division. The behavior described 
by escalation of commitment is captured in the aphorism, “throwing good money after 
bad.” While the term escalation of commitment initially referred to the theory developed 
by Staw (1976), it now serves as an umbrella term for related concepts that all center 
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around individuals committed to failing courses of action. These related concepts include 
the “sunk cost effects” (Arkes and Blumer, 1985), “too much invested to quit” (Teger, 
1980), and entrapment (Brockner & Rubin, 1985).  
The literature on escalation of commitment both highlights that updating is 
difficult and suggests mechanisms that should be considered in the context of updating, 
including the need to justify actions to oneself (Brockner, 1992; Staw & Ross, 1989) and 
how alterative choices are framed (Whyte, 1986), however, this literature focuses almost 
exclusively on the factors that promote escalation rather than factors that might minimize 
or mitigate escalation. The few articles that examine de-escalation of commitment 
(Drummond, 1995; Garland, Sandefur, & Rogers, 1990; Heng, Tan, & Wei, 2003; Pan, 
Pan, & Flynn, 2004; Simonson & Staw, 1992) treat de-escalation of commitment as the 
opposite of escalation, however, it may be that the factors that inhibit updating are NOT 
the opposite of those that promote updating.  
Despite the wide variety of theories explaining escalation and de-escalation of 
commitment, there are some common findings, which can be summarized as follows: to 
increase the likelihood of escalation of commitment (and perhaps decrease the likelihood 
of updating
1
), pick a novice (Garland et al., 1990) who is highly confident and has a high 
need to achieve success (Moon, 2001; Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997); place them in a 
threatening environment (lacking psychological safety or tolerance for failure) 
(Edmondson, 1999; Pan et al., 2004); ensure that they feel the need to justify their 
behavior to themselves (Salancik, 1977a; Staw, 1976) and others (Brockner, Rubin, & 
Lang, 1981; Fox & Staw, 1979), emphasize that they are personally responsible for any 
                                                 
1
 As an aside, you will also note that this description of a recipe for escalation of commitment is very 
similar to how healthcare providers, particularly physicians, are trained. 
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failure (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981); leave them on 
their own with little to no monitoring of their behavior (Drummond, 1995; Keil & Robey, 
1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992); and make the situation highly ambiguous so that it is 
difficult for them to determine the cost of their continued commitment (Garland et al., 
1990; Staw & Ross, 1987). The implication of the escalation of commitment literature for 
studying updating is that it is important to pay attention to expertise, perceived 
responsibility, social context, and feedback as they may influence when updating is more 
and less likely to occur.  
Taken together, the research on belief persistence, social theory persistence, 
explanations, cognitive biases, behavioral commitment, and escalation or de-escalation of 
commitment suggests (1) that updating is difficult and (2) that it may take relatively little 
in the way of initial cognition or initial action to create a context where individuals 
become committed to a course of action. I want to be careful about the conclusions that I 
draw from these varied streams of research as I certainly do not want to overstate the 
findings or create a “straw man.” While updating may be difficult, common sense and an 
entirely different set of research within the organizational literature emphasizes that 
updating must be possible as part of everyday work, otherwise individuals would not be 
able to successfully accomplish their work and errors would be omnipresent. I now turn 
to an examination of various streams of research that assume that updating occurs as part 
of everyday work.  
“Updating occurs as part of everyday work” perspective 
In every waking moment, the complete balance of the organism and its 
environment is constantly interfered with and as constantly restored. Life is 
interruptions and recoveries… At these moments of a shifting in activity, 
conscious feeling and thought arise and are accentuated. 
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(John Dewey, 1922/2002: 178-179). 
 
Dewey‟s (1922/2002) quote, which speaks of recovery and restoration as 
commonplace “in every waking moment,” is a sharp contrast to the Francis Bacon quote I 
used to begin the previous section of this dissertation. Dewey writes about life being 
“interruptions and recoveries,” and I think about updating as a recovery. Even though 
there is significant evidence that updating is difficult, we also know that updating must 
and does occur as part of everyday work. Individuals engaged in complex and 
interdependent work must be able to update their understanding of an evolving situation 
in order to successfully accomplish their work and detect and correct errors early in their 
unfolding.  
The need for updating is most obvious in extreme contexts, such as aircraft 
carriers, nuclear power plants, or wildland fire crews, where failures of updating can 
result in catastrophe. For example, on the dynamic environment of the flight deck on an 
aircraft carrier, the aviator and many other individuals, including air traffic controllers, 
landing signal officers, and air operations staff, must all be able to organize to update 
their understanding in order for the aviator to safely take off and land their plane (Weick 
& Roberts, 1993: 362). In a large wildland fire, a variety of professionals from 
firefighters (coming from all around the country) to helicopter pilots to those expert in 
operating earth moving equipment, such as bulldozers, must all be able to organize to 
update their understanding of the evolving fire in order to put the fire out and to avoid, as 
much as possible, loss of property and loss of life (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  
In addition, updating must also occur in less extreme contexts, particularly those 
contexts where innovation is required and where work is fast-paced. Employees within 
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IPO software firms must be able to organize to update their understanding of the financial 
markets in which they operate in order to maximize profit (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003). 
Employees in utility companies must be able to organize to update their understanding of 
continually fluctuating demand in order to avoid brownouts or blackouts (Schulman, Roe, 
van Eeten, & de Bruijne, 2004). Likewise, entrepreneurs must be able to quickly update 
their understanding of changing market conditions, including what their competitors are 
doing and what their investor‟s concerns are, in order for their business to survive 
(Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002). 
If we take seriously the idea that updating must and does occur as part of 
everyday work, then it is essential to understand when and how updating occurs. As 
mentioned previously, there are several streams of research – such as sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995) or high reliability or resilient organizing (Roberts, 1990; Sutcliffe & 
Vogus, 2003; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Wreathall, 2006), 
coordination (Bechky, 2006; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Klein et al., 
2006), and knowledge-in-practice (Brown & Duguid, 1996; Orlikowski, 2002) – that 
implicitly assume that updating can and does occur as part of everyday work. Although 
these literatures assume that updating occurs, the mechanisms through which updating is 
accomplished in interdependent work remain under-specified. Although updating-like 
concepts are discussed in these literatures – for example, the importance of doubt and 
discrediting in sensemaking (Weick, 1979: 221-228) – a rich description of patterns of 
updating and a more detailed understanding of the interactional and contextual conditions 
that promote updating is largely absent.  
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A variety of different streams of research – taken together – suggest what topics 
are important to keep in mind when studying updating. For example, noticing that there is 
something to update about is a necessary precursor to updating. The literature on how 
changes in the environment become salient for actors within organizations encompasses a 
wide range of concepts including surprise and sensemaking (Louis, 1980), perceptual 
filters (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), problem sensing (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982), problem 
recognition (Cowan, 1986), and problem detection (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, & Woods, 
2005). Three dominant themes emerge from research on how changes become salient: 
first, whether a change is noticed depends both on the nature of the stimulus and the state 
of the perceiver, second, violated expectations prompt noticing and third, how changes 
are labeled shapes subsequent sensemaking. I expand on these points below. 
First, noticing depends on the both the nature of the change (stimulus) in the 
environment and the state of the person observing the stimulus (perceiver) because the 
perceiver cannot be separated from their environment (i.e. the perceiver influences the 
environment just as the environment influences the perceiver). Certain stimuli seem to be 
more easily noticed than others (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), 
particularly stimuli that are personally relevant, that fit within the perceiver‟s schema or 
framework for understanding the situation, and that deviate from acceptable parameters 
or prior expectations. However, it is not the stimulus alone that matters: Starbuck and 
Milliken (1988) point out that, “The stimuli that one executive receives may be precisely 
the same stimuli that another executive filters out,” emphasizing the perceiver also plays 
a role in whether stimuli are noticed. For instance, experts may be more likely to notice 
changes that novices miss (e.g., Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis, & Stannard, 1999; Dreyfus 
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& Dreyfus, 1986; Klein et al., 2005). If noticing depends on both the stimulus and the 
perceiver, this implies that updating must be studied in context in order to develop a 
fuller understanding of the reciprocal influence of the stimulus and perceiver.  
Second, a gap or discrepancy often triggers noticing. Cowan (1986) argues that 
noticing occurs when the discrepancies between what is being observed and what is 
desired accumulate past a particular threshold. However, Klein and colleagues (2005) 
disagree with Cowan and assert that noticing occurs when there is a discrepancy between 
what is observed and what is expected (rather than what is desired). This perspective is in 
keeping with the sensemaking literature, where violated expectations are thought to 
trigger sensemaking (Louis, 1980; Weick, 1995). Violated expectations can occur in 
several different ways: something expected doesn‟t happen, something unexpected 
happens, or something completely inconceivable happens (i.e. “bolt from the blue”) 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). One implication of this research for my study of updating is 
that it is important to pay attention to how a need for updating is noticed in the first place, 
which may be visible in “marked moments” when individuals indicate, either to 
themselves or to others, that they have noticed that events are “taking an unacceptable 
trajectory and may require action” (Klein et al., 2005: 14). Examining what triggers and 
shapes noticing will help elaborate my theory of updating. 
Third, how individuals talk about or label what they notice is also important for 
updating. Labels matter because labels shape and limit subsequent sensemaking (e.g., 
Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Weick et al., 2005). More specifically, labeling a stimulus puts 
it in an identifiable category, which then triggers “managing, coordinating, and 
distributing” (Weick et al., 2005: 411) or, in the language that I have been using in this 
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dissertation, a trajectory of cognition and action. If a stimulus is perceived as a threat, this 
perception can trigger a threat-rigidity response, limiting information processing and 
decreasing available behavioral and cognitive repertoires for responding to the change 
(Staw et al., 1981). 
Although the literature on how changes in the environment become salient is a 
helpful starting point for studying updating, these models – with the exceptions of Klein 
et al. (2005) and Weick et al. (2005) – are dominantly individualistic and cognitive, 
neglecting how individuals situated in a particular context and engaged in interdependent 
work might interact with each other and the context to influence updating. The role of 
social interaction in updating is not often discussed. My research aims to fill this gap. 
So how might social interaction influence updating? Individuals engaged in 
complex interdependent work, by the very nature of their work, must interact with others. 
Through their interaction, individuals engaged in interdependent work may serve as a 
resource for cognition and action for each other. For example, the literature on advice 
giving and advice taking suggests that individuals consider the advice of others when 
making decisions, weigh the advice, and subsequently sometimes change their mind 
about the appropriate course of action based on that advice. Bonaccio and Dalal, in their 
review of the advice giving and advice taking literature, write that, 
Decision-makers seek out and attend to advice in order to share accountability for 
the outcome of the decision and to improve the probability that their decisions 
will be accurate or optimal (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b). For 
instance, interacting with others prior to making a decision forces decision-
makers to think of the decision problem in new ways (Schotter, 2003) and 
provides decision-makers with new information or alternatives not previously 
considered (Heath & Gonzalez, 1995) (2006: 129). 
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But decision makers often discount advice. Advice giving and advice taking does not 
occur in isolation, rather it occurs in a context where individuals engaged in 
interdependent work must persuade others to consider their ideas.  
The idea of persuasion highlights that, in social interaction, meaning is negotiated. 
If we take the social constructionist perspective seriously, then individuals are engaged in 
negotiating an understanding of themselves and the environment. There are many 
literatures that touch on this idea of socially negotiated meaning-making, among them 
social problem theory, issue-selling, and sensegiving. Social problem theory (Kitsuse & 
Spector, 1973; Schneider, 1985) suggests that claims making and claims granting are 
important in determining which interpretation is seen as valid or legitimate (Dutton & 
Duncan, 1987). Likewise, the literature on issue-selling examines how individuals direct 
the attention of senior management to various strategic issues (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). 
Finally, the literature on sensegiving, which considers how individuals (usually leaders) 
attempt to influence “the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a 
preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 442). Taken 
together, these literatures that touch on persuasion and meaning-making highlight that it 
is important to pay attention to which individuals attempt to exert influence, how they 
shape their attempt, who is the target of their influence attempt, how their influence 
attempt is received, what makes an influence attempt more or less legitimate, and what 
happens when their attempts to influence are unsuccessful.  
Having asserted that understanding interactions between individuals is vital to 
understanding updating, what do we know about updating in the context of 
interdependent work? The literature on high reliability organizations (HROs) suggests 
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several patterns of interaction that may facilitate updating (e.g., Roberts, 1990; Weick, 
1993; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick et al., 1999). This literature emphasizes that the 
attitude that individuals engaged in interdependent work have toward each other and the 
ways in which they interact with each other are of paramount importance. Certain 
patterns of interactions – specifically heedful interrelating (Weick & Roberts, 1993) and 
respectful interacting (Weick, 1993) – are theorized to create an environment of 
heightened awareness, where weak signals (or small cues) are more likely to be noticed, 
interpreted, and responded to before they become large problems (Weick et al., 1999).  
Heedful interrelating is a social process of creating joint action; in heedful 
interrelating, individual action contributes to a larger pattern of joint action and 
individuals understand how their actions fit into the larger action (Weick & Roberts, 
1993). Heedful interrelating involves three elements – contribution, representation, and 
subordination – in which, “Actors in the system construct their actions (contribution), 
understanding that the system consists of connected actions by themselves and others 
(representation), and interrelate their actions in the system (subordination)” (Weick & 
Roberts, 1993: 357). Respectful interacting is a social process of creating joint meaning; 
in respectful interacting, an individual communicates meaning to another individual and, 
through this communication, a joint intersubjective meaning is generated. Respectful 
interacting evolved from Asch‟s moral imperatives for cooperative knowing (see 
Campbell, 1990: 45) and requires the presence of trust, honesty, and self-respect.  
While heedful interrelating and respectful interacting are theorized to be 
foundational for high reliability organizing (Weick, 1993; Weick & Roberts, 1993), little 
subsequent research has investigated how and when they occur and whether they actually 
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result in improved performance and error detection. A notable exception is research by 
Vogus (2004), who finds that heedful interrelating and respectful interacting predict 
higher levels of mindful organizing and are associated with decreased medical errors. The 
implication of heedful interrelating and respectful interacting for updating is that it is 
important to pay attention to the quality and nature of interactions between individuals. In 
particular, it is important to observe the ways in which heedful interrelating – or how 
individuals generate shared action – and respectful interacting– or how individuals 
generate shared meaning – play a role in updating. 
Another literature that examines how individuals coordinate their work in order to 
update their understanding is the literature on team adaptation, particularly in response to 
unforeseen changes. Research on how teams adapt to non-routine events or unexpected 
changes again supports the idea that updating is difficult to accomplish but does occur 
(LePine, 1998; LePine, 2003; LePine, 2005; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; Waller, 
1999; Waller, Gupta, & Giambatista, 2004). For example, in a study of team decision 
making, LePine (1998) finds that only approximately half of the teams (53%) are able to 
adapt in response to an unforeseen change (a communication disruption in a simulated 
military command and control exercise); although it is discouraging that half the teams 
are unable to adapt, it is heartening that some of the teams are able to adapt to unforeseen 
changes. Below I review some of the findings from the team adaptation
2
 literature that 
are relevant to updating.  
                                                 
2
 A quick note about the studies related to team adaptation: in these studies, various terms – such as teams, 
crews, or groups – are used to describe individuals engaged in complex interdependent work. However, 
functionally, these terms all mean roughly the same thing. Therefore, when reviewing the research I use the 
terms that the researcher has assigned but these terms can be thought of as interchangeable. 
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Overall, the research on team adaptation in the face of unexpected events draws 
attention to two facets of interactions: first, team adaptation is more likely if individuals 
working together are able to draw upon the resources (i.e. ability, information) that each 
individual team member brings to the team (e.g., LePine, 1998; LePine, 2003; Okhuysen, 
2001; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002) and second, it may be that the timing of interactions 
between team members influences adaptation (e.g., Waller, 1999). I discuss each of these 
points in more detail below. 
First, adaptation is more likely if teams are comprised of individuals with more 
resources and if the teams are able to draw on those resources (please note that I use 
resources broadly here to encompass not only raw ability, such as intelligence, but also 
other resources, such as information that the individual team members possess). LePine‟s 
research on team adaptation (1998; 2003) finds – not surprisingly – that teams comprised 
of individuals who have higher cognitive resources (i.e. are smarter) and who are more 
conscientious are more likely to adapt. Furthermore, he suggests that the best team 
member makes a difference to team performance in that team members with higher 
cognitive resources seem to be able to compensate for other team members with lower 
cognitive resources (LePine, 1998: 157-158). The finding that an individual team 
member can positively affect the whole team is in keeping with Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe‟s finding (2002) that successful teams have at least one generalist on a team and 
Paul Schulman and colleagues‟ suggestion that certain individuals acting as high 
reliability professionals may enable the whole group to function in a more reliable 
fashion (Schulman et al., 2004), however it is not clear yet how one team member might 
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influence the team (i.e. compensate for a weaker member). Understanding how a team 
creates the conditions that promote updating remains an unanswered question. 
For some resources, such as information, it is not sufficient for individual team 
members to possess the information, they also need to be able to share and integrate the 
information in order for this resource to promote adaptation. Okhuysen‟s work on 
knowledge integration (Okhuysen, 2001; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002) is a good 
example of this. Okhuysen finds that groups must create moments for reflection (“self-
interruptions”) so that individuals within the group can raise concerns and surface 
important information and integrate knowledge. He writes, 
When groups face unclear or uncertain problems, it may be difficult for them to 
determine ultimate goals or to design strategies for the effective completion of the 
tasks (Weingart, 1992). In these situations, it is important that groups adapt to 
their emerging understanding of their tasks. As groups are able to increase the 
opportunities to modify their strategies, and thus increase their adaptability, they 
are likely to be more effective in their tasks. Higher performance is a consequence 
of an increase in the number of self-interruptions because they are opportunities to 
reorient the activities of a group to the emerging understanding of the task. 
(Okhuysen, 2001: 797). 
 
These moments of reflection or “opportunities to modify their strategies” seem to 
be most effective if groups have a few meaningful interruptions in work where the group 
process is carefully examined and modified on the basis of that reflection rather than 
having frequent small interruptions that do not result in process change and can actually 
hinder performance (Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002) 
Second, the timing of interactions between team members seems to influence 
adaptation. Waller (1999) finds that crew performance was not associated with increased 
frequency of adaptive behaviors (such as information collection and transfer, task 
prioritization, and task distribution) but rather with the timing of those behaviors i.e. “the 
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longer that it took the crews to engage in adaptive task performance after a non-routine 
event, the lower the crew performance” (Waller, 1999: 135). Additionally, Waller and 
colleagues (2004), in their research on nuclear power plant crews undergoing evaluation 
in a high-fidelity simulation setting, find that few differences exist between high and low 
performing crews during monitoring or routine situations but significant differences do 
exist in non-routine situations. Specifically, high performing crews are better able to 
collect information, to develop shared mental models, and to use more effective 
communication processes within the crew. The implication of Waller‟s findings for 
updating is that it is important to pay attention not only to patterns of interactions but also 
the frequency and timing of those interactions. 
 I now turn from a discussion of organizational literature related to updating to 
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Research Design and Methods 
In this chapter, I describe and provide the rationale for the design of my 
dissertation research. I explain why I chose the work of ED healthcare providers as the 
context for my study of updating. I then provide more information about Children‟s 
Hospital, where I collected the data for my dissertation. I also provide an introduction to 
the methods that I used in my dissertation. I describe more explicitly the particulars of my 
context and analysis in the two empirical chapters – my field chapter and my simulation 
lab chapter – that follow. 
Selecting a research context 
Similar to many organizational constructs, much of the past literature related to 
updating has been acontextual, by which I mean that updating (or lack thereof) has often 
been study in isolation, removed from the work that people actually do. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) recommend choosing a context that brings the phenomenon into sharp 
relief. My goal, then, in selecting a research context was not to find a context that was 
most like a traditional organization, but rather to select a context where the phenomenon 
of interest was more extremely portrayed i.e. where updating was both difficult and 
imperative to accomplish.  
When designing my study, I wanted to select a research site where sensemaking 
and updating were a core component of the everyday work, where there were multiple 




 observations possible), and where updating (or lack thereof) had important practical 
consequences. The ability for workers to update their understanding of an evolving 
situation is relevant to many industries but is particularly important in high-risk settings, 
such as nuclear power plants (Schulman, 1993), aircraft carriers (Weick & Roberts, 
1993), and hospitals (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Klein et al., 2006).  
Given my background and my criteria, I selected healthcare as the broad context 
for my study of updating and – more specifically – I decided to study updating in the ED 
of an academic medical center. The work of ED healthcare providers involves making 
sense of a patient‟s symptoms and updating their understanding as a patient‟s symptoms 
change over time. There are multiple opportunities for sensemaking and updating. In an 
eight hour shift, a team of healthcare providers may care for 20-30 patients (Levin et al., 
2007) and within each patient‟s care lie multiple opportunities for updating. The ED is a 
setting where updating is both challenging and necessary: updating is challenging 
because the ED is a chaotic environment full of interruptions (Chisholm, Collision, 
Nelson, & Cordell, 2000) and because the ED is precisely the type of setting – given that 
actions of the ED staff are volitional, public, and often irrevocable – where we would 
expect the tendency toward commitment (and away from revisiting and revising) to be 
high (Salancik, 1977a). At the same time, updating is also necessary because, as patients‟ 
symptoms change and evolve over time, ineffective updating can have lethal 
consequences (Fordyce et al., 2003; Kachalia et al., 2007; Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000).  
In addition, the setting of an academic medical center allows the researcher to 




that healthcare providers-in-training (student nurses, EMTs, residents, interns, and 
medical students) not only report the information that they have collected from and about 
the patient, as well as their working diagnosis and plan for investigation, but also report 
their thinking behind why they believe what they believe. Similarly, for teaching 
purposes, senior healthcare providers verbalize the logic behind their thought processes to 
residents in order to share how they approach specific problems. As a result, many of the 
thought processes that are usually tacit are made explicit, providing a window into the 
usually interior and silent activity of diagnosis 
The work of an ED healthcare provider is complex. ED healthcare providers 
function in a very complex and unpredictable environment: work in the ED is unbounded, 
is frequently interrupted, involves caring for multiple patients simultaneously, is subject 
to high levels of uncertainty, is provided under significant time constraints, and affords 
little opportunity to practice risky procedures (Chisholm et al., 2000; Eisenberg et al., 
2005). ED healthcare providers must be able to make sense of and manage a wide range 
of symptoms, spanning from situations as clear cut as a small laceration requiring sutures 
to situations as ambiguous as a patient who is brought to the ED because they have 
become confused and combative. This wide range of symptoms requires the ED 
healthcare providers develop a wide range of cognitive and behavior repertoires in order 
to manage these symptoms.  
The work of an ED healthcare provider is interdependent: many different types of 
healthcare providers work in the ED. Most large hospitals have a range of providers 
including physicians, nurses, licensed practical nurses (LPNs), pharmacists, mid-level 




(EMTs), respiratory therapists, and child-life specialists (trained to help calm and 
entertain children in distress). The care of patients in the ED is usually so complicated 
that a single individual working alone cannot diagnose and treat a patient.  
Teams of ED healthcare providers are usually described as “temporary action 
teams,” (Faraj & Xiao, 2006: 1162). The teams are temporary because they are “a set of 
diversely skilled people working together over a complex task over a limited period of 
time” (Goodman & Goodman, 1976: 494). The use of the concept of “action teams” is 
common amongst scholars who have studied complex interdependent work in a variety of 
healthcare settings (e.g., Edmondson, 2003; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Klein et al., 2006; Yun, 
Faraj, & Sims, 2005). The phrase, “temporary action teams” highlights two different yet 
important aspects of the care in the ED: the “action team” component consists of “highly 
skilled specialist teams cooperating in brief performance events that require 
improvisation in unpredictable circumstances” (Sundstrom, de Meuse, & Futrell, 1990: 
121). The fact that teams are temporary action teams is important because many of the 
mechanisms that established teams rely on to coordinate activity are missing: 
relationships between team members cannot be presumed, team members may only know 
each other by the role that they play on the team, and team members need to be very 
explicit about what they are doing and why they are doing that. 
Selecting a level of analysis 
Updating can occur at many different levels of analysis. Because I am interested 




influences the trajectory of care of the patient. Strauss et al. define trajectory of care
3
 as 
“not only the physiological unfolding of a patient‟s disease but the total organization of 
work done over that course” (1985: 8). As such, the concept of trajectory of care 
encompasses both the unfolding understanding and the unfolding action involved in 
patient care and provides a theoretical framework within which to analyze where, when, 
and how updating is occurring. The trajectory of care encompasses the “arc of work” 
involved in patient care and, by definition, highlights that patient care is a social and 
interdependent process. The concept of trajectory of care has been used in other 
organizational research as the unit of analysis to study team and group organizing (e.g., 
Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Klein et al., 2006).  
In revisiting and revising the trajectory of care, healthcare providers are aiming 
for an increasingly plausible explanation of the patient‟s symptoms, which can be 
characterized as “more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is 
more resilient in the face of criticism” (Weick et al., 2005: 415). The accomplishment of 
updating as it influences the trajectory of care can, in the context of complex 
interdependent work, be thought of as a type of team performance. Recall that the 
trajectory of care of the patient is carried out and influenced by “action teams” of ED 
healthcare providers and, in patient care, the “brief performance” of the team revolves 
around an episode of care in which healthcare providers attempt to diagnose and treat the 
underlying cause of the patient‟s symptoms. Team performance is complex and can 
originate from many different sources. Klein and Kozlowski write,  
                                                 
3
 Although Strauss primarily described trajectories of care around chronic illness and suffering (or dying), 
this theoretical frame for understanding the organization of medical work is more broadly relevant and has 
been used more widely in recent years (e.g. Faraj, S., & Xiao, Y. 2006. Coordination in fast-response 





Team performance is a configural team property insofar as team performance 
emerges from the complex conglomeration of individual team members‟ 
performance. Depending on the nature of the team task, team performance may 
reflect the following: the sum of individual team members‟ contributions (the 
better each individual performs, the better team performance); the poorest team 
member‟s contribution (the team can perform no better than its weakest 
performer); the best team member‟s contribution (one team member can carry the 
team to a high level); the variability of team members‟ contributions (the more 
varied team members‟ contributions, the greater the number of nonredundant 
resources available to the team); or some more complex combination of team 
member contributions.(2000: 217) 
 
By focusing on the trajectory of care as my unit of analysis, I keep an open mind about 
which actor (or actors) might accomplish the updating.  
Selecting a research site 
I wanted to find a research site where I could study updating as it occurred “in the 
wild” and also as it occurred in the more controlled setting of the medical simulation lab. 
Studies have been done either in the field – the ED – or in the simulation lab but, to the 
best of my knowledge, no studies have combined these two settings (although “in vivo” 
simulation research, where the simulator is taken into the clinical care areas of hospitals 
is becoming a more popular way to do simulation research).  
My dissertation research took place at Children‟s Hospital (pseudonym), a large 
urban Midwestern research and teaching hospital that is routinely ranked among the top 
10 pediatric hospitals in the US. I chose Children‟s Hospital because their ED is one of 
the busiest pediatric EDs in the country with an annual census of approximately 91,000 
patient visits and averaging 246 unscheduled visits per day. The ED provides care for a 
spectrum of patients from patients with minor ailments (i.e. ear infections, upper 
respiratory tract infections) to patients with extremely rare and complex medical 




which means that this facility receives patients from a wide geographic region who have 
been seriously injured in accidents or had some other kind of trauma. As well, Children‟s 
Hospital has an on-site simulation lab where ED healthcare providers and Trauma Team 
staff regularly participate in simulation scenarios for both training and evaluation 
purposes. This simulation lab – in contrast to many labs around the country – trains 
interdisciplinary teams of healthcare providers in the simulation, rather than focusing on 
one group (i.e. physicians). The interdisciplinary nature of this simulation training is 
critical to my research design. 
It was difficult to gain access to a research site – I spoke to clinicians around the 
country for almost a year before being introduced to Children‟s Hospital. Children‟s 
Hospital senior leadership was enthusiastic about my project and helped facilitate access. 
There were significant human subjects concerns about observing healthcare workers 
engaged in direct patient care and it took another year to obtain human subjects approval 
from all the appropriate parties. I had approval from the University of Michigan‟s 
Behavioral Institutional Review Board (IRB), from the Children‟s Hospital‟s internal 
IRB, and from the National Institute of Health‟s Certificate of Confidentiality program, 
which protects my data from subpoena, a necessary safeguard given the sensitive and 
potentially litigious nature of work in which ED healthcare professionals are engaged.  
Selecting a research design 
As mentioned previously, I wanted to study updating in two contexts: the ED and 
the medical simulation lab. For the first study, set in the Children‟s Hospital ED, my data 
were non-participant observations and archival digital video footage of patient care in the 




provided insight into different patterns of updating and how updating was accomplished 
as part of everyday work. For my second study, set in the Children‟s Hospital medical 
simulation lab, my data were video footage from the simulations. The goal of my second 
study was to elaborate and refine the theory that I developed in the first study. I begin 
with a brief overview of the methods that I used to investigate my research questions: 
“What does updating look like?” and “When and how does updating occur?” 
Barley and Kunda assert that organizational researchers rarely study how work is 
actually accomplished and issue a call to scholars to “bring work back in” (2001). 
Similarly, Hoff and colleagues (2004), in their review of journal articles that examined 
organizational factors in medical error, critique many of the existing studies – noting that 
the studies were often atheoretical or methodologically weak – and call for more rich 
descriptive work grounded in theory. I answer these calls for studying work as it is 
accomplished – specifically, I draw on ethnographic techniques (non-participant 
observations) and microethnographic techniques (video analysis) in order to study how 
updating occurs in the context of complex interdependent work as it unfolds in real-time.  
Ethnography focuses on understanding social phenomenon and culture by closely 
observing patterns of behavior (Locke, 2001; Patton, 1990). Non-participant observations 
entail spending time in the field and being immersed in the day-to-day activity of the 
research subjects. Microethnography (sometimes called video-based ethnography) 
focuses on understanding situated human interaction as it unfolds over time, particularly 
with respect to how people use language, action, and tools to make sense together from 
moment to moment (Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002; Heath, Luff, & Knoblauch, 2004). Video 




perspective, which asserts modalities of human communication – such as speech, gesture, 
writing, etc – are misunderstood if studied in isolation. Multimodal research seeks to 
integrate “modalities and their interaction and their interaction with features of context in 
everyday cognition, work, and social life” (Goodwin, LeBaron, & Streeck, 2008 (under 
contract), p. 1 book proposal). 
In the subsequent two empirical chapters, I go into detail about my data sample, 







 Updating in the Emergency Department 
Updating, which I have defined as “a process through which actors revisit and 
potentially revise their understanding of and response to an evolving situation,” is a 
fundamental but poorly understood aspect of organizing. Prior research suggests that 
updating is difficult to accomplish (e.g., Anderson et al., 1980; Nickerson, 1998; Nisbett 
& Ross, 1980; Staw, 1976) but is important for adapting to unexpected events and for 
detecting and correcting error early in its unfolding (e.g., Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & 
Kendall, 2006; Waller, 1999; Weick et al., 2005). However, what updating looks like and 
when and how updating occurs remain open questions. In order to address this gap in the 
literature and learn more about updating, I conducted an inductive exploratory study of 
updating in a context where updating is critically important: the ED.  
In this study, I use data from non-participant observations in and archival video 
footage from the ED to develop a deeper understanding of how updating is (or is not) 
accomplished as part of everyday work. I found that ED healthcare providers were able to 
update their understanding of a patient‟s changing medical condition but that updating 
was constrained by many contextual features of the ED. I found that healthcare providers, 
in an attempt to facilitate updating – something they recognized was important yet 
difficult to achieve – engaged in proactive routines to help facilitate updating. Last, my 
findings suggest that whether and when updating occurred depended on the nature and 




 introduce a framework for thinking about these interactions as either implicit or explicit 
bids for attention that are either sensemaking or sensegiving in nature. Having already 
situated my research questions within the literature in the previous chapter, here I present 
some other influences on my theory development. Next, I provide more details about the 
context and method for this study and, last, I present my findings and conclusions.  
Developing theory around updating 
Updating is a moment in the larger process of patient care when one or more 
members of the team return to the trajectory of care, reconsider the trajectory, and 
potentially revise it. I situate updating at the juncture where the sense made at one period 
in time (s1) is reconsidered and a new sense may be developed (s2) (see Figure 4.1). It is 
important to emphasize that updating, by definition, occurs only in situations where some 
sense has already been made and the main function of updating (theoretically speaking) is 
not around making sense from ambiguous or uncertain information but rather around 
determining whether the course of cognition and action that has been decided upon 
remains appropriate. In updating, there is a comparison and evaluation component that is 
often absent from naïve sensemaking. Updating occurs in face of an already established 
trajectory of care and, in many ways, is about the refinement of understanding. I use the 
term “refinement,” which has its etymological origin in the metallurgical practice of 
separating metals from dross or other extraneous matter (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary, 2002), to emphasize that once a trajectory has been initiated, there can be 
adjustments in understanding that polish, or improve, or clarify the trajectory but that 




As I gathered and analyzed my field observations, I found the work of Mary 
Parker Follett (Metcalf & Urwick, 1957), who writes about “moments in a process” that 
punctuate a flow of activity, to be helpful in building theory around how updating occurs. 
In this study, I am examining how healthcare providers update their understanding of a 
patient‟s trajectory of care as the patient‟s medical condition evolves over time. Updating 
is, in some ways, the reactivation of sensemaking but it is not just a simple triggering of 
sensemaking; updating is also a complex process with its own cognitions and behaviors 
that relate to how actors negotiate their way from one sense to another.  
Finally, a quick aside, before I turn to the methods section, about how I 
determined that it was feasible to study updating. As mentioned in the literature review 
chapter, there is a significant disagreement in the organizational literature around whether 
and when updating occurs. In fact, the organizational literature was divided enough on 
this topic that, prior to starting my dissertation research, I engaged in an extensive pilot 
study (approximately 200 hours of observations in the ED of another large Midwestern 
research and teaching hospital) to explore whether it would be possible to observe 
updating as part of complex interdependent work. I found field observations to be a rich 
source of data for studying updating and so I decided to proceed with this dissertation.   
Chapter-Specific Research Design and Methods 
Research context 
In this section, I build on the rationale introduced in Chapter 3 (Research Design 
and Methods) to illustrate why the ED is an apt location for studying updating and to 
bring my particular research context to life. As mentioned previously, in order to learn 




which updating (1) was a central component of the work, (2) occurred frequently, and (3) 
had practical importance. As I have argued before, the ED is a context where updating is 
both challenging and necessary. The ED is the interface between the organization and the 
environment and is often referred to as the “front door” to the hospital (Institute of 
Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health 
System, 2007). The ED is a context where, more than any other area of healthcare, high 
levels of uncertainty are part of daily work. Work in the ED is, “unbounded in scope, 
unpredictable, and potentially unlimited in demands” (Cosby & Croskerry, 2009: 5).  
Croskerry and colleagues, in the preface to their book on patient safety in the ED, write,  
 
It [the ED] is an environment like no other. The diversity of conditions has no 
match in any other area of medicine, and nowhere else is the decision density as 
high nor the cognitive and emotional load so heavy. Its richness and variability 
make it a special place to be and a fascinating place to work. But the nature of the 
environment that makes it interesting comes with a price. … The ED environment 
has been fittingly described as one that is prone to error, and even a natural 
laboratory for the study of error. Perhaps more than any other area of medicine, 
purposeful and deliberate attention to safety is necessary to coordinate the 
complexity of multiple processes and people required to run an ED.  (2009: xiii) 
 
The data from my dissertation come from Children‟s Hospital, a large urban 
Midwestern research and teaching hospital that is routinely ranked among the top 10 
pediatric hospitals in the US. As mentioned previously, Children‟s Hospital is a Level 1 
Trauma Center, which means that this facility receives patients from a wide geographic 
region who have been seriously injured in accidents or had some other kind of trauma. In 
addition to being one of the best pediatric hospitals in the US, it is also one of the busiest. 
There are over 90,000 visits per year to the ED, which averages out to about 250 visits 




The ED is staffed by many different kinds of healthcare providers, with over 50 
Emergency Medicine (EM) physicians on staff (combination of teaching and clinical 
faculty), other physicians who serve on the trauma team (such as trauma surgeons, 
orthopedists, anesthesiologists, etc), pediatric emergency medicine fellows, a variety of 
residents from a number of different emergency services residency programs, medical 
students, pediatric nurse practitioners, EMTs, nurse anesthesiologists, ED nurses, 
operating room nurses, LPNs and nurses‟ aides, respiratory therapists, child life-
specialists, social workers, clergy, and a pharmacist who specializes in ED care. In 
addition to the healthcare providers, there are a number of administrative personnel – for 
example, registration clerks and ward clerks – who play a key role in registering the 
patient, arranging the flow of patients through the hospital, requesting old patient records, 
and coordinating billing.  
At my dissertation research site, senior ED physicians play one of two roles: they 
are either teaching faculty or clinical faculty. Teaching faculty see patients in conjunction 
with a team of fellows, residents, interns, and medical students – when supervising 
learners, the attending physicians had to not only monitor how the patient was doing but 
they also had to monitor how the physicians-in-training that they were supervising were 
doing. In contrast to teaching faculty, clinical faculty see patients on their own. ED 
physicians sometimes alternated between these two roles (i.e. on one shift they were 
teaching faculty and on another shift they were clinical faculty) or sometimes crossed 
between roles within the same shift (i.e. clinical faculty would occasionally supervise a 




range of other ED healthcare providers (mid-level providers, nurses, social workers, etc) 
to care for patients. 
There are multiple healthcare providers on shift at any given time but the length 
of shift and when the shift begins and ends varies between and within various types of 
healthcare providers to ensure overlapping coverage (for example, nurses work 12 hour 
shifts, while attending physicians work eight hours) and to allow for double (or triple or 
quadruple) coverage of key roles during times of peak demand (for example, each area in 
the ED may have their own head nurse and own attending physician assigned to them).  
The entire hospital, including the ED, is designed to make care as pleasant as 
possible for children and their families. It is decorated be as appealing to children as 
possible, with bright colors and cheery murals on the walls. In the ED, there are seasonal 
decorations hanging from the hallway ceilings (in the spring there were paper cut-outs in 
the shape of shamrocks and raindrops and umbrellas; in the summer, the paper cut-outs 
were all sorts of flowers). Even the portable x-ray machine in the ED is decorated to look 
like a fire truck. Most of the nursing staff wears colorful apparel (called “scrubs”) with 
cheerful designs or cartoon characters on them and even the masks that they put on 
during patient care have cartoon characters on them. Children and their families are 
provided with movies or cartoons while they wait (TVs are in each exam room) and can 
order food from the cafeteria menu (if they are allowed to eat). The hospital employs a 
number of child-life specialists, who are experts in child development and are trained to 
help children cope with challenging experiences (for example, they help calm and distract 




specialists who are assigned to the ED and attend every trauma page. As well, there are 
social workers and clergy on staff to support family. 
Patients present to (this is a term that healthcare providers use, which means 
“come to”) the ED via at least three routes: (1) they decide on their own that they need to 
be seen in the ED and go there, (2) they are seeing another physician who refers them to 
the ED (and usually calls the ED to let the staff know the patient is coming), (3) they are 
brought to the ED via emergency medical transport (i.e. ambulance). A central premise of 
ED care is the idea of triage, which means that patients are seen according to how urgent 
their need is for care: someone who has been in a car accident is seen immediately, 
whereas someone who has a fever and cough might have to wait for hours.  Children‟s 
Hospital has a triage area just off of the patient registration desk and the ED waiting room 
where patients are seen upon arrival by senior ED nurses who assign them a triage score, 
indicating how urgently they need to be seen.  
The ED at Children‟s Hospital is divided into a number of different clinical care 
areas (see Figure 4.2 for blueprint of ED). The most critically ill patients are brought into 
the Shock Trauma Suite (called the STS or sometimes the “trauma bays”). There are 
another four areas in the ED designed for varying levels of acuity of patient care. 
Depending on the patient volumes, different areas of the ED are opened up for care 
(during slow times, areas like Area D and Area E are kept closed). The sickest patients 
(not being seen in the STS) are sent to Area C, where the patient rooms have large 
windows so that the staff at the workstation can keep an eye on the patients. In 
descending order of acuity, patients are brought back to rooms in the STS, Area C, D, B, 




The STS is where many of my observations took place. As you can see from 
Figure 4.2, the STS is a large open space, with multiple entrances and exits, which is 
divided into three trauma bays (each with their own curtain to close off the area; each 
with dedicated equipment, including monitors, medication carts, etc). There is a long 
counter along one wall where nurses can prepare medications. There is a direct path from 
the ambulance bay (where ambulances park) to the STS. Children‟s Hospital, like many 
hospitals, has moved from having families excluded from traumas and codes to allowing 
them to be present, as long as they stay out of the way of healthcare providers. In the 
STS, there is a red line of tape on the floor marking off where families can stand (often 
one family member – for example, the mother – is allowed at the bedside to help comfort 
and restrain the child). The trauma bays each have a motion-activated camera that records 
all activity (families sign waivers upon admission giving permission for these videos to 
be used for quality improvement and research purposes).  
Below I describe my research design, data sample, collection, and analysis. Please 
note that I used two different types of data in this study – archival video footage from the 
ED trauma bays and non-participant observations in the ED. I began with the ED video 
and then progressed to observations but, in keeping with a grounded theory approach, the 
data collection and analysis progressed alongside each other as I iterated between data, 
creating theory, collecting more data to elaborate my theory, and so forth, until I reached 
“theoretical saturation” – the point at which new data does not generate new theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001). In addition, analysis of the data continued after I 





Research design: I began my study of updating “in the wild” by analyzing 
archival digital video footage from the ED. There were two main theoretical advantages 
to collecting and analyzing ED video footage before I began the ED non-participant 
observations. First, it was difficult to know what to pay attention to in the non-participant 
observations without a set of “sensitizing concepts” (Blumer, 1954) to act as a guide. 
Sensitizing concepts orient and focus the researcher; coding video around moments of 
updating (or where it seems as if updating should be occurring but is not) before going in 
the field allowed me to have a sense of not only what updating looked like but also what 
conditions seemed to co-exist with or precede updating. The ability to pause and rewind 
and see what is happening in the moments before updating occurs is not possible in the 
field.  
Second, video captures moments that could be missed by an observer. Non-
participant observations rely on the observer as research instrument. There is the 
possibility that biases the researcher holds may influence their perception of behaviors 
and interactions in the field. This issue is particularly problematic for a physician 
researcher, like me, in a healthcare context. Being able to step back and systematically 
and repeatedly review video helped mitigate potential bias.  
Data sample and collection: As mentioned above, Children's Hospital has 
motion-activated cameras mounted on the ceiling in the trauma bays that record all 
ongoing care of patients requiring evaluation and/or treatment in the critical care area of 
the Children's Hospital ED. This archival data was part of a pre-existing data set that 
Children's Hospital collected for medical education and quality improvement. I was able 




video is routinely reviewed by patient safety staff for quality assurance purposes. I was 
able to ask them for video that focused on particular issues (for example, codes that 
involved healthcare providers from different disciplines) or that matched times when I 
had been doing observations in the ED. I sampled video collected at various times in the 
ED over a period of approximately five months (from March 2008 to July 2008). In total, 
I watched approximately 20 hours of ED video (videos ranged in length from 12 minutes 
to over an hour).  
Data analysis: I followed LeBaron‟s recommendations (2007) about coding 
video – I began by logging the video, flagging general moments of interest and searching 
for instances of my phenomenon, giving special attention to boundary moments (such as 
opening, closings, and transitions), marked moments (where subjects indicate to each 
other that the moments are important), tensions and paradoxes. Once moments were 
selected, I transcribed the video. For confidentiality reasons, I was the only person who 
could view and transcribe these videos (i.e. I could not have research assistants code them 
as well). From a technical standpoint, it was quite difficult to transcribe these videos. 
There were usually multiple actors talking at the same time and the environment of the 
trauma bay was an extremely noisy one.  
I used March Evidence Reader to view the ED video (it was encrypted and could 
only be seen through this software) and QSR International‟s NVivo 8 to manage and 
analyze my field notes and transcripts from the ED video. I iterated between analyzing 
video and gathering and analyzing field observations until I reached theoretical 
saturation. Once I had a sense of what updating looked like and when and how it 




how updating was accomplished around a patient‟s changing medical condition by the 
healthcare providers as they performed their everyday work. As I began to review the 
video, I was first overwhelmed by the chaos and noise in the setting. Eventually, I began 
to see patterns of interactions amongst the chaos. I tried to identify what the healthcare 
providers were doing to actually be able to accomplish their work in this setting. As I 
continued to review video and began non-participant observations in the ED, I realized 
that healthcare providers recognized the difficulties associated with updating as they 
themselves were often overwhelmed by the setting. With this insight, I began to look for 
behaviors common between different healthcare providers that addressed the challenges 
to updating.  
ED observations 
Data sample and collection: I began with a brief period (two weeks) of general 
observations (in order to understand how the ED was configured, what types of 
healthcare professionals worked where, workflow, etc). I then engaged in approximately 
four months of non-participant observation in the ED (from April 2008 – July 2008). My 
observations generated hundreds of pages of field notes.  
In the pilot study for my dissertation, I had tried a variety of different approaches 
to non-participant observations and found that it was most helpful to shadow specific 
healthcare providers (particularly resident or attending physicians) as they worked. I 
shadowed healthcare providers because I was interested in observing their understanding 
of the patient‟s trajectory of care as it unfolded over time. Much of the time I shadowed 




responsible for altering the patient‟s trajectory of care and were the individuals to whom 
the other healthcare providers reported.  
A key difference in my study, in contrast to other researchers who have employed 
shadowing (i.e. Fletcher, 1999), was that I was unable to take notes while observing. 
There were two reasons why I did not take notes in the field – one practical and the other 
theoretical: first, I was unable to obtain approval through IRB to take notes while 
observing; second, in conversation with other scholars who have experience with 
ethnographic observation in the ED (Hoff, personal communication) I was warned that 
taking notes in front of the participants would make people reluctant to speak freely. 
Instead, I trained myself to memorize dialogue, interactions, and patterns of events and 
would excuse myself at frequent intervals and go to my office (down the hall) to make 
field notes about my observations. When shadowing, I observed the participants as 
unobtrusively as possible. In order to learn more about what happened during a shift 
related to updating, I supplemented the shadowing with questions of clarification during 
the shift (if questions wouldn‟t disrupt workflow) or just after the shift. Detailed field 
notes were usually written immediately after the observations and no field notes were 
written more than twelve hours after observations. 
In this study, the goal of shadowing was to watch how updating unfolded from the 
perspective of a particular healthcare provider – for example, to observe how they spoke 
about and acted upon their understanding of a patient‟s diagnosis or to observe how they 
interacted with other healthcare professionals to make sense of the patient‟s symptoms or 
to accomplish the complex and interdependent work of patient care. I was particularly 




understanding of a patient‟s condition. The observations were conducted on a 
convenience sample i.e. the staff members observed will be those working during the 
shifts selected.  I sampled a full range of shifts – including daytime, night time and 
overnights, weekdays, weekends, and holidays – but found shifts later in the day to be 
more generative for observations as the ED tended to be busier then. 
ED employees were considered a vulnerable population, so I took several steps to 
protect them. First, I spoke with key personnel and got their “buy-in” for the study. 
Second, I attended multiple staff meetings for various ED healthcare providers to tell 
them about the study and also sent out focused emails and put flyers in their mailboxes. 
Third, I used a protocol that allowed staff to anonymously opt-out of observations if they 
were not comfortable being part of the study – in this study (as well as my pilot study), 
no staff ever opted out of observations.  
Data analysis: In keeping with the grounded theory methods described by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967), I used constant comparison to develop and verify concepts, and I 
shifted my sampling strategy (around where to focus my observations) accordingly. For 
example, I noticed that questions were emerging as an important factor in updating so I 
focused my observations on understanding what sorts of questions people asked, who 
asked questions, what function questions served, and so on.  
Just as I looked for key moments in the video – boundary moments, marked 
moments, tensions or paradoxes – I coded my field notes for moments that seemed 
striking. Boyatzis (1998) refers to these moments that are striking as “code-able” 
moments – either because they seem interesting or because they seem recurrent or basic. I 




theoretical insight, and then returned to the data for further analysis and coding based on 
the new insights that I developed. As well, I followed the recommendations of Miles & 
Huberman (1984) to look for outliers, negative cases, rival explanations, and other 
discrepant information. As I collected and analyzed the data, I also regularly wrote 
analytical memos, which were short notes that captured my impressions, emerging 
insights, questions, and puzzles as I made sense of the data (Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
As my observations and analyses continued, I began to notice that how people 
interacted with each other influenced when and how updating occurred. As a result, I 
engaged in theoretical sampling and focused my observations around certain types of 
interactions – for example, for a period of time, I studied how people used questions to 
facilitate updating. After awhile, a certain type of interaction around requests or bids for 
attention emerged as key to updating. In this type of interaction, a team member who had 
a concern about the patient‟s trajectory of care would attempt to re-direct the attention of 
the team back to the patient‟s trajectory of care. For example, an individual healthcare 
provider might notice that the patient‟s clinical condition had worsened despite ongoing 
care and they would bring this concern to the attention of other team members.  
These requests for attention from a team member to other team members seemed 
analogous to the pattern of requests (bids) for emotional connection described by 
Gottman and colleagues (e.g., Bakeman & Gottman, 1997; Coan & Gottman, 2007; 
Gottman & DeClaire, 2001). Gottman et al. have developed a rich vocabulary for 
describing social interactions in marriages and elaborated a coding scheme for evaluating 
the process of “bids and turning,” which consists of bids for emotional connection and 




modified to examine bids for attention instead of emotional connection and so I 
developed a typology of bids for attention (and responses to those bids), which will be 
discussed in more detail in the findings. 
Even after I left the field, I continued to re-view the ED video and re-read my 
field notes. As I coded and re-coded data, my codes evolved over time – for instance, I 
initially had codes around distinct moments of revisiting and revising but eventually 
realized that it was often difficult to disentangle these moments and supplemented my 
analyses with more holistic codes that identified updating trajectories, sources of 
updating, impediments to updating, etc. In addition to supplementing my codebook with 
new codes, I also differentiated older codes into more precise categories – for example, 
near the end of my analyses, I divided my code on bids for attention into (1) sensemaking 
bids (an attempt to persuade other team members to recognize that there is a problem and 
revisit the trajectory of care) and (2) sensegiving bids (an attempt to persuade other team 
members to revise the trajectory of care in a particular way).  
Findings 
My findings are organized around my two research questions, “What does 
updating look like?” and “When and how does updating occur? First, my findings suggest 
that updating does occur as part of the everyday work of healthcare providers and is 
shaped by the contextual constraints of the ED. Second, I find that healthcare providers in 
the ED are acutely aware of the challenges to update and I identify three ways in which 
they attempt to proactively manage these challenges through (1) deliberately revisiting 
the trajectory of care and (2) surfacing expectations, and (3) communicating richly. 




with attention management and that social interactions – in the form of bids for attention 
(and responses to those bids) – shape whether and when revisiting and revising of the 
trajectory of care happens. Bids for attention occur when a team member attempts to 
focus the attention of the team on something they have noticed (or realized) with other 
members of the team, with the intent to have the team revisit (and possibly revise) the 
trajectory of patient care. These bids serve multiple purposes and can either be 
sensemaking or sensegiving in nature; as well, these bids vary in their explicitness. I 
illustrate these different types of bids and begin to explore their significance for updating.   
Updating was shaped by contextual constraints 
During my field study, I became aware of the influence of several additional 
features of the ED on the sensemaking and updating related to patient care. As mentioned 
previously, ED staff have limited control over the inputs of their work (i.e. the flow of 
patients), there is often little past history available on patients (especially if they are 
severely injured or cannot communicate for some reason i.e. are in a coma), there are 
significant time pressures (and the speed-accuracy tradeoff isn‟t one that healthcare 
providers want to – or can – make), and the staff are caring for multiple patients 
simultaneously (therefore, attention is divided amongst many patients, at varying stages 
of care) (Croskerry, Cosby, Schenkel, & Wears, 2009; Eisenberg et al., 2005).  
In particular, my findings suggested that updating was shaped by four aspects of 
patient care that were unique to the setting of the ED: (1) patient care in the ED has a 
variable tempo, (2) patient care in the ED is episodic, (3) patient care requires 
maintaining multiple sensemaking “threads
4
,” and (4) patient care aims toward accuracy. 
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First, patient care in the ED has a variable (but usually fast-paced) tempo, which 
fluctuates both within specific episodes of patient care and within the ED more generally. 
By tempo, I mean “the rate of activity” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 
2002). ED healthcare providers are very attuned to the tempo of their work. When the 
tempo is faster, staff (e.g., nurses and physicians) are “pulled” into the ED (in fact, the 
call schedule includes people assigned as “jeopardy” staff, which means that they can be 
called in to work if the ED gets too busy). When the tempo is slower, staff are called at 
home and told to report in later than the scheduled start of their shift because they aren‟t 
needed at that moment.  
Staff demonstrated their sensitivity to tempo in other ways. ED staff are 
superstitious about quiet times or lulls in pace: a fast way for a newcomer to the ED to 
earn a stern rebuke is to remark, “Oh, it seems quiet right now.” To which they respond, 
“Shh, don‟t jinx it” or “We don‟t say that word here” (that word refers to “quiet”). As 
well, staff – especially ED attendings and charge nurses (who are the nurses in charge of 
handling the flow of staff and patients in the ED) – are always aware of the backlog of 
patients waiting to be seen. Staff will regularly check the electronic patient registration 
system to see how many patients are “queued up” and waiting to be seen in the ED (even 
when they aren‟t working that shift, ED attendings often check the electronic “queue” – 
or list of patients registered but not yet seen – from the computers on their office desks!). 
These ebbs and flows in tempo shape the sensemaking and updating nested within patient 
care. For example, when the tempo is faster (either because of greater numbers of patients 
or because of higher complexity/acuity of care), there are increased sensemaking 




Second, patient care in the ED is episodic. In the ED, patients present to the ED 
for acute problems, are cared for by a set of healthcare providers they likely do not know 
and likely will not meet again, and then leave, sometimes with planned follow-up at their 
primary care provider‟s office or a specialist‟s office. The ED, traditionally, has been a 
place where “serious illness and injury were quickly addressed and, it is hoped, cured, 
with the patient admitted if necessary” (Siegel, 2004). Even though an increasing number 
of patients are using the ED not only for episodic care but also for ongoing care, EDs 
(and the systems that support them) are not designed well for continuity of care or patient 
follow-up (Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the 
United States Health System, 2007).  
Episodic care poses several challenges for sensemaking. First, episodic care is 
problematic in the face of evolving and progressive diseases. If the timeframe when 
patients are seen by healthcare providers is either too brief or too early in the progression 
of the disease (i.e. before the patient‟s condition “declares
5
” itself), it is often difficult for 
providers to accurately ascertain the cause of the patient‟s symptoms. In this case, 
patients often return to the ED for re-evaluation when their disease progresses. Second, 
episodic care interferes with the development of healthcare providers‟ skills as 
sensemakers. Because they only see patients for short periods of time and infrequently 
get feedback about the accuracy of their sensemaking, ED healthcare providers often 
have difficulty learning about their successes and failures of sensemaking and updating 
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 The language of a disease “declaring” itself is used by healthcare providers to capture the notion that 
diseases have natural histories (i.e. symptoms evolve in a predictable sequence over time). In the early 
stages, it is often difficult to determine what the cause of a patient‟s symptoms are but – over time – more 




(Chern, How, Wang, Lee, & Graff, 2005; Croskerry, 2000; Croskerry et al., 2009; Wears 
& Schiff, 2005).  
Third, patient care in the ED requires that healthcare providers create and 
maintain multiple sensemaking threads
6
. For example, a recent study on workflow in the 
ED by Levin and colleagues (2007) showed that, during high demand times (3-7pm on 
weekdays), the average treatment area census (number of patients receiving care) was 26 
patients and individual physicians were responsible for the care of up to 14 patients (it is 
worth noting that the ED in Levin et al.‟s (2007) study had an annual volume of 43,000 
visits per year, which is less than half the volume seen at my dissertation research site). 
While updating moments occurred within a specific patient‟s trajectory of care, 
healthcare providers care for multiple patients simultaneously and so their attention is 
divided amongst many patients. As a result, healthcare providers have to create and 
maintain many different sensemaking threads (one for each patient under their care, all of 
whom could be at differing stages of treatment). As well, because their attention is often 
split between patients, they are exposed to information discontinuously. When the ED 
became busier – either because there were an increased number of patients being seen or 
because the patients being seen were more complex – the sensemaking burden on staff 
also increased. Caring for multiple patients simultaneously has the potential to lead to 
information and interpretation overload (Sutcliffe & Weick, 2008). 
Fourth, in the setting of the ED, accuracy – as well as plausibility – mattered. In 
medicine, there is a saying, “When you hear hooves, think of horses, not zebras,” which 
is used to emphasize that – for medical diagnoses – common things are common. 
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However, the ED is an exception to this rule. In the ED, the trajectory of patient care is 
fundamentally about making sense of the patient‟s symptoms and providing the 
appropriate treatment as quickly as possible. In particular, the role of the ED healthcare 
providers is to rule out life-threatening illnesses, regardless of whether they are very 
probable (plausible). In this context, accuracy counts and even if the healthcare providers 
can‟t determine the diagnosis, the accuracy around appropriate treatment and disposition 
is very important.  
This focus on accuracy may seem out of keeping in terms of how sensemaking is 
usually described: Weick writes that sensemaking is about plausibility not accuracy 
(1995: 55). Furthermore, Weick and colleagues argue that “[s]ensemaking is not about 
the truth and getting it right” (Weick et al., 2005: 415). Yet this claim depends, in part, on 
what the focus or target of the sensemaking is. Certainly, for many situations, it may be 
that there is no right answer or underlying truth to discover. However, in many situations 
where sensemaking is the core of the work, the actors involved in sensemaking are trying 
to “get it right.” In medical diagnosis there is a paradox: the people engaged in 
sensemaking have a positivist orientation, even though the way in which they accomplish 
their work is socially constructed (Wears & Nemeth, 2007). It is this blending of the 
positivist (the belief that there is a right answer) along with the social constructionist (the 
way in which the diagnosis and treatment are negotiated through social interaction and 
interpretation) that makes this such an interesting context to study. 
Healthcare providers were aware of challenges to updating 
One of the dominant themes that emerged from my observations was that 




chaotic, so noisy, and so full of interruptions. It amazed me that anyone could get any 
sort of work done, let alone the type of complicated high-stakes work that ED healthcare 
providers perform. Healthcare providers were acutely aware that a patient‟s medical 
condition could evolve (or devolve) over time, sometimes changing quite precipitously. 
One senior ED physician described working in the ED this way:  
It‟s a crazy place, the longer you do it, the nuttier it seems.  It‟s amazing; it‟s 
amazing that anything gets done right…. I‟m not sure that people appreciate that; 
they understand that it‟s busy, they understand that it‟s hectic, they can see that 
it‟s hectic but the understanding that every patient is virtually entirely new and 
you are sorting out [patients] and the detail to which we have to sort things out 
now, compared to what it was ten or fifteen years ago. I mean, all the tests have to 
be sorted out. They [the patient] have to be wrapped up in a bow before they get 
admitted. Plus, you don‟t want to admit them until they actually have to be in the 
hospital because they‟ll just be waiting around for ten hours for a bed or using a 
bed that you want the next person to be in.  It‟s definitely become a harder and 
harder and harder job over time. 
 
One of the sources of scattered attention was interruptions. The ED is a context 
full of interruptions: phone calls from physicians outside the hospital requesting advice or 
requesting to transfer a patient to the ED, pagers going off, people interrupting to ask 
about administrative details or patients from another shift, etc. Healthcare providers are 
often frustrated by the number of interruptions; when I was collecting my field data, one 
of the physicians I was shadowing turned to me and said, “Make sure that you put 
interruptions in your paper” and went on to clarify that interruptions were one of the most 
challenging aspects of her job.  
There were certain times when interruptions were more troublesome than others. 
Interruptions were particularly problematic when they disrupted one healthcare provider 
relaying a patient‟s history and physical to another provider (either to get their opinion on 




site seemed to be that if someone had a question but the person they wanted to talk to was 
in the midst of a “report out” (when the story was being relayed), they would stand 
nearby until the report was completed and then ask their question. However, if their 
question was urgent, they would interrupt, usually apologizing as they did so. In one 
instance, I was watching a resident present a patient to the attending I was shadowing; 
during the discussion of this patient, another resident came over to the attending, touched  
her on the arm, and said “Sorry to interrupt but her BP [blood pressure] is 68/40.” This 
statement referred to another patient they shared in common; a BP of 68/40 is 
dangerously low. There was a brief conversation about what to do about the low BP i.e. 
whether the resident should start another IV, give more fluids, make sure steroids that had 
been ordered were given, order more lab tests to attempt to determine whether patient‟s 
condition was worsening, etc. Once this issue was addressed, the attending turned back 
toward the other resident they had been talking to. It took a minute to get back on track 
with the first presentation and to figure where they had left off in the patient‟s story.   
Not only was the timing of interruptions problematic, the sheer volume of 
interruptions created difficulty around sensemaking and updating. Healthcare providers 
often experienced multiple interruptions in a short period of time. Here is another 
example from my field notes:  
An ED attending was attempting to finish charting. She kept repeating, “Don‟t 
talk to me, I‟m trying to finish these charts” but still experienced multiple 
interruptions. Within a few minutes she had (1) a request from a ward clerk to 
sign off  (electronically) on a chart of the patient in B2 who was going upstairs to 
be admitted, (2) an outside phone call announced by colleague returning from 
cafeteria with caffeine-free diet coke that he had picked up for my attending (He 
asked, “Can you pick up 5025, I got paged when I was in line”), (3) a resident 
asking a question about how to sign off on a chart, (4) a self-interruption – she 
stopped her own flow of work and asked me “what tooth is this?” (I said incisor; 




adult ED physician moonlighting in the pediatric ED said that he never 
memorized the numbers because he rarely saw patients with all their teeth) and 
(5) another resident wanting to tell her about a patient they had seen.  
 
The result of these interruptions was that, very frequently, staff would lose their “train of 
thought” or forget to return to their original discussion or task (“Now, where were we?”). 
My observation that the ED is a context full of interruptions is in keeping with Chisholm 
and colleagues, who described the ED as “interrupt-driven” (Chisholm et al., 2000; 
Chisholm, Dornfeld, Nelson, & Cordell, 2001) and found, in one of their studies, an 
average of 30 interruptions (an event that briefly required the attention of the subject but 
did not require switching tasks) and 21 “breaks in task” (events that required the attention 
of a physician for greater than 10 seconds AND subsequently involved switching tasks) 
during an 180 minute observation period in the ED (Chisholm et al., 2000)! 
Another theme that emerged from my observations was that ED healthcare 
providers recognized that updating was difficult and proactively took steps to facilitate 
updating. By proactive, I mean “acting in anticipation of future problem, needs, or 
changes” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002). In particular, they 
deliberately revisited trajectories of care, they surfaced expectations to make it clearer 
when those expectations were being violated, and they enriched channels of 
communication. I focus on these three ways of facilitating updating because they touch 
on the three stages – scanning, interpreting, and acting – that link changes in the 
environment with changed behavior within organizations (Daft & Weick, 1984).  
Revisiting trajectories of care: One of the challenges for updating in a context 
like the ED, where attention is such a scarce resource, was staying on top of all the data 




“falling through the cracks” and regularly engaged in routines where they proactively 
revisited trajectories of care to determine if there had been any changes or developments 
that would necessitate revising the trajectory of care. By routines, I mean “repetitive, 
recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors” (Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003: 95). One example of a proactive updating routine recognized 
throughout the ED was called, “running the board
7
,” which involved various actors 
(usually physicians or nurses) running through the list of patients under the care of a 
particular physician or team to see whether each patient‟s condition had changed, 
whether lab or x-ray tests were back, etc.  
Here, one ED physician explained to me why regularly “running the board” was 
important for updating 
Ideally, I have the residents run the board with me every couple of hours, so that 
nobody gets lost.  It can happen.  You can get lost in the shuffle and before you 
know it, four hours have elapsed and, you know, “What happened to that person 
in room six?” 
 
Another ED physician talked about how he developed competency around proactively 
updating – here is an excerpt from my field notes:  
He said that before [the hospital had an electronic whiteboard] he had trouble with 
seeing a new patient, and another one, and another one. Now, he steps back and 
reads the monitor (all patients belonging to one doctor have the same color 
scheme, i.e. today‟s was white on green) and trained himself to go to the 
computer screen at regular intervals to ask, “What‟s happening with this person?” 
“How about this person?” Also, now, compared to previously, he feels much 
                                                 
7
 This phrase, “running the board” harkens back to the time when EDs had white dry-erase boards. At my 
dissertation site, they had recently converted from a white dry-erase board to a computerized “whiteboard.” 
Each staff member (physicans, nurses, etc) began each shift by signing into the electronic medical record 
system called EmStat, which is a commonly used ED information management system, and selected a color 
code that identified their patients that shift (for example, they could pick to have all their patient‟s flagged 
with black text on a white fill background or white text on a blue background). This system, amongst other 
functions, provided an electronic listing of all patients in the ED, along with the patient‟s assigned room 
number, test results that had been ordered (and the actual results when available), xray results (all images 




more on top of labs i.e. used to have residents come up to him saying, this lab is 
back, but now he is saying, “Have you seen this glucose?”  
 
It is important to note that the way that this proactive updating routine was enacted (i.e. 
the performative nature) varied somewhat from healthcare provider to healthcare provider 
but the principle underlying the routine (i.e. the ostensive nature) – in this case, to 
intermittently review the patient(s) under the care of the team – did not (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003). At my dissertation site, I found that the “running the board” routine 
could be enacted by the attending physician going through the list of patients on his or 
her own and checking in with various other staff members to see what was going on with 
the patient. The routine was also often enacted by dyads (i.e. attending and one resident) 
or by groups (i.e. the whole team got together to go through the list).  
ED staff also recognized that different types of patients called for different 
“thresholds” of updating. One ED physician said to me that he wondered if the “trigger” 
for updating ought to be set at a different threshold or point for each type of patient and 
suggested for acutely ill patients (for example, those who had been in a trauma), “You 
should be actively searching, you should be questioning. Asking, „Does anyone not agree 
with me?‟” In contrast, for less acute patients, he said that “If you try to constantly 
update, you can drive yourself crazy” 
Surfacing expectations: Another challenge in the ED was that patients often 
presented with symptoms that could be brought about by many different diseases – for 
example, the possible causes for joint pain and swelling in children ranges from benign 
(i.e. sprain or minor injury) to severe (i.e. infection in the joint or cancer). As such, ED 




patient‟s symptoms. I noticed that the ED was a context where healthcare providers often 
made explicit their expectations about how they thought that patient‟s symptoms, 
diagnosis, and treatment would unfold. Put another way, there was a lot of “thinking 
aloud
8
” about what ED healthcare providers would expect to find and what those findings 
might represent. For instance, I was shadowing an attending physician who was talking 
through the pros and cons for various diagnostic possibilities for a patient with petechiae 
(which are tiny round red spots from microscopic bleeding), “For a patient with 
petechiae…. What else could it be? Viral illness? Some kind of allergy? Kawasaki‟s? [a 
rare but serious disease that causes inflammation and damage to blood vessels, including 
those in the heart]... but we would need to have fever for Kawasaki‟s.” One important 
consequence of this type of “thinking aloud” was that underlying thought processes were 
articulated, making it easier for the various healthcare providers working together to 
notice when things diverged from or converged with the expected plan. 
There was another instance where ED staff were seeing a small boy of around 
four years old who presented with vomiting, fever, and headache but no diarrhea. Lab 
tests for two other common causes (strep throat and mono) of that constellation of 
symptoms were both negative. The ED attending explained to staff that if the patient 
developed diarrhea then the patient could be sent home with the presumed diagnosis of a 
viral illness but, if he did not develop diarrhea during the time he was being observed in 
the ED, then they would have to do more invasive diagnostic tests (to rule out more 
worrisome causes of vomiting, fever, and headache). One of the nurses, who knew that 
the other staff caring for the patient were wondering if the patient would develop 
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diarrhea, came bouncing up to the nursing station and announced that the patient had 
developed diarrhea. The staff literally did a happy dance, which they then qualified by 
saying that they weren‟t happy that the patient had diarrhea but they were happy to be 
able to make a relatively benign diagnosis.  
In addition (and this may be related to the fact that my dissertation site was a 
teaching hospital), ED attendings would often ask the staff they were supervising to make 
predictions about what they would expect to see and what results would change the 
trajectory of care. For example, attending physicians posed questions like, “Should we 
order CBC or not? Would it change what we‟re going to do?” or “What should we do if 
the urine comes back pristine?” There were many instances during my field study when 
there was a gap between what was expected and what was found: for example, an x-ray 
that was ordered to document the absence of a fracture returned showing – much to the 
surprise of the ED staff – that a fracture was present; a lab test ordered as part of a panel 
and expected to come back as negative returned as positive, causing staff to reconsider 
their earlier diagnosis; during the resuscitation of a baby who had stopped breathing, 
repeated blood gases returned with worsening parameters, indicating that the baby was, in 
fact, getting sicker despite an improved clinical appearance. Given that the literature 
suggests that sensemaking is frequently re-activated when expectations are violated 
(Klein et al., 2005; Louis, 1980; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), this technique of surfacing 
expectations before data became available seems like a useful way to heighten sensitivity 
to violated expectations.  
Communicating richly: One of the other challenges to updating in the ED was 




providers to communicate with each other and coordinate their actions. There were 
certain areas, like the trauma bays, where communication was especially problematic. For 
instance, during resuscitations in the trauma bay, it was common to have multiple 
simultaneous conversations in a small workspace, which meant that people were “talking 
over” one another, making it difficult to hear any one conversation. As well, during 
traumas, it was common for a single individual to be carrying on more than one 
conversation at a time – for example, with the patient and with another colleague – which 
made it difficult to follow what was happening in each conversation (as an everyday 
analogue, think of how difficult it is to follow the conversation when you are on the 
phone talking to one person and someone in the same room is also trying to have a 
conversation with you). 
Just as healthcare providers developed behaviors to deal with the problem of 
scanning for relevant information and interpreting clues, they also engaged in behaviors 
intended to help coordinate their actions. Particularly when they were in environments – 
such as the trauma bay – that made communication difficult, healthcare providers tended 
to communicate richly, augmenting the information that they conveyed through speech 
with other modalities of communication, like gaze or gesture. For example, healthcare 
providers would often precisely identify the person to whom they were speaking – for 
instance, by using someone‟s name or describing them (e.g., „you in the red shirt‟) or by 
using gestures or gaze (i.e. pointing at them or looking at them) to get their attention. 
Alternatively, they might use gestures to demonstrate what they wanted the target of their 
communication to do. For example, one attending physician wanted to upgrade a trauma 




this to the nurse who would send out the page by using a thumbs-up gesture on both 
hands, moving her hands upwards, as she said, “Upgrade the page – we need more 
helpers.” 
In addition to enriching the information they were sending out to others, they also 
engaged in practices meant to ensure that their communication (and the information they 
were conveying) had been received correctly. For example, there was a policy in the ED 
of using “repeat-backs” for medications. This routine meant that when a verbal order for 
a medication was given to a team member, that team member had to repeat back the order 
and receive confirmation from the person who had given the order that they had heard it 
correctly. This practice of repeat-backs (sometimes called “read-back”) is common in 
healthcare and other high-hazard environments, like nuclear power (Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 2008)      
In extremely chaotic situations, ED healthcare providers seemed to employ one of 
two strategies: they either amplified their communication (i.e. spoke more loudly) or they 
quieted the situation. Asking for quiet seemed to be most legitimate when the requester 
was an individual in a position of power (i.e. the attending physician or the recording 
nurse). One of the well-respected attending physicians told me (and I had also observed 
this) that he routinely spoke more softly than normal during codes so that people would 
have to be quiet in order to hear him. As well, I would often hear staff use the phrase, 
“Only one person at a time” or “Let‟s be quiet so that we can hear what x has to say. One 
recording nurse in particular would frequently say, “Let‟s be quiet so we can hear our 
marching orders,” referring to the summary and instructions that the attending physician 




Social interactions that shape updating 
The last major theme that emerged during this study was the fundamental role of 
social interactions for shaping updating. Patient care in the ED is, by its nature, complex 
interdependent work. It is very rare in the ED for a single healthcare provider to be able 
to re-evaluate a patient and change the trajectory of care on their own (even if they are 
the team leader, they might be able to order the change in trajectory but likely will not be 
able to carry out all the work to accomplish that change). This process of re-evaluating 
and possibly changing trajectory requires healthcare providers to articulate what they are 
thinking and then to navigate together, if necessary, toward a new understanding of the 
patient‟s condition. This process of revisiting and revising the trajectory of care requires 
coordination. There are numerous definitions of coordination (e.g., Crowston, 1997; Faraj 
& Xiao, 2006; Malone & Crowston, 1994; Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 
2008) but, in the context of the ED, both coordination of activity and expertise are 
required. Therefore, when I use the term coordination, I conceive of coordination broadly 
and mean, “team-situated interactions aimed at managing resource and expertise 
dependencies” (Faraj & Lee, 2000: 1555).  
Bids for attention: One of the main challenges of updating is focusing the 
attention of the team on an issue that may require revising the trajectory of care. In this 
section, I focus on a particular type of “team-situated interaction” that emerged as key for 
coordinating and shaping updating: bids for attention and the responses to those bids. A 
bid for attention is an attempt by a team member to share something they have noticed (or 
realized) with other members of the team, with the intent to have the team revisit (and 




attempted to bring an issue of concern to the attention of the team and bids took many 
different forms. Bids for attention were usually verbal – for example, a team member 
might say, “The patient doesn‟t seem to be responding to our treatment – can we take a 
step back and look at what‟s going on?” – but bids could also include non-verbal gestures 
– for example, a team member might touch another team member on the arm to get their 
attention. Bids were more than information exchange; they served to shape meaning-
making and to shape action. In my analysis, I found that bids varied in terms of their 
nature (sensemaking or sensegiving) and varied in terms of their explicitness (implicit or 
explicit). From my data, I developed a typology of bids (see Figure 4.3). I begin by 
defining terms and then illustrate each category with examples. 
Bids varied around whether they were sensemaking or sensegiving. Remember 
that sensemaking occurs when “people organize to make sense of equivocal inputs and 
enact this sense back into the world to make that world more orderly” (Weick et al., 
2005: 410). In contrast, recall that sensegiving is, “the process of trying to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 442). Please note that – in the context 
of complex interdependent work – bids for both sensemaking and sensegiving involve 
attempting to persuade others to pay attention. The difference between sensemaking and 
sensegiving bids is that sensemaking bids are an attempt to persuade other team members 
to recognize that there is a problem and to engage in sensemaking (i.e. revisit the 
trajectory of care and re-activate sensemaking), while sensegiving bids are an attempt to 




convince other team members that the bidder‟s redefinition of reality is the most 
plausible one). 
To illustrate, the conversation I related on p. 61 about interruptions – “Sorry to 
interrupt but her BP [blood pressure] is 68/40” – is an example of a sensemaking bid. 
This statement is a bid because the resident was deliberately bringing a new symptom to 
the attention of other team members (an alternate response, upon hearing the blood 
pressure was 68/40 might have been to dismiss it as a concern or to address the issue 
herself but, instead, she brought her concern back to the team). This statement is a 
sensemaking bid because the person bidding didn‟t put forward any particular plan for 
what was causing the patient‟s symptoms or what ought to be done about them but, 
instead, was engaging other team members (particularly her attending physician) in 
making sense of what they should do about the patient‟s trajectory of care, given this new 
symptom of low blood pressure.  
Contrast that sensemaking bid with a sensegiving bid: during my observations, a 
nurse came up to where the physicians were working and said, “I‟m worried this patient 
has appendicitis.” This statement is a bid because the nurse is attempting to persuade 
other team members to revisit and revise the trajectory of care. This statement is a 
sensegiving bid because the bidder has already developed a theory about the cause of the 
patient‟s symptoms and is attempting to influence others on the team to revise the 
trajectory of care in a particular direction (in this case, a concern that the patient has 
appendicitis means revising the trajectory of care and consulting the surgeons because 




Bids for attention also varied in terms of their explicitness, ranging from implicit 
to explicit. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2002) defines explicit as “fully 
revealed or expressed without vagueness; leaving no question as to meaning or intent” 
and the Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms (1984) clarifies that explicit, 
“implies such verbal plainness and distinctness that there is no need for inference and no 
room for difficulty in understanding.” Implicit is the antonym of explicit and is defined as 
“contained in the nature of something although not readily apparent.” By definition, 
implicit bids are more subtle and equivocal than explicit bids. To illustrate the difference, 
I draw on a common situation that occurs during resuscitations: a nurse thinks that the 
trajectory of care for a patient needs to be modified, specifically that a certain medication 
or treatment should be given to the patient but this nurse does not have the authority to 
order it him or herself so has to bring this concern to the team. An example of an explicit 
bid around this issue is, “I think this patient needs fluids” vs. an implicit bid, “Would you 
like to give fluids?” 
Sometimes implicit and explicit bids were combined in sequence. Here is an 
illustration of how an ED nurse used an explicit sensemaking bid (“I think it is a stye”) 
followed by an implicit sensegiving bid (“Would you like a warm compress?”) to shape 
the revisiting and revising of a patient‟s trajectory of care. This excerpt from my field 
notes comes from the case of a 23 month old female with a swollen eye. Various 
diagnoses for the swollen eye were being considered, including a bug bite that had gotten 
infected or a mild pre-septal cellulitis (an infection of the eyelid and surrounding tissue). 




having difficulty seeing the affected part of the eyelid (it was encrusted with pus). Here is 
an excerpt from my field notes:  
When the ED nurse was done [cleaning the eye], she came back up to the area 
where the resident was sitting and working on the computer and said “It looks like 
a stye,” going on to explain that she‟d cleaned up the eyelid and there was a hard 
round white area with purulent drainage. She (the nurse) then asked, “Would you 
like a warm compress?” [which is the appropriate treatment for a stye]. The 
resident went in to check and came back out saying that she agreed.  
 
It was interesting that later, when the resident was telling the attending about the patient 
that she said (also), “I think it‟s a stye” – instead of, for example, “The nurse noticed 
during the cleaning that it likely was a stye and I agree.”  
Responses to bids: Earlier, I introduced a typology for classifying bids for 
attention. My study also suggests that there are different types of responses to bids (see 
Figure 4.3): positive responses, which build on the bid; neutral responses which either 
don‟t acknowledge the bid or acknowledge the bid but don‟t build upon it, and negative 
responses, which belittle or criticize the bid (and were extremely uncommon). 
First, I share an excerpt from my field notes that shows multiple positive 
responses to bids for attention. This sequence comes from the ED video in the trauma 
bay.  
A nine day old male was brought into the STS in respiratory arrest (i.e. not 
breathing). The team intubated the patient and, although the intubation initially 
went smoothly, soon afterward the O2 saturations began falling precipitously. The 
trauma nurse in charge of airway noticed the O2 sats were falling and began to 
verbalize what she was doing to fix the problem (i.e. “I‟ve repositioned the head,” 
“I‟ve checked MAP placement”). As the trauma nurse continued to make changes 
intended to improve the O2 sats, the sats continued to fall. The attending said the 
number outloud: “55” (indicating that the O2 sats were 55%), then said the 
number again and touched the airway nurse‟s arm to get her attention. The 
resident, who was overhearing this conversation, turned to look at the O2 sat, said 
“Is that real?” (referring to the O2 sat reading), and immediately began to re-





You will notice several interesting things about this example. First, the team is able to 
stay flexible and update the trajectory of care in an effective manner. Second, there are 
multiple bids for attention, in particular by the trauma nurse (who was narrating what she 
was doing to fix the problem of the low O2 sats) and the attending physican (who built on 
the initial bid around the low O2 and let the trauma nurse know, through saying “55” and 
by touching her arm that the trajectory continued to worsen). As well, the resident 
responded positively and immediately to the bid regarding the patient‟s precipitously 
declining respiratory status and took action to change the trajectory of care (re-intubated 
the baby). 
 Often, however, bids for attention were not received as positively. If a bid for 
attention was ignored or belittled, the team member making the bid then either (1) 
persisted in their bidding attempt (i.e. re-bid), (2) potentially escalated their bid for 
attention, (3) attempted to strengthen their bid (i.e. recruited others on team to consider 
re-evaluation
9
), (4) performed an “end-run” and went above the team leader (this very 
rarely occurs) or (5) ceased bidding.  
Next, I present an example where the healthcare provider making the bid for 
attention was initially rebuffed but persisted and eventually the bid for attention was 
granted. One of the best illustrations of this type of bid and response came during the 
pilot study for my dissertation and so – because it is such a good example – I include it 
here. I was observing a code on a middle-aged gentleman who had been brought into the 
ED in full arrest (no respirations or cardiac activity). The patient was originally in 
pulseless electrical activity (PEA), which means that although a cardiac rhythm is 
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detected on the monitor, the heart is not pumping efficiently enough to cause blood to 
circulate in the body (i.e. the patient is pulseless). The staff were following the standard 
Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) protocol for PEA. One of the important steps in 
a resuscitation is to stop intermittently to determine whether the patient is responding to 
treatment – in particular, whether the patient regains a pulse following the administration 
of various medications (and electrical shocks). It is important to determine whether the 
patient has a pulse because the management of a patient with and without a pulse is 
significantly different. In this case, the resident and attending physician felt that the 
patient had no pulse but one of the nurses was insistent that she could feel a pulse. The 
nurse kept saying, “Come over here, where I am standing, so you can feel the pulse here 
(pointed to the patient‟s wrist).” The physicians complied with her request but still stated 
that the patient did not have a pulse. The nurse was convinced that the patient did have a 
pulse. Finally, the nurse requested that the resident go and get an ultrasound machine to 
visualize quickly at the bedside whether there was cardiac activity. Eventually, it was 
determined that the nurse was, in fact, correct and the patient had a weak but detectable 
peripheral pulse. However, the nurse needed to be very assertive in this situation to get 
the physicians to believe her assessment of the situation.  
Lastly, sometimes bids for attention are unsuccessful. As mentioned previously, if 
the initial bid is ignored or dismissed, the healthcare provider must make the choice 
whether they wish to bid again. They can choose to persist or escalate their bid. But, 
eventually, if their bid does not elicit a positive response, then they may stop bidding for 
attention. At my dissertation site, there was a tragic example of an unsuccessful bid for 




a motor vehicle accident. The staff caring for the patient were having difficulty gaining 
venous access (i.e. trouble placing a central IV). They were focused on gaining access 
and were paying less attention to other aspects of the patient‟s care. One of the residents 
on the patient care team kept saying, “I think this patient has a pelvic fracture” but was 
unable to gain the attention of other members on her team. As a result, the team did not 
revisit the diagnosis and the patient was not treated as if he had a pelvic fracture. 
Unfortunately, the resident was correct – the patient did have a pelvic fracture, which is a 
medical emergency, requiring immediate surgical attention (fractures of big bones, such 
as the pelvis, can cause massive internal bleeding), and the patient died. This case is an 
example of successful individual updating but unsuccessful updating at the level of the 
trajectory of care. 
Having presented my findings, I now turn to a discussion.  
Discussion 
In this study, I begin to sketch a portrait of updating as it was accomplished as 
part of the everyday work of healthcare providers. In doing so, I join a small but growing 
set of organizational researchers who study the processes that underpin the 
accomplishment of complex interdependent work as it occurs in organizational settings 
(e.g., Bechky, 2006; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Klein et al., 2006; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007; Obstfeld, 2001; Patriotta, 2003; Schulman et al., 2004; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). My field study sets out to answer the research questions, “What does 
updating look like?” and “When and how does updating occur?” I found that updating 
was indeed part of the everyday work of healthcare providers but that updating was a 




In the ED, healthcare providers were aware of the importance of and challenges to 
updating and engaged in behaviors to proactively address these challenges, including 
deliberately revisiting the trajectory of care in order to monitor how the patient was 
doing, surfacing expectations in order to highlight when findings diverged from what had 
been anticipated, and communicating richly in order to facilitate communication and 
coordinate action. I found that social interactions – in the form of bids for attention – 
were a key way in which individual team members brought issues of concern around the 
patient‟s trajectory of care to the attention of the team. In a context where attention was a 
scarce resource, social interactions that helped manage the flow of attention within the 
team by directing attention to areas of concern were vitally important. I also found that 
bids for attention were not straight-forward exchanges of information but, instead, were 
important pathways for sensemaking and sensegiving around the trajectory of care. 
Contribution to the sensemaking literature 
My study makes a number of contributions to the sensemaking literature. 
Historically, the sensemaking literature has primarily considered how (1) sensemaking 
around a particular set of circumstances is activated by jolts (Meyer, 1982), surprise 
(Louis, 1980), gaps (Cowan, 1986; Klein et al., 2005), or violated expectations (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007), or (2) how sensemaking continues to unfold over time (Weick, 1995). 
There has been little discussion of the processes that enable actors to revisit and revise an 
already established trajectory of cognition and action.  
I argue that updating is a particular aspect of sensemaking. While naïve 
sensemaking creates meaning out of chaos and establishes a trajectory of cognition and 




and revise actions and cognitions already in motion. There is an element of comparison 
and evaluation in updating that is absent from naïve sensemaking. To clarify, when I use 
the term naïve sensemaking, I do not mean that sensemaking has emerged from some sort 
of experiential vacuum – of course, the actors were engaged in a flow of activities from 
which they had to extract cues (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) – instead I mean naïve 
in the sense of new sensemaking that initiates a trajectory of cognition and action. For 
example, in the ED naïve sensemaking occurs when a patient presents for care and 
healthcare providers must determine the answers to the two sensemaking fundamental 
questions, “What‟s the story” and “Now what do I do” (Weick et al., 2005: 410), and 
establish an initial trajectory of care for the patient; in contrast, updating involves 
revisiting that already established trajectory of care to determine whether revision is 
necessary. This distinction between naïve sensemaking and updating is important because 
there is evidence to suggest that once a trajectory of cognition and action is underway, it 
is extremely difficult to make changes (Davies, 1997; Keil, 2006; Salancik, 1977a).  
Second, my study contributes to our understanding of how sensemaking and 
updating occur in a context with multiple sensemaking demands. The ED is a setting in 
which there are large amounts of available information, there are frequent interruptions 
and distractions, the “signal to noise” ratio is low, and the consequences for missing a 
diagnosis are profound (Eisenberg et al., 2005) and oftentimes the “amount of input to a 
system exceeds its processing capacity (Speier, Valacich, & Vessey, 1999),” which is one 
of the definitions of overload (Sutcliffe & Weick, 2008: 3). My findings highlight that 
caring for multiple patients simultaneously and, as a consequence, having to maintain 




However, ED staff seem to recognize the challenges involved in processing large 
amounts of information and employ proactive behaviors to manage these challenges. In 
particular, their behaviors of regularly scanning the environment (revisiting the trajectory 
of care), facilitating interpretation (through surfacing expectations), and coordinating 
action (through rich communication), helps mitigate potential information and 
interpretation overload (Sutcliffe & Weick, 2008) 
Third, my findings draw attention to the importance of considering how often 
team members influence the sensemaking of others on the team. Recall that sensegiving 
is defined as “the process of trying to influence the sensemaking and meaning 
construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991: 442). Much of the literature on sensegiving has focused on top-down 
sensegiving – i.e. how leaders (Bartunek, Krim, Necochea, Humphries, & Wagner, 1999; 
Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia & Thomas, 1996) or other 
individuals in positions of authority (i.e. middle managers, Balogun, 2003) shape the 
sensemaking of subordinates in the organization – but relatively little has been written 
about bottom-up or peer-peer sensegiving. Two other literatures also concerned with 
influence and persuasion – the literature on issue selling, which considers “individuals‟ 
behaviors that are directed toward affecting others‟ attention to and understanding of 
issues” (Dutton & Ashford, 1993: 398), and the literature on employee voice, which 
considers why and when employees proactively make suggestions for change (e.g, 
LePine & Van Dyne, 1998) – have examined when and how individual employees raise 
issues of concern about work to senior management. Whereas these literatures have 




factors that contribute to speaking up or remaining silent, my findings point toward the 
importance of studying the interactional moves that actually influence the meaning-
making process of others.  
Last, my findings suggest that updating is also shaped by the relative power or 
status of various members of the team. Conversations in the sensemaking literature are 
beginning to incorporate discussion around how power and status shapes the construction 
of meaning-making but this remains an under-explored area of sensemaking research 
(Weick et al., 2005: 418). Although my research is exploratory, my field study suggests 
that status shapes how team members make bids for attention. For example, team 
members engaging in explicit bids tended to be in roles that have been traditionally 
considered higher-status (i.e. physicians), whereas team members who engaged in 
implicit bids (particularly, implicit sensegiving bids) tended to be in roles that have 
traditionally been considered slightly lower in the healthcare status hierarchy (i.e. nurses). 
Healthcare is an extremely hierarchical setting, and this hierarchy often interferes with 
communication (Sutcliffe, Lewton, & Rosenthal, 2004). Future research is required to 
explore how issues of power and status influence how sensegiving and sensemaking bids 
are used to influence updating a patient‟s trajectory of care.  
Contributions to the adaptation and coordination literature 
My findings also contribute to the adaptation and coordination literatures. There is 
a long-standing focus in organizational research around how organizations and the actors 
within them respond to changes in their environment (Thompson, 1967). As work has 
become more complex, fast-paced, and interdependent, there has been a renewed focus 




manage unexpected events (e.g., Burke et al., 2006; Gittell, Seidner, & Wimbush, 2008a; 
Griffin et al., 2007; Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999; LePine, 1998; Pulakos et 
al., 2000; Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 2004; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). In a recent review 
of the literature on team adaptation, Burke et al. (2006) highlight the dearth of research 
on understanding the team processes associated with adaptation and call for more 
research on this topic.  
My field study points out the difficulties of such adaptation and coordination in a 
context where attention is a scarce resource, where work is complex and interdependent, 
and where failures of adaptation and coordination are costly. I find that healthcare 
providers are able to direct the flow of attention within the team to issues of concern 
through bids for attention. These bids can be made in various ways, from implicit to 
explicit, and serve various purposes either by attempting to refocus the attention of the 
team on revisiting the trajectory of care and re-activating sensemaking (sensemaking bid) 
or by attempting to influence the revising of the trajectory of care in a particular direction 
(sensegiving bid). As well, I suggest a spectrum of responses to bids for attention, 
ranging from a positive response, in which other team members build upon the initial bid, 
to a negative response, where the other team members belittle or criticize the bid.  I draw 
attention to the role of social interactions and propose these different types of bids for 
attention and the responses to those bids as the building blocks of updating.  
As a brief, but important, aside: please note that my typology of bids and 
responses does not imply or assert appropriateness to either bids or responses, but merely 
categorizes actions in terms of the responses they elicit. By that I mean, I am not claiming 




voice literature that not all voice is salutary (Campbell, 2000; Grant & Ashford, 2007). 
Likewise, I do not make the claim that a positive response to a bid is always appropriate – 
there may be circumstances in which a particular bid ought to be ignored or disregarded. 
Findings from my field study suggest that updating is shaped through more or less 
generative sequences of interaction. I use the phrase “generative” to indicate that there 
were some patterns of interactions that seemed to generate more resources for meaning-
making and for action. In bringing attention to the types of social interactions between 
team members that seem fundamental to updating, I draw on a long tradition of scholarly 
work that takes seriously the notion that the quality and frequency of interactions 
between teams members has important consequences for the ability of teams to detect 
errors and adapt to changing circumstances (Campbell, 1990; Gittell, Weinberg, 
Pfefferle, & Bishop, 2008b; Vogus, 2004; Waller, Uitdewilligen, & Zijlstra, forthcoming; 
Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick et al., 1999; Weick et al., 2005). Concepts such as 
“heedful interrelating” or “respectful interacting” are frequently used to describe how 
actors create joint action or joint meaning, however few scholars have attempted to 
measure these constructs and link them to performance outcomes (for exceptions see, 
Gittell et al., 2008a; Vogus, 2004; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). By identifying bids as 
building blocks for updating, I hope to be able to gain an empirical toe-hold and make 
progress in my lab study in developing a more nuanced understanding of how various 
types of interactions lead to more or less effective updating. 
Last, my focus on interactions raises the question of whether interactional 
competence matters for adaptation and coordination and whether teams can learn how to 




“interactional competence” is one that I developed as an analogue to other competencies, 
intending to point out the importance of developing competence around interacting. I use 
the term “interactional competence” instead of other terms, such as “relational 
coordination” – the “mutually reinforcing process of interaction between communication 
and relationships carried out for the purpose of task integration" (Gittell, 2002: 301) – or 
“relational competence,” because I cannot presume relationships between team members 
in the ED. The term “interactional competence,” it turns out, is also used by scholars who 
are interested in the social nature of language and interaction (Sanders, 2007; Young, 
2000). In this usage, interactional competence captures the notion that (1) social realities 
are constructed through discourse, (2) the context that discourse takes place in matters, 
(3) discourse is social action, and (4) meaning is negotiated in interaction (Young, 2000). 
These characteristics, although from an entirely different field, speak to many of the 
dimensions of the competence around interactions that seems important from my field 
study.  
Limitations and Future Research 
There are several important limitations to this work. First, my data are collected in 
a dynamic high-risk setting where workers were acutely aware of both the importance of 
and challenges to updating and engaged in proactive behaviors to address these 
challenges. It may be that in less dynamic, less high-risk settings, workers may be less 
aware of the importance of updating and may exhibit different behaviors around 
updating. Although it is appropriate for exploratory inductive research to be conducted in 
an extreme setting (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), future research should focus on exploring 




related to updating. Second, I investigate updating at the level of analysis of team 
performance (the trajectory of care for the patient). In studying updating as it is 
accomplished as part of everyday work, there is also merit to understanding more deeply 
individual-level and organizational-level variables that affect the unfolding of updating, 
however my data does not speak to these. Third, field research is useful for creating a rich 
portrait of how updating is accomplished as part of everyday work but it is difficult to 
determine what patterns of interactions are more or less effective, for example, because 
there is no way for the researcher to know how well teams are doing in terms of their 
performance of updating (the referent around which they are updating is unknown). My 
next chapter addresses this concern and I study updating in the simulation lab, which 






















































Team leader and other team 
members grant attention













Updating in the Lab 
In the previous chapter, I described how updating was accomplished as part of the 
everyday work of ED healthcare providers. From my field study, I recognized the 
importance of social interactions, particularly those that shaped the patient‟s unfolding 
trajectory of care. I developed theory around a certain type of social interaction – bids for 
attention and the responses to those bids – that seemed important for updating that I 
wanted to explore further. Building on the previous chapter, I continue my exploratory 
inductive study of updating and I expand upon the theoretical insights derived from my 
field work. To do so, I examine the same type of everyday work (caring for patients in 
crisis) performed by the same personnel (ED and Trauma Team healthcare providers) in a 
much more controlled setting: the simulation lab, which allows me to study updating as it 
unfolds in real-time as part of everyday work and also affords me the ability to assess the 
effectiveness of updating, something that is almost impossible to gauge in the field.  
 There have been a range of different types of studies to investigate updating (or 
lack thereof), including experiments (e.g., Davies, 1997; Staw, 1976), field studies (e.g., 
Bosk, 1979; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Klein et al., 2005; Maitlis, 2005), interviews (e.g., 
Paget, 1988), mathematical models (e.g., Rudolph, Morrison, & Carroll, forthcoming),
retrospective case studies (e.g., Vaughan, 1996; Weick, 1988; e.g., Weick, 1990, 1993; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003), and simulation lab evaluations (e.g., LePine, 1998; Rudolph, 




because it is difficult to anticipate when updating might occur (and be present to observe 
it), there is little opportunity to compare and contrast performance, and it is often difficult 
to know whether updating is being effective (the exception in the above list are the 
simulation lab studies). Therefore, in this study, I exploit the features of simulation lab to 
gain deeper insight into patterns of more and less effective updating. The simulation lab 
is a setting that replicates the type of work that healthcare providers are normally engaged 
in and mimics the experience that they have during their day to day work (e.g., Devitt, 
Kurrek, Cohen, & Cleave-Hogg, 2001) yet allows the researcher to also study the 
efficacy of updating.  
The full potential of the simulation lab for studying updating (and related 
constructs, such as resilient organizing) has not yet been realized. In medicine, the 
original research in simulation labs focused on whether healthcare providers could learn 
how to do procedures in a lower-risk (i.e. lab) setting. There is a large body of evidence 
to support that simulation training can enhance task performance (e.g., Lee et al., 2003; 
McFetrich, 2006). It is only recently that the simulation lab has been used to investigate 
behaviors and interactions (i.e. safety organizing) and this type of research shows 
promise that experiences in the lab can influence clinical outcomes (e.g., Blum, Raemer, 
Carroll, Dufresne, & Cooper, 2005; Ruddy & Patterson, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2004). 
Likewise, in organizational research, past simulation studies have collected performance 
data  related to updating and associated performance with either individual level traits 
and team composition (LePine, 1998) or with frequency and timing of behavior (Waller, 
1999; Waller et al., 2004) but rarely with unfolding processes (exception, Rudolph, 




performance of teams engaged in the same task and, since most simulations are also 
video-taped, provides data about the moment-to-moment interactions that facilitate 
updating (or any other process of interest).  
 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of updating, I studied how ED healthcare 
providers, who were participating in simulation training, updated their understanding 
around a patient‟s changing medical condition and trajectory of care. More specifically, I 
compared and contrasted the performance of 24 teams of ED healthcare providers who 
participated in the same asthma simulation scenario. In my study, there was significant 
variance in performance around updating – for example, the time it took teams to 
complete the same updating element of the simulation (time to notice and fix a key piece 
of broken equipment) ranged from less than 30 seconds to almost 16 minutes. Based on 
their performance, teams divided into roughly three groups. One third of the teams were 
able to accurately and quickly update their understanding of the situation (9/24 or 38% of 
teams). One third of the teams updated their understanding much more slowly and often 
required a clue from a confederate to accurately update (7/24 teams or 29%). The 
remaining third were unable to update on their own (8/24 or 33% of teams).  
Based on my field work, I began this study with a set of assumptions around 
updating, particularly the importance of generative social interactions. In the lab, I found 
that social interactions were central to updating but, in addition, I found that two other 
types of interactions – specifically, interactions with the physical and cognitive 
environments that the individual team members are embedded in – were also key sites for 
emergent updating. I develop a model of updating as an interactional accomplishment 




updating was a result of a cumulative failure of these interactions, particularly the social 
interactions, which formed the foundation for updating. I begin by situating my research 
questions within the literature, provide more details about the context and method for this 
study, and the present my findings and conclusions. 
Observing updating 
As work becomes more complex and interdependent, there is increasing interest 
in learning about how teams update their understanding of evolving situations (Griffin et 
al., 2007; Pulakos et al., 2000; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) In my dissertation, I explore two 
inter-related questions: (1) how and when does updating occur, and (3) what do patterns 
of more and less effective updating look like? These questions related to how updating is 
accomplished as part of complex interdependent work lie at the intersection of the 
sensemaking (e.g., Weick, 1995; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al., 1999; Weick et 
al., 2005), the coordination literatures (e.g., Bechky, 2006; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Rico et 
al., 2008), and the adaptive team performance literatures (e.g., Burke et al., 2006; LePine, 
1998; LePine, 2003; LePine, 2005; Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 2004),  While the 
sensemaking literature presumes that updating occurs, the mechanisms through which it 
occurs remain underspecified (Weick et al., 2005). While the coordination literature 
begins to unpack the mechanisms behind updating, there is little comparative research 
examining what factors influence performance outcomes for teams engaged in identical 
tasks. While the adaptive team performance literature explores some of the antecedents, 
consequences, and timing of updating, there remains much to be learned about the 




This study begins to address those gaps in the literature. The study of updating as 
part of the everyday work of ED and Trauma Team healthcare providers offers insight 
into how updating unfolds in a setting where updating is both challenging yet critically 
important. Patient care is work that involves significant time pressures, where the stakes 
are high, and where many resources that facilitate team performance (for example, team 
familiarity) cannot be assumed to be present (Eisenberg et al., 2005). Recall that I have 
described teams of ED healthcare providers as “temporary action teams” (Faraj & Xiao, 
2006). The phrase, “temporary action teams” highlights two different yet important 
aspects of the care in the ED: the “action team” component consists of “highly skilled 
specialist teams cooperating in brief performance events that require improvisation in 
unpredictable circumstances” (Sundstrom et al., 1990: 121).  
One of the main challenges of updating (although it is true of many other aspects 
of complex interdependent work) is coordinating trajectories of cognition and action 
between various team members. Please note that, like Burke et al (2006) and Kozlowski 
et al (1999), I think of team performance NOT as a global property of the team but as 
“the pattern of unique lower level team member and dyadic contributions that compile to 
characterize adaptive team performance (Kozlowski et al., 1999)” (Burke et al., 2006: 
1192). Thus, I code for both individual actions as well as interactions between team 
members. Much of the literature on coordination and team performance assumes shared 
mental models (e.g., Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, 
& Cannon-Bowers, 2000)
10
. However, in practice, this assumption of shared mental 
models may not be appropriate. Certainly, the assumption of a shared mental model 
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cannot be made in the setting of the ED. Teams in the ED differ from teams in other 
settings, like the operating room (OR), in that team members are not necessarily familiar 
with each other and while they may share knowledge related to a patient‟s clinical care 
(i.e. what the standard asthma treatment is), they often lack knowledge of who knows 
what on any given team.   
Of course, team members with common professional training will have similar 
vocabulary and understandings but, even among professionals, mental models are often 
not shared and communication between different types of professionals is frequently 
complicated, fraught with misunderstanding, and often requires methods to facilitate 
conversation across professional boundaries (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Stasser & Titus, 
1985). More generally, members of teams do not have the ability – unless they have 
worked together for a long time and are able to anticipate each other‟s thoughts and 
actions – to know what other team members are thinking or feeling. Rather, team 
members rely on external signals – e.g., what other team members say and do, what 
markers of expertise team members display (Bunderson, 2003), and what roles they 
occupy (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996) – as the basis for their own thoughts and 
action. In essence, team members must draw upon their observations of interactions 
within a particular situation to shape their own future cognitions and actions. While I 
acknowledge the importance of what occurs at the intra-individual level (i.e. individual 
cognition, affect, motivation, ability), the focus of my study is the accomplishment of 
complex interdependent work, visible in the actions and interactions (i.e. articulated 
thoughts, actions to change the trajectory of care of the patient, etc) that shape updating 




Chapter-Specific Research Design and Methods 
Research context 
To learn more about patterns of effective and ineffective updating
11
, I wanted to 
be able to evaluate healthcare providers caring for patients in a context that replicated 
their usual work and where I could begin to evaluate the quality of their updating. This 
study of my dissertation uses data from the medical simulation lab. There are many 
advantages to using the medical simulation lab as a context in which to study updating. In 
general, it is simpler to observe updating in the lab – the healthcare providers are only 
caring for one “patient” so the trajectory of action and cognition around diagnosis is 
clearer, the time the patient is under their care is much shorter, and - most important – the 
researcher knows a priori what is wrong with the patient so can study not only when 
updating is occurring but when updating is not occurring but should be.  
My data for the lab chapter come from the same organization where I did my field 
work, Children‟s Hospital, a Midwestern research and teaching hospital that is routinely 
ranked among the top 10 pediatric hospitals in the US.  Specifically, the simulations took 
place at the Center for Simulation and Research on the Children‟s Hospital campus. This 
facility is a high-fidelity simulation lab, by which I mean that it replicates the normal 
work environment of the healthcare providers as closely as possible. It has the following 
characteristics: (1) the simulation takes place in an exact replica of the trauma bay at 
Children‟s Hospital, (2) the simulation scenarios are designed and performed by staff 
who are expert in both patient care and medical simulation (the Children‟s Hospital 
                                                 
11
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Center for Simulation and Research staff are experienced ED physicians, nurses, and 
EMTs with specialized training in designing and running simulations), (3) the simulations 
use a robotic mannequin that enables two-way communication with the healthcare 
providers (i.e. healthcare providers can ask questions of the “patient” and the Children‟s 
Hospital staff running the simulation can answer through a microphone embedded in the 
simulator), (4) the robotic patient is programmed to respond physiologically to 
interventions (medications/procedures, etc) the same way a human patient would and (5), 
the simulation lab is equipped with ceiling-mounted video cameras that record the 
simulations. It is important to also note that the simulation lab differs in at least 
significant way from the ED: in the simulation lab, staff are usually caring for only one 
patient at a time, which means that there are fewer interruptions and less potential for 
overload as fewer sensemaking threads are being maintained in the lab context.  
Data sample and collection  
For this study, I used an existing set of archival video data, which were collected 
over a period of approximately two and a half years (from July 2005 to March 2008). As 
part of ongoing evaluation, all ED and Trauma Team healthcare providers at Children‟s 
Hospital participated in simulation training. ED and Trauma Team healthcare providers 
were randomly assigned to interdisciplinary teams (i.e. teams consisted of a combination 
of attending physicians, fellows, residents, nurses, respiratory therapists, EMTs, etc). The 
participants in the simulation interacted with simulation staff employees and were able to 
ask them for assistance. For instance, they could request test results (i.e. after a chest x-
ray (CXR) was ordered in the simulation, a CXR film of a real patient with asthma was 




from anesthesiology would come to help). As well, simulation staff employees 
sometimes participated in the simulations, usually playing the role of the babysitter or 
parent of the child with asthma. Occasionally, especially if the team was small, one 
confederate would also participate as a member of the patient care team (there was no 
correlation between the presence of confederates and updating performance). Healthcare 
providers were aware that they were being videotaped and signed consent for the video to 
be used for teaching and educational purposes 
In total, 26 teams of ED healthcare providers participated in simulation training. 
Each team spent two days together at the simulation lab and – out of 15 possible different 
simulation scenarios – participated in an average of six simulations  (average = 6.08; 
median = 7; min = 3; max = 8). The set of simulations that each team participated in 
varied from team to team but teams shared multiple scenarios in common (complete list 
of simulation available upon request). Recall that one of my main goals for this study was 
to be able to contrast and compare the updating of various teams that were facing the 
same challenge to get a sense of what patterns of more or less effective updating looked 
like. Therefore, I chose to analyze the asthma simulations as all but one of the teams 
undergoing simulation training participated in this scenario (i.e. 25/26 teams; 24 asthma 
videos available for analysis
12
). In the asthma scenario, teams ranged in size from 4 to 8 
people (mean size 6.54; SD 1.35). The teams were predominantly female – of the 157 
participants, 130 (83%) were female and 27 (17%) were male. Figure 5.2 displays team 
composition, including number and gender of members – note that that while there were 
several (seven) all female teams, there were no all male teams.  
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The simulation training was designed to minimize external influences on 
performance outcomes. In order to minimize order effects, the various simulations were 
presented in random order over the two-day period (the order of the asthma scenario in 
the sequence of scenarios was not significantly correlated with any key performance 
outcomes, p = .05; I also checked to see if teams that did more scenarios – i.e. 7 scenarios 
vs. 3 scenarios – performed better and there was no correlation). In order to preserve the 
element of surprise for those participating in the simulation training later on, healthcare 
providers also signed confidentiality agreements promising not to divulge their 
experiences in the lab with others (there was no correlation, p = .05 between when 
training took place and performance i.e. going later in the training cycle did not improve 
teams‟ performance).  
In the simulation lab, the “patient” is programmed with a specific problem (or set 
of problems) that must be diagnosed and managed. In the asthma scenario, a small boy 
with a past history of asthma is brought to the ED with increasing difficulty breathing. As 
the scenario unfolds, the patient‟s asthma worsens to the point that he stops breathing. 
The team must appropriately diagnose and treat the patient‟s asthma, including assisting 
his breathing (when he is no longer able to breathe on his own). The additional challenge 
in this scenario is that one of the key pieces of equipment necessary to ventilate the 
patient is broken (the piece of equipment is called a bag valve mask and it is used to help 
the patient breathe). The team must figure out that the bag is broken and replace it, in 
addition to providing appropriate treatment for the patient‟s asthma. If they do not replace 
the bag, the patient cannot get oxygen and eventually goes into cardiac arrest and dies. 




successfully complete the simulation: the first updating is around a commonly expected 
event (a patient‟s condition worsens i.e. he goes into respiratory arrest) and the second 
updating is around a much less common event (equipment failure).  
Data analysis  
Data analysis involved multiple steps. First, a timeline and transcript (of speech 
and action) was created for each video. Second, codes from the codebook that had been 
created during the field study were applied (for example, codes around bids for attention, 
both implicit and explicit; positive, neutral, and negative responses, etc). Third, in 
addition to applying codes that had already been derived, grounded theory analysis of this 
video provided additional codes (for example, codes around re-bidding – or bidding again 
– were added). Fourth, preliminary statistical analysis augmented my qualitative analysis 
to explore the relationship between key variables. 
The 24 videos were all double coded: I coded all the videos and two research 
assistants coded half of the videos each. This double-coding technique is yet another 
strategy to increase the validity of my findings (Yin, 2003). The research assistants were 
blind to the hypotheses I had developed in my first study. Each video was transcribed in 
the following fashion: a timeline was constructed of key clinical events and updating 
moments and then a detailed transcript was created. The detailed transcript used a 
modified conversation analysis transcription of conversations and actions (refer to 
Appendix A for sample timeline). Coders identified the initial trajectory of care (in all 
cases, teams engaged in an asthma trajectory of care) and then noted all other possible 




Coders also noted the time when certain key events took place (see Figure 5.3 for 
a list of key events i.e. when patient became unresponsive, when someone on the team 
noticed that patient was unresponsive, when someone on the team first took action to 
address unresponsive patient, when bagging the patient started, etc). As well, intervals 
were calculated for key updating moments. For example, in the asthma scenario, there 
were two updating intervals calculated: first, the interval of time required to update the 
trajectory of care around the change in the patient‟s respiratory status from respiratory 
distress to respiratory arrest (which was the length of time between when the patient 
became unresponsive and when the team provided respiratory support i.e. starting 
bagging the patient) and, second, the interval of time require to update that the trajectory 
of care in the face of equipment failure (which was the length of time between when the 
team started using the broken bag and when they finally replaced the broken bag with 
another bag). Note: some teams noticed the patient was having increased difficulty 
breathing and start preemptively assisting the patient‟s respirations with the bag - for 
these teams, the updating interval was entered as zero seconds. 
After the annotated timelines had been created, I began to analyze the data using a 
modified grounded theory approach, following the guidelines suggested by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) and Miles and Huberman (1984). Because this research was an extension 
of my research in the ED, I initially coded the data around the categories of social 
interaction (bids for attention) that had emerged from initial field work as important. I 
trained my research assistants on each element of the codebook (including showing them 
examples of each code) and had them practice coding until an acceptable level of inter-




After the initial training, we continued to meet weekly to discuss any questions or 
concerns that had arisen and to resolve coding discrepancies. For example, at one of our 
coding meetings, we made the decision to also code bids from the patient or patient‟s 
family in addition to bids from other team members (an example of such a bid would be a 
patient‟s father, who asked staff, “Is he taking a nap?,” after his son had gone into 
respiratory arrest and become unresponsive, an event unnoticed by staff). As their coding 
skills developed, I had the coders go back and re-code the video they had done early on, 
so that the transcripts were uniform in quality. Once all transcripts were finalized and 
coded, I calculated Cohen‟s (1960) Kappa statistic of inter-observer agreement, which 
represents the proportion of joint judgments (codes) in which there is agreement, after 
chance agreement is excluded. The Cohen‟s Kappa for all codes were above .8, which is 
considered by Landis and Koch (1977: 165) to be “almost perfect.”  
As I continued to read over the transcripts, I noticed that other forms of 
interaction were generative for updating, particularly interactions with the physical 
environment. Recall that in my field chapter, I introduced the phrase, “generative 
sequences of interactions” to highlight that some types of interactions were generative in 
the sense of enabling rather than inhibiting the meaning-making and action of the team. 
After further reading, it became apparent that updating emerged in interaction with either 
the physical, cognitive, or social environments (or some combination these) in which the 
actors were embedded. I re-coded the video transcripts to identify the type of interaction 
that led to updating. In addition to re-coding the 16 video transcripts where effective 
updating did occur, I also re-read and re-coded the transcripts where effective updating 




sample of 24 teams. I constructed various ways of displaying the data, starting with a 
table and ending with a visual display in the form of a Venn diagram (discussed in detail 
in the findings section).  
In trying to understand how updating emerged through interactions, I re-read 
literature and sought out new literature to inform my theorizing (Eisenhardt, 1989a), 
including the language and social interaction literatures (Drew, Raymond, & Weinberg, 
2006; Glenn, LeBaron, & Mandelbaum, 2003), the behavioral research literatures 
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1997; Gottman & Roy, 1990), and the cognition in action  and 
shared cognition literatures (Levesque, Wilson, & Wholey, 2001; Levine, Resnick, & 
Higgins, 1993; Michel, 2007; Weick & Roberts, 1993). I found the literature on 
multimodality (Goodwin et al., 2008 (under contract); Streeck & Mehus, 2004) to be the 
most useful and complete framework because it included all three components of the 
environment (physical, cognitive, and social). Using the multimodal interaction 
framework as a guide, I began my final analysis of the data to determine the pathway of 
action (i.e. individual revisiting and revising trajectory of care on own, individual 
initiating revisiting but including other team members in revising, collective revisiting 
and revising) through which updating unfolded (or did not). 
I used QSR International‟s NVivo 8 to manage and analyze my qualitative data 
and SPSS 16 to analyze my quantitative data. NVivo 8 can manage text, audio, and video 
files and allows the researcher to create codes (known as “nodes”) which can be either 
free-standing or hierarchically related to each other. In addition, this newest version of 




data by various attributes (i.e. you can run various queries, for example comparing high 
and low performing teams and how explicit or implicit bids were coded, etc) 
Findings 
Overview 
Recall that my initial research questions were, “What does updating look like?” 
and “When and how does updating occur?” In order to answer these questions, I present 
my findings below beginning with a broad overview of the updating across the 24 teams. 
I then explore patterns of effective and ineffective updating, paying particular attention to 
the ways in which updating emerges in interaction and the pathways through which 
updating is accomplished.   
Updating was accomplished more or less effectively in a wide variety of ways. 
Even though all the teams were participating in the same simulation, there was marked 
variation in the performance of updating between teams (see Figure 5.4 for a comparison 
of performance measures for all 24 teams). Remember that there were two major events 
in this scenario that require updating the patient‟s trajectory of care: the first event was  
when the patient‟s medical condition deteriorated – i.e. the patient transitioned from 
respiratory distress (significant trouble breathing) to respiratory arrest (no longer 
breathing) – and the second event was when a key piece of equipment failed (the piece of 
equipment used to ventilate the patient – the  bag valve mask, sometimes called bag or 
bvm for short – did not work in this scenario, which meant that efforts to assist the patient 
with breathing were not effective). The first updating event seemed to be fairly 
straightforward for teams – in general, teams were able to update quickly around the 
change in respiratory status and provide assistance to the patient (mean time from when 




addition, a number of teams (8/24) anticipated ahead of time that the patient would go 
into respiratory arrest and started providing help by assisting the patient with breathing 
before the patient had actually arrested (note: anticipating changes in trajectory of care 
and proactively intervening was coded as effective updating).  
However, the second major updating event – the broken bag – was associated 
with much more varied performance. Figure 5.5
13
, a histogram, shows the distribution of 
team performance related to the time it took to update the trajectory of care and replace 
the broken bag. The minimum amount of time to appropriately update around the broken 
bag and to replace it was 23 seconds and the maximum time was almost 16 minutes 
(15:38). The mean time for this updating interval was 6:13 minutes (shown on Figure 5.5 
with a vertical red line) with a standard deviation of 4:25 minutes (shown on Figure 5.5 
as a blue rectangle). Approximately one third of the teams (9/24 teams or 38%) were 
designated as high performers because they were able to accurately and quickly (i.e. time 
to update = less than mean) update around the central challenge of the simulation (the 
broken piece of equipment). For the high performers, the average time to fix the problem 
with the bag was 2:01 minutes, in contrast to the other teams, where the average was 8:52 
minutes. One third of the teams updated their understanding much more slowly and often 
required a clue from a confederate to accurately update (7/24 teams or 29%). Of these 
seven teams, five of the teams updated on their own but did so much more slowly than 
the high performers (i.e. time to update ranged from 6:54 -15:38 minutes) and two of the 
teams required clues provided by a confederate to update (one team took 5:43 minutes, 
the other 12:53 minutes). In the remaining third (8/24 teams or 33%), the teams were 
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never able to update on their own: for seven of the teams, the confederate provided the 
answer and one of the teams was never able to update (for this team, the simulation was 
finally halted by the simulation staff).  
There are several things that are striking about the patterns of updating across all 
24 teams. First, the range of variance with respect to the times required to update around 
the same issue is remarkable, which suggests that updating, while possible to accomplish, 
is certainly not straightforward, even amongst teams of experts. Second, the processes of 
revisiting and revising are sometimes distinct but, in cases where the trajectory of care is 
altered very quickly, these processes are difficult to tease apart. Third, certain types of 
updating challenges have considerably more variability than others. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, the interval to update around the first updating moment – the time 
between when the patient becomes unresponsive and when teams begin to bag the patient 
– is generally short and consistent across teams. This contrasts with the high variation 
around the second updating moment: updating around the broken bag. This raises the 
question of whether teams may be more skilled at updating around certain events than 
others. In this simulation, teams were more effective in updating around changes in 
clinical status (patient‟s symptoms worsening to the point where they stop breathing or 
their heart stops is a fairly routine occurrence in the ED) than in updating around the 
unexpected event of equipment failure (a much less common occurrence). Fourth, it took 
much longer (and there was much more variation around) for teams to raise the 
possibility of a broken bag than to test that possibility. Most teams mobilized quickly 
once someone on the team suggested that the bag might be faulty (this interval between 




correctly – marked by a green bar – to the time when the bag was changed – marked by a 
purple bar – tends to be fairly short
14
). This suggests that, for these teams, much of the 
challenge in updating is around generating plausible options to test rather than testing the 
possibilities. 
Updating as an interactional achievement 
I find that updating is a dynamic unfolding process, which punctuates the 
trajectory of care and emerges through interaction primarily between individual team 
members and their environment. By interaction, I mean, “mutual or reciprocal action or 
influence” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002). A quick note of 
clarification about the use of interacting instead of enacting or relating: the term 
“enacting,” particularly in the sensemaking literature (Weick, 1995), is often used to 
describe how actors create aspects of their environment; I use the term “interact” to focus 
on the precise interplay between a particular actor and a particular aspect of a particular 
environment. As well, I use an interactional perspective rather than a relational 
perspective because, in this context, relationships may or may not exist. 
The idea that organizing (and organizations) come about through interaction is not 
new; Weick‟s (1979) seminal text highlighted the importance of taking serious the 
organizing processes – the “interlocked behaviors” – that constitute and re-constitute 
organizations. However, there still remains much to be learned about how organizing is 
accomplished moment-to-moment as part of everyday work (Barley & Kunda, 2001). For 
example, some of the early promising work on “double interacts,” which examines 
action, response, and re-action as a unit of organizing, has largely fallen out of favor with 
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organizational researchers (there are exceptions, e.g., Quinn & Dutton, 2005), although 
this fine-grained focus on interaction is thriving in other disciplines, like communications 
(e.g., Cooren & Fairhurst, 2004). 
My data draw a rich portrait of updating as an interactional accomplishment (see 
Figure 5.1 for model). I have organized my findings into three sections: (1) sites of 
interacting, which describes the types of interaction through which updating occurs, (2) 
the actor or sets of actors who accomplish updating, which are connected by (3) the 
interlocked behaviors, specifically different types of double-interacts, that are more or 
less generative and are associated with effective and ineffective updating. My findings 
contribute to a broader understanding of the mechanisms that create transitions in 
understanding. 
Sites of updating: My findings suggest that updating emerges as team members 
interact with various elements of their environment, specifically their physical, cognitive, 
and social environments. An example of an individual interacting with their physical 
environment would be a healthcare provider feeling the patient‟s chest to see if it‟s rising, 
looking at the monitor to see what the current oxygen saturation level is, or using a piece 
of equipment i.e. bag. An example of an individual interacting with their cognitive 
environment would be a healthcare provider interacting with cognitive tools such as a 
standard protocol for treating patient with a severe asthma attack, a standard PALS 
(Pediatric Advanced Life Support) protocol for treating patient with a heart rhythm 
shown on the monitor but no pulse for patient (this situation is known as PEA or 
pulseless electrical activity, I mention this because it comes up in some of the 




ventilating patients; D = displacements; O = obstruction; P = pneumothorax; E = 
equipment failure). An example of an individual interaction with their social environment 
would be a healthcare provider interacting with another team member (e.g., a team 
member who isn‟t sure whether the patient is breathing might ask another team member 
to check to see if they can hear breath sounds). It is interesting to note that there were no 
instances in my data of updating emerging as an epiphany, disconnected from the 
interactions within the simulation. All of the updating could be traced to its roots in 
interaction with either the physical, cognitive, or social environments (or some 
combination of the three). Because the physical, social, and cognitive environments are 
inter-related, I have portrayed their relationship as a Venn diagram (see Figure 5.6).   
Although I derived this framework from the analysis of my data, this three-part 
model is very much in keeping with the tradition of microethnography, which, as I have 
mentioned earlier, focuses on understanding situated human interaction as it unfolds over 
time, particularly with respect to how people use language, action, and tools to make 
sense together from moment to moment (Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002; Heath, Luff, & 
Knoblauch, 2004). Streeck and Mehus write, “Critical to all studies of cognitive practices 
conducted in a microethnographic vein is the analysis of the interplay of context, 
interactional participation, and cognitive tools” (2005: 390). It is unusual in 
organizational research to consider the interplay of all three types of environments. There 
are many streams of research that consider the interplay of two of these environments – 
for example, research on shared or distributed cognition is increasingly focusing on the 




are embedded (e.g., Gioia & Sims, 1986; Michel, 2007) – but the physical environment is 
often absent from consideration (obvious exceptions include research on artifacts, etc).  
I use this model of updating emerging through interactions between an individual 
and their physical, cognitive, or social environment to organize and explain my findings. 
Of the total sample of 24 teams, 16 teams were able to update their understanding and 
replace the broken bag (14 teams on their own, at varying speeds, and 2 teams after clues 
given by confederates; see Table 5.1 for more details). For each team, the type of 
interaction that prompted updating was mapped onto the Venn diagram (see Figure 5.7). I 
identify each team in Figure 5.7 by their rank order number, corresponding to their 
relative performance (i.e. Team 1 updated the quickest – in 23 seconds – in contrast to 
Team 24, that took 15 minutes 38 seconds to update). Below, I begin to analyze the 
various dimensions of updating through interaction, beginning with the physical 
environment. 
Updating in interaction with the physical environment: Updating often 
involves noticing changes in the environment (Weick et al., 2005). The updating 
challenge in the asthma scenario (a broken piece of equipment) by its very nature 
provides several physical cues to team members. First, when the valve in the bag is 
broken, the bag feels and sounds different during use than it normally does (as air leaks 
out it makes a sound and because the bag is not moving air, it is easier to compress the 
bag than it should be, especially in a patient with asthma). Second, because the bag is 
broken it is not able to properly ventilate the patient (i.e. the patient‟s chest does not rise 




physically closer to the cue might be able to more quickly update their understanding that 
the bag is broken. My data support this finding.  
You will note in Figure 5.7 that the nine fastest teams all had updating emerge as 
the result of some type of interaction with the physical environment. In two cases (Teams 
1 and 5), the individual who started bagging the patient (i.e. had the role of managing the 
patient‟s airway) felt there was something wrong with the bag and took action themselves 
to replace the broken bag. Below is an excerpt from the transcript for Team 1 which 
details the type of interaction with the physical environment that prompts updating - I 
include this transcript to illustrate that updating is emerging through a single individual 
interacting with a physical object (i.e. the man bagging the patient figures out that the bag 
is broken by the way that the bag feels). Of course, he is working in a context where 
others are present and he is interacting with them but the updating is contained within a 
single individual and emerges through interaction with the physical environment: 
4:57: The man managing the airway (A) begins to bag patient. After he has given 
several breaths with the bag, he begins to look at the bag, to adjust the seal of the 
bag on the patient‟s mouth, to feel the connector between the mask and the bag. 
He keeps looking back and forth between the bag and the monitor. Two other 
team members, F and E, listen to patient‟s chest with stethoscope. 
 
5:05: E says “Yeah, he‟s not breathing very well, at all.”  The team leader asks, 
“Are you assisting ventilation, Mike? “ A doesn‟t not immediately respond as he 
is busy checking the equipment. A couple of seconds later he says, “Yes ma‟am,” 
and continues bagging the patient. He keeps looking at the bag and adjusting it. 
 
5:16: A, speaking to one of the simulation coordinator, says “Can you get me that 
other bag?”  Simulation leader hands him another bag and says “This one?”  A 
says “Yeah, this bag doesn‟t seem to give me any chest rise. I don‟t know if it‟s 
the bag or not.” B, another team member at the head of the bed, is helping A 
change the bag. A says to B, “You know what I‟m saying?  It just doesn‟t seem 
like it‟s going through the valve.” 
 
5:20: A removes the old bag, tossing it onto the equipment cart, and says, “We 




bag and continues bagging patient. The simulation coordinator helps hook the 
tube up to the oxygen on the wall. 
 
It is impressive to note that it only took 23 seconds for this individual to update around 
the fact that the bag wasn‟t working! The above description, although unfolding slightly 
faster, was typical of all cases where updating came about through interaction with the 
physical environment (in Table 5.1 you can see that the five fastest teams updated in 
under two minutes). When updating emerges through interaction with the physical 
environment, individual team members were using and manipulating the equipment (i.e. 
bagging the patient) and either responded to the “feel” of the bag (as in, “this doesn‟t feel 
right”) or to the lack of chest rise, which bagging the patient should produce (as above). 
While there is a certain level of expertise required to know whether the bag “feels” right, 
the attention to whether the action (bagging) is producing the intended result (chest rise) 
is a more general clinical skill. 
You will note that, in Figure 5.7, there are a number of teams where updating the 
trajectory of care for the patient began when a single individual expressed concerns about 
the equipment and then worked with colleagues to update their understanding. For 
example, Team 7 took just over a minute (from the moment they start bagging the patient 
to when they change the bag) to update the trajectory of care: 
8:22: H is standing at head of bed and begins bagging the patient. She is really 
squeezing the bag hard (it‟s completely collapsed with each squeeze). She asks 
“Can somebody listen for breath sounds?”  G (another team member) listens with 
her stethoscope to both sides of the patient‟s chest as H continues to bag. 
 
8:31: A says, “Sats are still dropping…65…heart rate is 72 now” 
 
8:36: G says “I have no breath sounds” 




G: “No breath sounds. Are we not in far enough?” B leans back and looks at 
where the ET tube crosses the patient‟s lip and says “We‟re in too deep.”  
 
Team leader (A), H, and B all move physically closer toward the patient‟s head 
and look at mouth. A asks, “How far are we down?” 
 
8:50 H lets go of the bag and bends over to look at ET tube, G, without being 
asked, immediately takes over bagging patient and says, looking at the monitor, 
“Sats are dropping” 
H says “We‟re 20…. No, we‟re 19 at the lip”.  
A: Turning away from patient to look back at monitor, “Alright… at 65.” (talking 
about dropping O2 sats) 
H: “Should I pull this back?” 
B:  “Pull it back to 16 or 15” 
 
9:00: H says she is pulling the tube back to 16 at the lip, A says “keep listening 
for breath sounds, keep listening for breath sounds,” B is taking stethoscope off 
(had it around her neck) saying, “I got it, I got it” and begins to listen to both sides 
of the patient‟s chest.  
H: “It‟s at 16.” G continues to bag, and B listens to patient‟s chest and says, “We 
still have no chest rise” 
 
G: Keeps looking at bag and at the O2 tubing and says, “I don‟t feel like anything 
is moving through the bag.” H: “I know it doesn‟t feel like that either. It sounds 
like there‟s a leak.”  
 
9:18: G hands the bag to H and says “you do this [meaning, you keep bagging the 
patient], I‟m going to switch bags”, H continues to bag while G goes to wall and 
starts attaching tubes for new bag 
 
The updating of the patient‟s trajectory of care unfolded in the coordinated activity 
between A, B, G, and H but it is the moment when G mentioned her concern about the 
bag – “I don‟t feel like anything is moving through the bag,” – which was immediately 
responded to and reinforced by H – “I know it doesn‟t feel like that either. It sounds like 
there‟s a leak,” – that preceded the change of the broken bag. It is interesting to note that 
here, as was the case in my field observations, bids and responses seem to progress in a 
sequence, moving from more implicit to more explicit and from sensemaking to 




initial sensemaking bid – “I don‟t feel like anything is moving through the bag”- is met 
with an explicit sensegiving response – “It sounds as if there‟s a leak.” 
I found that moments such as these, where a concern about the trajectory of care 
was reinforced by someone else on the team, to be highly consequential. There were 
several teams that were unable to update, despite the fact that the person at the patient‟s 
airway continually expressed concerns about how well the bag was working, however, no 
other team members ever engaged with them to work through their concern. This 
example illustrates how an individual‟s concern about something they noticed while 
interacting with the physical environment (i.e. that the bag did not seem to be working 
properly) was reinforced through social interaction that built consensus around the nature 
of the problem (Streeck & Mehus, 2004).  
 Updating in interaction with the cognitive environment: Patient care – both in 
real life and in the simulator – is underpinned by a set of clinical protocols that are 
considered “best practices” for healthcare providers. Nowhere is care more formulaic 
than the ED, where healthcare providers have protocols to care for patients with a wide 
range of problems – patients who have been in accidents, who have irregular heartbeats, 
who are unconscious, who have stopped breathing, etc. These protocols function as a sort 
of “cognitive tool” and are shared in common amongst the various healthcare providers. 
For example, all healthcare providers in the ED are required to have PALS training, 
which teaches them a set of standard set of protocols to be used in various emergencies. 
In addition to protocols, healthcare providers also learn common sets of mnemonics 
meant to remind them of what diagnoses could be responsible for certain symptoms and 




airway, breathing, and circulation and is the order in which healthcare providers are 
supposed to address the patient‟s problems i.e. fix airway first).  
The most relevant mnemonic device in this scenario related to updating is the 
“DOPE” mnemonic, used to remember the causes of failures to ventilating the patient. 
Recall that D is displacement or dislodgement of the tube (checked by either xray to see 
tube placement, direct visualization of tube, or re-intubation); O is obstruction of tube or 
airway; P is pneumothorax (either seen on xray or detected clinically by putting a needle 
into each lung to see if air escapes; and E is equipment failure. For the two teams that 
were able to update only after a clue, it was the DOPE mnemonic that prompted 
updating. In one team, a single individual responded to the clue from the confederate and, 
in a fairly agitated fashion, went through the mnemonic. The transcript below shows the 
moment of updating through the interaction of one team member – the recording nurse – 
and the DOPE mnemonic: 
16:38: The recording nurse at the foot of the bed (A) says, “We are spinning our 
wheels.” Team leader agrees, “Yeah we don‟t have an airway.” ICU consultant 
(who has just re-intubated the patient) says, “I gave you an airway.”  A says, 
“Yes, but we are not ventilating.” ICU consultant says, “I think you had an airway 
before I came though, and that mnemonic I can‟t remember…”  
 
17:00: A, speaking very loudly, bouncing up and down, and gesturing widely, 
begins to counting off each element of the mnemonic on her fingers, “DOPE! 
Dislodgement, we know it‟s in the right place. Obstruction…we‟ve already 
checked that. Pneumothorax, so we have that?” Team says no. “Equipment 
failure? We‟ve got equipment failure. Are we connected to the right oxygen 
tube?” Someone checks and determines yes.  
 
17:20: Team leader grabs bag and asks, “Is this a problem?”Airway nurse starts 
checking the oxygen tubes again.  
 
17:30: A has moved out of position at the table at the foot of the bed and has 






17:35: ICU consultant says feel free to change the equipment. Airway nurse 
reaches for a new bag.  
 
17:48: A says, “Suction his tube!” They do. 
 
  17:55: The team finally changes the patient‟s bag. 
 
As you can see from the above example, the DOPE mnemonic serves as an important 
prompt to revising understanding and action. The recording nurse runs through the 
various elements of D-O-P and stops when she gets to E, having realized that the research 
team is having trouble with the patient is because of equipment failure. Although the clue 
(DOPE) was provided by a confederate, the nurse‟s interaction with the mnemonic is a 
cognitive one – she asks and answers the question herself, “Equipment failure?  We‟ve 
got equipment failure.” There were only a few instances of this type of interaction 
resulting in updating but evidence from medicine and other fields suggests that various 
cognitive tools, such as mnemonics or checklists, help avoid common cognitive biases, 
such premature closure (ending search for diagnosis too early) or fixation error (getting 
focused on one particular choice without considering others) (Croskerry, 2003) and even 
improve communication across professional boundaries (Lingard et al., 2008). 
Updating in interaction with the social environment: As you can see from 
Figure 5.7, updating often occurred as a result of interactions between individuals and 
their social environment. There were five teams where updating emerged as a result of 
their interactions with each other rather than with the physical or cognitive environments. 
These teams were able to accurately update their understanding that the bag was broken 
but it took them considerably longer than the top nine teams. These five teams were 




their environment were sometimes flawed – i.e. thinking that the patient‟s chest was 
moving with bagging when it was actually not – they were eventually able to update the 
trajectory of care through interactions with each other.  
The issue of responsiveness to bids emerged as an important difference between 
high and low performing teams. By responsive, I mean “quick to react” (Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002). High-performing teams tended to be more 
responsive to each other and low-performing teams tended to less responsive (sometime 
they completely ignored each other). To illustrate, in a responsive team when a team 
member made a bid for attention, the other members of the team would immediately and 
positively respond to the bid by acknowledging the bid had been made and then begin 
address the issue of concern raised in the bid. For example, a team member might say, “I 
don‟t think the chest is rising” and – in a team where members were responsive to each 
other – other team members would start to look at the patient‟s chest to see if it was 
rising, listen to the patient‟s chest to see if there were breath sounds, and, if they 
confirmed that the patient‟s chest wasn‟t rising, they would start to problem solve 
together to figure out why the patient‟s chest was not rising.  
For many of these teams, the social interactions were the way in which they 
continued to generate possible causes for the patient‟s symptoms – in essence, their 
interactions created an ongoing conversation about what could be happening. Some of the 
teams had correctly assessed the situation and were aware that the problem was that they 
couldn‟t get enough air into the patient but, unfortunately, did not explore the possibility 
of an equipment failure as the cause of the patient‟s symptoms until much later in the 




there was no foreign body in the airway, making sure the patient did not have a 
pneumothorax (air outside the lung but still inside the chest cavity, which compresses the 
lung), and checking to make sure the tube was in the right place (either by extubating the 
patient and re-intubating or by ordering a chest x-ray to see tube placement).  
This next section transcript illustrates how updating emerges through social 
interactions – due to the length of the transcript, I want to highlight several key points to 
attend to while reading it. First, for this particular segment of transcription, instead of the 
regular abbreviations for team members (assigning them to a letter of the alphabet, in 
clockwise order around the patient‟s bed), I have written out the roles for each speaker – 
this is a very long transcript and using abbreviations for the speakers makes it difficult to 
keep track of what‟s happening. Second, note that the length of the transcript is directly 
related to how long it teams to update through social interactions – as you can see in 
Table 5.1, social interactions tended to take the longest amount of time of all three 
categories (and are somewhat painful to watch and to read). Third, several key team 
members engage in most of the social interactions related to updating – pay particular 
attention to the interplay between the three physicians (one at the foot of the bed, another 
at the head of the bed, and the team leader). Fourth, note the disconnect between how 
they talk about the patient‟s symptoms and what they do to test their hypotheses – the 
physician at the foot of the bed had correctly identified the problem as failure of 
mechanical ventilation at around 8:30 but did not actually test his hypothesis until 13:00 
when the bag was changed. If this was a real patient and not a simulation, the almost five 
minute delay in acting to test a hypothesis would mean that the patient would have been 




5:59: Airway nurse asks, “Can you do continuous epi.” Simulation coordinator 
responds that they can do it through the IV and not the airway. Meanwhile the 
team leader has been telling the physician at head of bed that they are going to 
need to look in the patient‟s airway. 
 
6:12: Physician at foot of bed, “Do we want to think about a terbutaline drip?” 
Team leader says, “Yep.” Physician at head of bed, “What have you got going on 
there? You have one IV over there right?” 
 
6:32: Physician at foot of bed says, “So, pneumothorax is still a possibility.”  
 
6:40: Med nurse asks how much ketamine she should give the patient. She has to 
repeat her question until someone responds. 
 
6:49: Physician at head of bed announces, “We are not making his chest move 
much.” Physician at head of bed and the physician at foot of bed listen to the 
patient‟s chest. 
 
7:07: Physician at foot of bed asks the “babysitter” (played by the simulation 
coordinator) if the patient choked on anything. She says no, he was just on the 
couch getting his breathing treatments all day. Babysitter, “Is he going to be 
okay?” Physician at foot of bed, “We don‟t know exactly what is going to happen. 
He‟s having a really difficult time with his asthma and we are going to have to see 
where it goes from here.” 
 
7:27: Med nurse asks the team, “Are we getting air in?” Physician at head of bed 
responds with, “Not much.”  
 
7:39: Another physician at the head of the bed addresses team, “So we are ready 
to intubate? Everyone okay with intubating?” Everyone agrees. She begins 
intubation. 
 
7:45: Med nurse asks, “Did you want to give him Atropine?” Team leader, “I am 
just seeing what his heart rate is doing first.” Physician at foot of bed says it won‟t 
hurt him so they tell the med nurse she can give it and she does. 
 
8:00: Physician who was trying to intubate the patient fails to accomplish this 
successfully.  The airway nurse continues to bag the patient. 
 
8:10: Team leader asks if the physician who had been intubating was able to see 
the chords – she says yes. Team leader says, “So it‟s not his airway.” Physician at 
foot of bed mentions a foreign body. Team leader lists off what drugs and 
treatment they have given the patient. 
 
8:37: Physician at foot of bed, “So it‟s all going to be mechanical at this point. We 




Physician who had tried intubating patient before tries again and successfully 
reintubates the patient. 
 
8:49: Airway nurse, “Do you want to bag and I‟ll tape him really quick?” 
Physician who had intubated the patient takes over bagging. Physician at head of 
bed, “I‟ll listen while you bag.” 
 
9:03: Physician at head of bed says there is still very little air movement.  
9:10: Med nurse says to the team, “I don‟t see his chest rising.” 
9:15: Physician at head of bed again says, “Not much chest rise, not much air 
movement.” Physician at foot of bed asks if they can increase the pressure and use 
two hands to squeeze the bag. No one really responds.  
 
9:30: Physician at head of bed asks if they should put in-line albuterol in, but then 
the airway nurse says she thought it can‟t be done with this bag. The physician at 
foot of bed agrees. The physician at head of bed suggests that they put the patient 
on a ventilator to give him more pressure. But they don‟t have a ventilator. 
 
9:53: Team leader asks the simulation coordinator, “Can we get x-ray in?” 
Simulation coordinator, “X-ray can come in.”  
 
10:04: The physician at head of bed says that they can‟t get much pressure out of 
this bag and they can‟t use an ambu bag. The physician at foot of bed and the 
physician at head of bed have a short inaudible but seemingly heated discussion. .  
 
10:25: The physician at head of bed announces to the team that the CXR is 
normal and the ET tube is in the right place and no pneumothorax. 
 
10:27: The physician at foot of bed says, “We are going to have to increase his 
PEEP
15
 a lot, can we increase PEEP with this?” Physician at head of bed says he 
needs more pressure. Airway nurse says she would love to give it. 
 
10:47: The physician at head of bed and the physician at foot of bed suggest using 
the green bag now for better pressure. The airway nurse moves to get the green 
bag ready but then stops when the physician at head of bed asks her if she is 
bagging in albuterol and she says that she could, she needs more equipment. The 
airway nurse asks if they should just pretend to give it through the bag then. 
 
11:35: Patient receives another epi through IV instead. Meanwhile the physician 
at foot of bed has been keeping up a constant stream of talking to the team leader, 
ignoring the team and the patient. He says he thinks it‟s all about airway 
management at this point. 
 
                                                 
15
 PEEP stands for “positive end-expiratory pressure,” which essentially is additional pressure above and 
beyond the regular atmospheric pressure; higher PEEP helps keep open the alveoli, which are the primary 




12:03: Physician at head of bed asks the airway nurse, “We‟re giving him 
albuterol through here?” The physician at foot of bed and the team leader says 
yeah they are. 
 
12:10: The physician at foot of bed and the team leader tell the team that they 
think it‟s time to switch bags as soon as they get the tube taped. Airway nurse 
asks, “So why are we switching the bags?” Team leader responds, “Because we 
are not able to ventilate him with this bag.” Physician at head of bed, “See if we 
can get better pressure out of it.” Airway nurse continues to tape the tube. 
 
12:35: Physician at foot of bed asks if the medicine they have used so far is right 
because he can‟t think of anything else to do. They talk about giving the patient a 
“drip” [referring to a terbutaline drip] for a while. 
 
13:00: The airway nurse switches to the green bag. 
 
13:10:  The physician who had intubated the patient says, “He has a left radial 
pulse.” Physician at head of bed says, “Okay we‟ve changed the bag, and you can 
give him a little bit of PEEP on your bag too.” Airway nurse pushes harder on the 
bag to increase the bag pressure. 
 
13:25: Physician at foot of bed, “Pulses are all there. It‟s all about his airway 
management.” Physician at head of bed agrees.  
 
13:42: Physician at foot of bed asks if they have a pressure monitor that hooks up 
to the bag. Airway nurse announces that the patient‟s stats are rising. Team turns 
to look at the monitor. 
 
14:05: Physician at foot of bed, “Look at those stats coming up now. It looks like 
the bag is the answer.” 
 
You can see from the transcript that as the team makes sense of the patient‟s symptoms 
bids transition from those that are primarily sensemaking (i.e. “Are we getting any air 
in”) to those that are primarily sensegiving (“We‟re going to have to increase his PEEP a 
lot…”).  However, you will also note that the team was able to appropriately update the 
trajectory of action without appropriately updating their understanding of the situation 
(they did not realize that the bag was broken but, to be fair, a broken bag is providing no 




PEEP was technically accurate). In this example, even though the team was having 
trouble determining the cause of the patient‟s symptoms, they were generally responsive 
to each other and proceeded to rule in or rule out diagnoses that were raised as possible 
causes instead of getting fixated on one possible cause.  
Actor or sets of actors who accomplish updating 
I begin by unpacking some of the ways in which effective updating occurred by 
describing various patterns of actors or sets of actors who actually accomplished the 
updating. I then end this section by using the same interactional framework to categorize 
failures of updating, in the case of teams that were unable to update. 
Figure 5.7 and Table 5.1 summarize the data for the 16 teams that were able to 
effectively update.  I want to disentangle two subtle yet related processes: the first relates 
to the site of updating i.e. in interaction with which environment(s); the second relates to 
the actor or sets of actors who accomplish updating. In Figure 5.7 and Table 5.1, the team 
number represents the performance of the team (teams are listed in rank order, so Team 1 
was the fastest). The position on the diagram in Figure 5.7 shows the site of updating; if a 
team is listed in one location with an arrow to another position, that means that the 
updating start through one type of interaction and then developed into another type. 
Teams that required a clue to update are coded in red and any updating that occurred as a 
result of an individual‟s insight is italicized. It is interesting to note that faster updating is 
more likely to emerge from interaction with the physical environment and is more likely 
to be accomplished by an individual actor acting alone whereas slower updating tends to 




In my data, there were three distinct patterns in terms of how effective updating 
was accomplished: in the first pattern, a single individual accomplishes the updating 
entirely on their own (from revisiting the trajectory of care to revising it); in the second 
pattern, revisiting the trajectory of care is prompted by an individual but revising 
becomes a social process (may be limited to only one other individual but there is social 
interaction); in the third and final pattern, revisiting and revising emerge as a collective 
accomplishment through social interaction without any one individual being dominant 
(this is the rarest pattern). Below I explore in more detail each of the three patterns of 
how updating is accomplished.  
Pattern 1 (individual action): You can see in Figure 5.7 the distribution of how 
updating was accomplished for each of the teams who successfully updated. Remember 
that the numbers in italics represent updating begins as a result of an individual‟s insight. 
For two teams, Team 1 and 5, the updating was entirely accomplished by an individual 
acting alone (recall the transcript for Team 1 when the person bagging the patient decides 
the bag is faulty). Individual updating as a result of physical interactions can result in 
very quick updating. Here is another example from Team 5 of how updating the 
trajectory of care occurs as a result of individual action. Note that in this transcript the 
airway nurse, who has been bagging the patient, has been checking the equipment but 
never voices a concern. As soon as the physician takes over bagging (i.e. after she‟s 
squeezed the bag once), she realizes it‟s broken and begins articulating her concern and 
then asks for a new bag: 
5:00 The airway nurse (A) starts bagging the patient but the bed is still tipped in 
the upright (45 degree angle) position. The physician at the head of the bed (B) 





5:07 They are finally able to get the head of the bed down and A begins to bag the 
patient again. A, who has been trying to simultaneously hold the bag on the 
patient‟s face and move the bed, says, “Sorry, I‟m trying to multi-task. This mask 
is too big. I need a small mask.” Team leader (D) and B both say, “There should 
be a small mask behind you.” B leaves and goes and gets a smaller mask from the 
med cart and hands it to the A. B then begins to listen to the patient‟s chest. 
 
5:20 A takes off the old mask and puts the smaller mask onto the broken bag 
 
5:27 A starts bagging the patient again. She bends over to look at mask and then 
straightens and looks behind her at the wall and the O2 tubing. She continues to 
bag. 
 
5:30 Meanwhile, D asks, “So is he breathing spontaneously?” B responds, “He is 
breathing spontaneously, but I guess he just has poor air movement.” D, “Sats are 
very low.” B says, “Rapid pulses….. 
 
5:38 B, Could we give him a sub-q epi?” D says, “I don‟t know how we give it 
sub-q” [referring to how you give it to the dummy] Simulation coordinator says, 
“You run it through the same system that‟s fine it‟ll go through sub-q” There‟s a 
pause and then A says, “Yes, I got it.” [referring to getting the sub-q epi] and 
hands bag to B. 
 
5:47 B squeezes the bag once, looks at it and says, “This is not functioning” D, 
“Is it hooked up? I mean is it hooked up to the oxygen?” B, “It doesn‟t feel right” 
A, “I felt the same way when I was bagging” D comes over, confirms that the bag 
was not hooked up to the O2 and hooks it up. The sound of the O2 running through 
the bag becomes audible. B says thank you to D and squeezes bag again and says, 
“It‟s still not…” A, “I thought the bag felt a little lax”  
 
6:12 B, “I just don‟t like how the bag feels but…. This still… this is not…. This is 
not… I‟m mean it‟s not… gimme that one” (she takes bag off with her right hand 
and uses it to point to other bag). A, “It‟s too little” B, “Well … this one‟s not 
functioning.”  
 
6:47 They switch bags. B, “That feels better” 
 
Pattern 1 seems to emerge from close interaction with the cue itself (in this case the 
broken bag) and when the actor is expert, confident in their assessment, and agentic, 




Pattern 2 (individual prompts social process): In this pattern, updating is 
accomplished through a set of actors. Sometimes, as in Pattern 1, an individual 
interacting with the bag first notices something is wrong and expresses their concern but, 
unlike Pattern 1, they do not immediately switch the bag on their own but instead engage 
others in discussion and build a consensus that the bag is not working properly before 
taking action to update the trajectory of care and change the bag. The social process can 
be limited to one additional person but the interaction produces the change in trajectory 
of care (i.e. changed bag). For example, there was one team – Team 6 – where the nurses 
at the airway began to take action on their own because the team leaders were not paying 
attention to their concerns. Pay particular attention in the following transcript to the fact 
that no other team members, including the physician at the head of the bed, respond to the 
two nurses‟ repeated voiced concerns about the patient until the very end of the 
transcript, when the they have successfully identified and resolved the problem by 
replacing the bag: 
8:55 Med nurse (A) is helping to hold the seal of the mask on the patient‟s face (a 
two-hand hold on seal – one on top and bottom of patient‟s mask). The airway 
nurse (C) starts squeezing bag one handed and looking at the O2 tubing. A turns to 
look at tubing as well. A and C take the mask off the patient‟s face, feel inside of 
it, and then C starts pushing the mask back onto the connection with the bag and 
the A is checking the O2 on the wall. C starts bagging again. 
 
A moves back to patient‟s side says, “I don‟t think we‟re.. havin…(putting hands 
back on mask to hold seal) I think we‟re havin… I don‟t think the oxygen is 
working. 
 
Simulation coordinator “He‟s 84%, guys” 
 
Team leader at foot of bed (E) is watching what is happening at the head of the 
bed and turns away laughing 
 
A: Is it working? 





A to C, “Try that↓ (touching O2 tank.) It‟s empty.”  
E, “Your oxygen tank is empty? 
A, “That one is. I don‟t… we‟re not…” 
Simulation coordinator walking up to the bedside says, “You are on the wall.” 
[meaning that the oxygen is being provided by the centralized supply mounted on 
the wall, not a freestanding oxygen tank] 
A “We‟re on the wall?” 
C, “It‟s not…” 
 
9:40: Simulation coordinator points out that it‟s best to listen over the speakers on 
the dummy. Physician at head of bed (B), who has been listening and silent for 
last while, “Yeah I‟m not hearing squat.” E, “You aren‟t hearing anything? He has 
no breath sounds?”  
Meanwhile the A and C keep making adjustments to the equipment, adjusting the 
seal of the mask, keep looking at the O2 tubing and flow monitor.  
 
9:48: A (still holding seal) bends forward at waist to look at mask carefully. C 
continues to bag with left hand. A says, “I don‟t think …. I don‟t….. (feeling 
patient‟s antecubital fossa for pulse). “LOOK.” C comes around to look  
 
10:00: E asks B, “You don‟t hear any breath sounds?” B, “I don‟t hear anything.”  
 
A says, “This isn‟t working.” [referring to the bag] 
C “How about that one?” and points to another bag on the med cart. A first picks 
up the green anesthetic bag and then picks up another larger clear ambubag, “This 
is awfully big” and turns back to patient. C says, “Just don‟t squeeze it as hard” A 
puts new bag at patient‟s head and goes to hook up the O2 tubing. C has 
disconnected the original bag from the mask and is replacing the broken bag with 
the new one. 
 
E says, “Let‟s go ahead and intubate him. Do we have any intubation meds?” 
10:31: B (who again hasn‟t been speaking), “If I‟m supposed to hear anything, I 
am not hearing anything.” E, “So bilaterally we‟re not hearing breath sounds” 
 
10:52: C, “Are we on?” Both A and C lean back to look at seal of mask on 
patient‟s head. A, “Tilt it back a little” as they are tipping the patient‟s chin up. 
They‟ve switching the position of the bag so the A can bag and the C holds the 
seal. “Try now” 
 
B, “Go ahead” 
 
A squeezes bag 
 





You will note that, in this example, neither of the actors who modify the trajectory of care 
were the team leaders. Medicine is an extremely hierarchical field and so speaking up 
about a concern and – further – taking action to change the trajectory of care of a patient 
without consultation with the team leader is risky and potentially costly (Van Dyne, Ang, 
& Botero, 2003). However, in this study, I find that – most of the time – when individual 
actors have updated their own understanding, they take action to alter the trajectory of 
care for the patient‟s benefit, regardless of whether they are directed to do so by their 
team leader. This finding of agency, even when potentially costly, may be a result of 
having a strong identification with and motivation to care for others (Ashford & Barton, 
2007; Blatt, Christianson, Sutcliffe, & Rosenthal, 2006).  
However, agentic action on the part of individuals who notice that something is 
wrong does not always happen – there was one rather heartbreaking video where the 
respiratory therapist at the airway suspected the bag was not working and made repeated 
bids to the team to address this issue – her bids were largely ignored and she did not take 
action on her own to change the bag. Eventually, the confederate on the team suggested 
changing the bag. Here is a synopsis of the bids she made before the confederate finally 
suggested changing the bag (at 7:40, giving the team plenty of time to respond to her 
bids),  
3:44 Respiratory therapist (A): “This really is not working. The chest isn‟t 
 rising” (bid ignored) 
 
4:08 A: “Yeah, this just really is not working.” (bid ignored) 
 
4:35 A places her hand on the patient‟s chest and looks at the team leader off- 
 screen as she shakes her head and says even louder, “We are just really not… the 
 chest is not rising, I‟m pushing as hard as I can, the seal is good.” (bid ignored) 
 




position (nurse nods).” B asks her, “Could there be a blockage in his airway?” A  
checks if there is anything in the patient‟s mouth and says to the team, “No,  
there‟s nothing in there. He was talking.” [meaning, if he had a foreign body as  
the cause, he shouldn‟t have been talking when he first arrived in the ED]. She is  
ignored. 
 
5:40: A makes another plea to the team and gestures to the bag, “Should we fix 
this?” 
 
This sequence of bids over the period of approximately two minutes shows an interesting 
progression from implicit sensemaking (i.e. “This really is not working”) to explicit 
sensegiving (“Should we fix this? – referring to replacing the broken bag) This 
observational data does not allow insight into the motivation that keeps the respiratory 
therapist from changing the bag, since she is clearly worried about it. However, research 
on voice and silence suggests that she could be motivated by either fear of negative 
perception or punishment or anticipated ineffectiveness (although in this case, the actual 
ineffectiveness of her bids is clearly demonstrated) (Van Dyne et al., 2003). 
Harkening back to the subtle distinction that I am making between interaction and the 
environment and actors who accomplish updating, I want to provide a contrasting 
transcript from one of the teams that had updating emerge through social interactions 
around the physical environment (Teams 2-4), as opposed to a team where updating 
started with an individual noticing something wrong through interacting with the physical 
environment and then recruited other teammates (Teams 6-9). In the following transcript 
from Team 2, pay particular attention to the interaction between C and B as they make 
sense of the situation:  
03:13 Nurse near airway (C) begins bagging patient 
03:14 C checks tube and bag (*As soon as C starts bagging, she notices something is 
wrong. She starts at the mask, manually brings her hand down the tube and up to the 




03:22 Team leader (B) to C: “Are you connected?” 
03:25 C mentions that there is still a leak and checks O2 connection 
 
03:26 Recording nurse (E) to B: “Have we completed our head to toe?”  
03:27 B to E: “No. We‟re still on a….” B to C: “Wait, what‟s going on?” (looks back 
to C, because C still seems to be having trouble bagging the patient) 
03:33 D (another nurse) makes a bid, “I‟m just wondering, he could have been stung 
by something” 
03:34 B “….Could be, but we‟ve given him sub-q epi and steroids” [meaning, even if 
he was stung, we‟ve given the correct medications to treat that problem] 
 
03:39 B to C: “What‟s goin‟ on?” 
(The simulation coordinator, G, is quickly trying to change out the bag so that the 
new one C is about to grab works correctly.) 
03:40 C tells B about bag problem (very softly): “Something‟s wrong with the bag” 
03:43 B: “Can we, uh, change bags?” 
03:53 The med nurse (A) administers 30 mg ketamine 
03:56 bag is changed, C: “That‟s better” [referring to bagging the patient]  
You can see in this transcript that B, the team leader, is highly attentive to what C, the 
airway nurse, is doing. B even interrupts a conversation with another team member, E, 
the recording nurse, to check back in and see why C is having trouble bagging the patient. 
Although C is the person closest to the broken bag, B plays an important role in bringing 
attention to the broken bag and suggests changing the bag. 
Pattern 3 (collective action): The last way in which updating is accomplished is 
through collective action. As you can see from both Figure 5.7 and Table 5.1, this type of 
updating derives from social interaction and action (the two categories are highly 
overlapping). Social interactions can be both where updating emerges from and the 
pathway through which updating is accomplished. Here is an excerpt from Team 24, a 
team that worked very well together but just did not consider that a broken bag might be 
the cause of the patient‟s symptoms: 
19:00 Team leader (D) reads off most recent bloodwork (istat) information at the 




the airway, pumping the bag, another nurse (B) is observing and notes they‟re still 
not moving any air, another nurse (A) is checking pulses 
 
19:02 A “The tube‟s not working. I think you guys, we‟re only at 76%. and the C 
CO2‟s not picking up.” 
19:06 Recording nurse (E): “Wanna get another chest x-ray?” 
19:07 D:”Yeah, can we get another chest x-ray please?” 
19:18 voice offscreen: Initially, when we were bagging him, his sats were going up. 
19:24 D: “I think after we took the tube out and bagged him up, his sats continued 
dropping. 76 is better than he was. He was 70 before.” 
 
19:37 One of the nurses (B) asks the team leader, physician (D):“Is there another way 
to get more air in? As far as like a ventilator? Or… will that be able to push more air 
in than the….” 
19:41 D: (simultaneously with B): ”More oxygen, we‟re trying to figure out what 
else to get into him…Is there anything else…Can we get him some..?” 
 
20:05 D asks the simulation coordinator if they can get something to maximize the 
air pressure going into the patient: “If we maximized our PEEP in terms of ya know, 
if we say we maximized our PEEP” 
20:09 D, asks simulation coordinator again: “So, can we get something to maximize 
the pressure?” 
 
20:11 Simulation coordinator tells the team they can use a bigger bag or anything 
else provided to them 
20:13 B: “A bigger bag?” 
20:51 A reaches for the bigger bag to get ready and attach it to the patient 
 
Note that this team does not identify the bag is broken but they are able to tell that the 
patient‟s symptoms continued to worsen, despite their interventions. And, like one of the 
previous teams who updated the trajectory through social interaction, they were able to 
appropriately update the trajectory of care without fully updating their understanding of 
the situation. You can see in the transcript above how they brainstorm ideas (B one of the 
nurses asking the question of whether there is a good way to get more air into the patient, 
a somewhat unusual question) and build off each other‟s ideas (D trying to figure out 





This process of reacting to how the patient is doing rather than focusing on a 
diagnosis is in keeping with Starbuck‟s assertion that good doctors pay careful attention 
to how patients respond to treatments. If a patient gets better, current treatments are 
heading in the right direction. But, current treatments often do not work, or they produce 
side-effects that require correction. The model of symptoms-diagnoses-treatments ignores 
the feedback loop from treatments to symptoms, whereas this feedback loop is the most 
important factor (Starbuck, 1993: 87). We can see in the transcript above that, through 
social interactions, the team is able to modify the treatment to improve the patient‟s 
symptoms, despite not knowing the actual diagnosis. 
Interlocked behaviors associated with effective and ineffective updating: 
Thus far, I have explored the sites of updating (different environments in which updating 
can occur) and the type of actors who accomplish updating. The last part of my process 
model of updating considers the interlocked behaviors – the nuts and bolts of organizing 
– that link these two elements (the environments and the actors). Weick (1979) and other 
process theorists suggest that interlocked behaviors form the building blocks that 
constitute organizing processes (and organizations). By interlocked behaviors, I mean 
that the behavior of one person is contingent on the behavior of another person (what A 
does shapes what B does). Organizational processes are made up of sequences of 
interlocked behaviors called “double-interacts” in which A acts, B responds to A‟s action, 
and A readjusts in response to B‟s response (Weick, 1979: 115). Given my interest in 
understanding how updating unfolds over time, double-interacts are a useful theoretical 
construct that turns a flow of activity into sequenced interdependent actions. My findings 




behaviors and, conversely, that ineffective updating was associated with non-generative 
sequences of interlocked behaviors.  
In this section, I focus on a particular type of interaction - recall that my field 
study alerted me to the importance of bids for attention, which I defined as, “the attempt 
of a team member to share something they have noticed (or realized) with other members 
of the team, with the intent to have the team revisit (and possibly revise) the trajectory of 
patient care.” There were important differences in the interlocked behaviors (bids and 
responses) of teams that were able to effectively update the trajectory of care and those 
that were not. I examined how bids and responses formed sequences of double-interacts, 
paying particular attention to the type and frequency of bids and the responses to those 
bids. In this section, I contribute a much richer description of the bids themselves and the 
responses (or lack of response) to those bids. I then draw upon data from teams that were 
not able to effectively update (8 teams) and compare and contrast the types of bids and 
responses between the high and low performing teams.  
Bids and responses were coded by taking sequential interaction into account – 
words (or sequences of words, commonly called utterances in the conversation analysis 
tradition) or actions were not considered in isolation but as part of the unfolding sequence 
of activity. The video was coded for bids and responses in two ways: (1) by identifying a 
moment where updating occurred (for example, the bag was changed) and then moving 
backwards through the transcript to look for words and actions that seemed like explicit 
or implicit bids and (2) by identifying words or actions that expressed concern about the 
patient or the trajectory of care and then paying particular attention to what unfolded in 




unresponsive now, we need to bag him” – is an unambiguous attempt to draw the team‟s 
attention to a change in the patient‟s status that would require a change in the trajectory 
of care. Other bids were more ambiguous and subtle – for example, the comment, “His 
sats are falling” [referring to a decreasing trend in the patient‟s oxygen saturation] – and 
were coded as implicit bids. The statement, “His sats are falling” taken in isolation could 
have many different meanings – it could just be a simple exchange of information but 
more often than not was the beginning of an unfolding sequence where the person 
bidding restated their observations or reframed them. 
I need to begin my discussion of double-interacts with a caveat. Although this A-
B-A sequence (which I will refer to as a simple double-interact) is considered a 
fundamental process of activity and influence, this classical A-B-A form was often 
altered in the context of complex interdependent work. The spirit of A-B-A (action, 
response to that action, and response to that response) persisted but oftentimes additional 
parties were involved (thus A-B-A was much more commonly A-B-C, a pattern I will 
refer to as a compound double-interact). For example, here is a simple double-interact 
(A-B-A sequence) following the bid the team leader makes to get the team to revisit the 
trajectory of care,  
08:51 Team leader (D) addresses team, “OK, let‟s think back, does anyone else 
have any thoughts about what other than asthma could be going on with this kid? 
08:56 One of the nurses (C) “An obstruction? Is it a possibility?” 
08:59 D: “Let‟s go ahead and take a look.”  
 
This type of straightforward A-B-A sequence occurred very rarely in my transcripts. 
More common was a compound double-interact (A-B-C sequence), like this sequence 




3:03 Person standing at the airway (G): O2 saturations 95%.... Jon… He‟s not 
responding (turns to look at end of bed) 
One of the physicians (C): Jon, are you with us (starts doing a sternal rub [rubbing 
knuckles over the breastbone, which is painful and helps determine if the patient 
is responsive to painful stimuli even if not otherwise responsive]) 
Nurse nearest the intubation equipment (D): leaves the bedside and get the ET 
tube and stylet from the wall to anticipation of intubation 
 
On the surface, it may not seem as if the above sequence qualifies as a double-interact but 
the bid, “Jon… he‟s not responding” is an explicit statement that the patient‟s condition 
has changed; the response by C, which builds on G‟s bid and checks to see if the patient 
will at least respond to pain helps determine that the patient is indeed completely 
unresponsive; and D‟s response to C‟s actions (confirming unresponsiveness) is to begin 
to assemble the equipment for intubation, which is the next appropriate step in the 
sequence of care. The transcripts are filled with these types of sequences of activities 
(and very rarely have simple double-interacts). If we consider that the accomplishment of 
complex interdependent knowledge work requires experts with shared cognitive models 
of patient care to coordinate their activity and take initiative (Klein et al., 2006), it makes 
sense that others would step in when their role was called for with little discussion of 
what needs to occur. 
 Teams that were able to effectively update were – with very rare exceptions – 
quite responsive to bids. Because they were so responsive to bids, there were only a few 
double-interact sequences per transcript regarding changes in trajectory of care, usually 
around when the patient changed status from respiratory difficulty (trouble breathing) to 
respiratory arrest (stopped breathing) and around when the bagging wasn‟t producing 
chest rise (as soon as the broken bag begins to be used to ventilate the patient). In 




usually ignored. For example, in the eight teams unable to update, there was an average 
of seven bids per team around the fact that the bagging isn‟t work (one team had 10) 
before the confederate provides the answer. Repeated bids were ignored. The sequence of 
failed bids presented below comes from a team who ignored multiple bids from the 
confederate and other team members (team members knew who the confederates were – 
they were running the simulation – so it seems extraordinary that they would ignore their 
bids, given that they were likely to know what was going on). 
Bid 1 (confederate)  
5:10 A (physician at head of bed, also confederate)“I don‟t think we‟re moving 
his chest very well. Can somebody listen for me” The two nurses at the head of 
the bed, B and C, listen. B says, “I heard some coarse wheezing otherwise I heard 
nothing” No one does anything else to pursue the issue of no chest rise. A does 
not say or do anything else during this sequence. 
 
Bid 2 (confederate)  
6:00 A: It doesn‟t feel like we‟re moving his chest can anyone see if he‟s got 
breath sounds. I can‟t see his chest rising” C listens, looks back at A and shakes 
head. A says, “No? Nothing?” 
D: (who has moved closer to the patient (patient‟s left) and talking to A: “The 
other thing we have to worry about is obstruction. He came in with a good airway. 
Worried about airway …” But then team gets distracted by giving intubation 
meds and possibility of obstruction is not followed up on. 
 
Bid 3 (confederate)  
7:57: A: “He just doesn‟t look like his chest is rising” F (med nurse) to D (team 
leader):“Yeah, I‟m not hearing any air movement at all 
8:07 8:32 patient intubated 
8:12 F to D:“Yeah, I‟m not hearing any air movement at all. Can someone listen 
for breath sounds and we should probably get an end tidal? But this idea was not 
pursued i.e.  no end-tidal monitor applied. 
 
Bid 4 (question from team leader to confederate) 
9:56 Team leader, “What‟s our respiratory status?” A (confed) “no chest rise” 
Then team leader is asked by another nurse if she wants to give magnesium and 
the issue of no chest rise is not pursued. 
 
Bids 5-7 (multiple actors) 




11:05 “Let‟s make sure everything is connected; I saw that go through the 
cords…we‟ve got... (A trying to figure out why not ventilating)” 
11:12 D (team leader): “Something else is going on here” (makes statement but 
then doesn‟t act to follow up on anyone‟s comments) 
11:16 E: “Do we have the end tidal CO2 hooked up?” “No not yet” 
11:26 2
nd
 epi given 
11:32 A: “I‟ve never had good chest rise with bagging him”  
D: “No we didn‟t, we had, he had chest rise when he came in we lost that” 
11:40 B: “Is his trachea midline?” [if there is a tension pneumothorax, the trachea 
– windpipe – shifts to the side opposite the pneumothorax] 




B: “Displacement of the tube…obstruction… tension pneumo…or the equipment 
(several people saying these together) 
11:56 B: “You know I‟m not getting…the reservoir bag‟s not filling”  
A (confed): “You wanna switch bags?” 
D: “Switch bags, check equipment” 
A: “Let‟s do that.. .See if we get anywhere with that” 
12:17 bag changed 
 
In the transcript above there were multiple examples of the type of non-generative 
sequences of interactions that characterized teams with ineffective updating. In particular, 
the double-interacts were left incomplete i.e. a person makes a bid, their bid is usually 
acknowledged but not built upon (classified as a neutral response), and then no 
subsequent response occurred to complete the double-interact. In essence, many of the 
teams with ineffective updating ended up agreeing that the patient couldn‟t breathe (and 
had rapidly decreasing O2 sats) but did not pursue possible causes or provide remedies. 
Incomplete bids were highly problematic, in part because they halted the flow of 
interaction. This finding is reminiscent of other research that suggests that keeping 
organizations in action is key for coping with unexpected events (Christianson, Farkas, 




 In contrast, teams that were able to effectively update their understanding were 
highly responsive to each other in all interactions, not just related to bids about the main 
updating challenges (patient going into respiratory arrest; broken equipment). As well, 
responsive teams made bids about other things they noticed and often used bids as part of 
identifying and correcting errors. Below is a transcript from a team engaged in 
conversation about why the heart rhythm looks odd (the leads that are placed on the 
patient‟s chest to monitor the electrical activity of the heart and show the heart tracing on 
the monitor had been accidentally reversed by the nurse applying the leads): 
F (physician, team leader): “What… what lead are we lookin at? on that… It just 
looks funny to me 
Everyone turns to look at the monitor 
C (nurse at the head of the bed): That is lead 2↓ 
F: That is lead 2, it just looks odd to me 
C?: Do you want another lead? 
 
F: walks down to the recording nurse and looks at the printed-out copy of the 
heart tracing (EKG) 
[pause – aside about family members and getting more history] 
 
F: I‟m not getting… his heart rate isn‟t matching, well, it‟s matching the pulse ox 
(points to the monitor) it‟s not matching the… 
A (nurse at the airway) has been looking back and forth at the monitor and the 
patient‟s chest; at this point, A touches the top lead 
F (seeing where A has pointed): Oh, that‟s what the problem is (realizes the leads, 
which are color coded, have been reversed; takes two left sided leads off and 
reverses them again so they are on correctly now) 
B (another nurse): Was it the wrong one? 
F: That makes sense, it wasn‟t… 
B: That‟s my mistake for the day 
F: That‟s OK, everyone has them 
C: I‟ll agree with that…. (looking at monitor) 
 
You can see in this transcript how responsive the team members are to each other, 
starting with the double-interacts between F, the team leader, and C, one of the nurses. It 




responds confirming that it is lead 2 on the monitor (the lead that is usually selected to 
display the heart tracing; different leads show different electrical wave forms); F restates 
her concern that the tracing looks odd, C asks if she wants to look at another lead. Even 
team members who aren‟t speaking, like A (nurse at the airway) participate and, in fact, 
A has figured out what has happened and communicates the answer wordlessly by just 
touching the lead, prompting F to realize that it‟s the wrong lead. The sequence ends with 
a double-interact between F and B, the nurse who had accidentally mis-applied the leads, 
talking about the mistake in a open and friendly way.  
Although my sample of teams that were not able to effectively update is much 
smaller (8 teams vs. 16 who were able to update), there were different patterns of 
interaction between teams who were able to effectively update and those who were not. 
Aside from the findings mentioned above, ineffective teams also had more implicit bids 
(often very descriptive ones, “His sats are falling,” “His chest isn‟t rising,”) a higher total 
number of bids (because initial bids were frequently ignored, there were many more re-
bids around the same issue), and many more incomplete double-interacts. In contrast, 
effective teams had sequences (usually of compound double-interacts) where they 
responded to each other bids, which tended to be more explicit (such as “This bag isn‟t 
working, please get me another one”). 
Failures of updating 
 Having discussed how updating is an interactional accomplishment, undertaken 
by various actors, through sequences of interlocked behaviors, I return to a discussion of 
patterns of ineffective updating. This data sample allows comparison between teams in 




more about patterns of ineffective updating (failures of updating) than patterns of 
effective updating. I analyze ineffective updating through the same interactional lens that 
I applied to effective updating (see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.8). In categorizing these types 
of ineffective interactions, I return to Daft and Weick‟s (1984) three stage model and 
have added (1) failures of scanning, (2) failures of interpretation, and (3) failures of 
action where appropriate to the diagram around sites of updating (Figure 5.8) 
You will see in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.8 that, unlike the patterns of effective 
updating, I cannot easily place the eight teams who were unable to update on one specific 
area on the diagram. Rather, ineffective updating seems results from a cumulative failure 
of these interactions. Certainly, there can be ineffective interactions between actors and 
the physical environment (for example, mis-interpreting physical cues), actors and the 
social environment (for example, being unresponsive to bids for attention from other 
team members), and between actors and the cognitive environment (for example, not 
using clinical care algorithms appropriately).  
 In thinking about how ineffective updating comes about, Reason‟s “Swiss 
Cheese” model of errors is a useful analogy – in Reason‟s model, errors only occur if the 
gaps in each defensive layer line up so there is a path through (Reason, 1997: 9). Think 
back to some of the previous examples around effective updating – in the transcript on 
pp. 117-119, there were multiple failures, particularly failures of social interactions as 
multiple bids by the two nurses nearest the airway were being ignored. However, through 
interaction with the physical environment, the two nurses realized the cause of the 
problem and acted alone to fix the bag. In this case, individual action compensated for 




around the physical interaction with the bag – the airway nurse never realized it was 
broken – but, through conversation with each other, the team finally figured out how to 
alter the trajectory of care. For many teams, social interactions seemed to form the last 
“line of defense” in preventing failures of updating, highlighting the importance of this 
type of interaction. 
Discussion 
 
My lab study builds on my field study and, in addition to addressing an important 
controversy in the literature around whether and when updating occurs, begins to shed 
light on how updating is actually accomplished. I compared and contrasted the 
performance of 24 teams of ED healthcare providers who participated in the same asthma 
scenario in the medical simulation lab. Most of the teams were able to effectively update 
their understanding in the simulation but there was significant variation in performance 
(for example, the time it took teams to notice and fix a key piece of broken equipment – 
the key updating challenge in the simulation – ranged from less than 30 seconds to almost 
16 minutes).  
In the lab, I confirmed that social interactions were central to updating but, in 
addition, I found that two other types of interactions – specifically, interactions with the 
physical and cognitive environments that the individual team members are embedded in – 
were also key sites for emergent updating. I illustrated that updating was accomplished in 
a variety of ways and examined when updating was accomplished through an individual 
acting alone, an individual acting in concert with others, or as a result of collective action. 
Building on my previous field study, I developed a more fine-grained analysis of bids and 




behavior consisting of “double-interacts,” in which A acts, B responds to A‟s action, and 
A readjusts in response to B‟s response (Weick, 1979: 115). I found variation in 
interactional patterns between high and low performing teams and further developed the 
theoretical vocabulary and framework around the importance of bids for attention and 
responses. Last, I found that ineffective updating was a result of a cumulative failure of 
these interactions, particularly the social interactions, which formed the foundation for 
updating.  
Contributions to sensemaking literature 
In my lab study, my most important contribution is an empirical examination of 
how initial sensemaking and subsequent updating unfold in a setting where it is possible 
to evaluate the efficacy of sensemaking. I know of no other studies that have used this 
approach to study sensemaking (the closest related studies are Rudolph‟s 2003 study of 
anesthesiology residents and fixation error and Waller‟s research in simulators with 
nuclear power plant and air crews but the focus of these studies was not unfolding 
sensemaking). In addition, this is one of the few empirical examinations that considers 
processes related to sensemaking and links them to performance outcomes (Gittell et al., 
2008a; Vogus, 2004; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Second, my findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how updating 
is actually accomplished. There is a great deal of focus in sensemaking literature (as well 
as adaptation and coordination literature) around the creation of collective understanding 
and action (or lack thereof). I found that updating emerged through a variety of pathways, 
ranging from an individual acting alone to collective action, and that the effectiveness of 




the team as well as the interactional competence of the team. There were many teams – 
particularly when updating occurred as a result of interacting with the physical 
environment – where individuals had key updating insights. Whether their insight was 
able to affect the trajectory of care of the patient depended on how confidently and 
persistently and agentically they made bids around and/or acted on that insight and how 
other team members responded to their bids.   
Third, my findings provide empirical support for the theory that skilled social 
interactions form the foundation for coordinated adaptive accomplishment of complex 
interdependent work (Vogus, 2004; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
This study highlights that interactional competence is an important component of 
effective updating. Teams that were able to update accurately and quickly also 
demonstrated interactional competence; effective updating emerged when team members 
noticed and responded to the bids of their colleagues and built upon those bids. In 
responding to bids, not being negative was not enough. I found that neutral responses 
were problematic; as was evidenced by some of the transcripts, bids need to build on each 
other and move the updating process forward. It was not helpful to have all the healthcare 
providers agree the patient couldn‟t breathe; they needed to figure out why.   
In comparing the findings in my study related to updating to similar studies in the 
literature, I noticed an interesting pattern. I found that a fairly high percentage of teams 
were able to effectively update on their own (58%), which is in keeping with LePine‟s 
(1998) study, which found that 53% of teams were able to adapt, and is almost three 
times higher than Rudolph‟s (2003) finding that 19% of individual actors (embedded in a 




seem to be more successful at updating than individuals is in keeping with Weick‟s 
observation that “having a partner makes social construction easier.” (1993: 642). 
However, it is important to also remember that, paradoxically, I found in my lab study 
that updating that occurred as the result of individual action happened more quickly than 
updating that resulted from more collective action (note trend in Table 5.1).  
Fourth, in my field study, I developed a typology of bids and responses and 
differentiated between sensemaking and sensegiving bids. The findings from my lab 
study refined this typology. Further analyses of the transcripts suggested that the type of 
bids that actors make may change as an episode of sensemaking unfolds. In reviewing 
transcripts, the general pattern emerged of bids becoming more explicit over time and 
transitioning from sensemaking (attempting to have the team revisit the trajectory of care) 
to sensegiving (attempting to influence the revision of the trajectory of care in a particular 
directions). The emerging progression is illustrated in Figure 5.9. This observation that 
bids tend to evolve over time brings attention to the importance of studying sensemaking 
processes as they unfold over time and raises new empirical questions, such as whether 
there are windows of opportunity during sensemaking during which certain type of bids 
may be more or less effective.  
Contributions to the adaptation and coordination literatures 
The findings from my lab study contribute to the adaptation and coordination 
literatures by returning to fundamentals to understand a key process of organizing. 
Organizations and organizing are achieved through interaction (Weick, 1979). Although 
Weick (1979) put forth this theory of organizations as an interactional accomplishment 




the coordination of activities (for exceptions, see Boden, 1994; Cooren & Fairhurst, 
2004; Putnam & Cooren, 2004; Quinn & Dutton, 2005) . My dissertation highlights the 
importance of considering sequential interactions as part of everyday work. Using this 
focus, I find that updating is not an abstract intrapersonal cognitive phenomenon but, as 
part of complex interdependent work, updating is a concrete accomplishment, which 
occurs through interaction.  
Even more than that, this study highlights the importance of studying interaction 
broadly construed. Much of the historical research on interaction has focused on person-
person interaction but of course individuals interact with their physical environment as 
well as their social environment. Scholars in communication, among other fields, have 
begun to investigate how individuals interact with inanimate objects, like texts (Putnam 
& Cooren, 2004). More recently, scholars have begun to carve out a new field – 
microethnography – that examines how individuals interact simultaneously with the 
physical, cognitive, and social environments (e.g., Goodwin et al., 2008 (under contract); 
Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002; Streeck & Mehus, 2004).  
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are several limitations of this work that are important to mention. First, I 
joined a simulation program already underway and there was information that would 
have been helpful to my analysis that was simply not available to me (for example, 
measures of expertise or measures of team familiarity). This missing data makes it 
difficult to fully account for alternative explanations around patterns of effective and 
ineffective updating – instead, in this study, I describe processes and associations rather 




shed light on the intrapersonal processes that may shape updating (for example, past 
research suggests that the conscientiousness and cognitive ability of individual team 
members influences team adaptation; LePine, 1998). It would be interesting when 
researchers undertake future studies of updating to gather data in order to be able to 
evaluate the influence of intrapersonal factors as well as other team or organizational-
level factors, such as team familiarity, on updating. 
Third, this study compares the performance of 24 teams from the same 
organization. While I am able to study how updating varies across teams within this one 
organization, I do not examine how updating varies across organizations. It is important 
to note that the very features that make studying updating appealing in this setting – 
updating occurring in a short time-frame, updating in a high risk setting where updating 
is of paramount importance – may also limit the generalizability of my findings to less 
dynamic and less high-risk settings. As well, the type of organization – a teaching 
hospital – may have unique attributes that shape how updating is accomplished. Teaching 
hospitals, by their nature, are fundamentally organizations where teaching and learning 
are prized. This learning orientation may influence interactional norms – for example, 
how acceptable it is to revisit and possibly revise a trajectory of care – that would not 
characterize other healthcare settings, like community hospitals. Future research of 








Comparison of Effective Updating 
 
Team # Time to update Site of updating Actor(s)  
1 0:23 Physical Individual acts alone 
2 0:32 Physical/Social Individual prompts social 
3 0:34 Physical/Social Individual prompts social 
4 1:07 Physical/Social Individual prompts social 
5 1:47 Physical Individual acts alone 
6 3:07 Physical Individual prompts social 
7 3:21 Physical Individual prompts social 
8 3:27 Physical Individual prompts social 
9 3:53 Physical Individual prompts social 
13 5:43 Cognitive/Social Collective 
14 6:54 Social Individual prompts social 
15 7:20 Social Collective 
18 7:42 Social Collective 
20 12:28 Social Collective 
22 12:53 Cognitive Individual prompts social 




Comparison of Ineffective Updating 
 
Team # Time to update Primary sites of failures of updating 
10 4:28* Individual updating occurred but no updating of 
trajectory of care  
Failure of action (including individual action) 
11 4:41* Failure of action  
12 5:00* Failure of interpretation (misattribute cause of symptoms) 
Failure of action 
16 7:20* Failure of action 
17 7:24* Failure of interpretation (mis-interpret physical cues) 
Failure of action 
19 8:18* Failure of action 
21 12:34* Failure of scanning 
Failure of action 
23 12:55** 
 
Failure of scanning 
Failure of interpretation 
Failure of action (get fixated on algorithm) 
 
* time confederate gives answer and updates trajectory of care 








Process Model of Updating 
Sites of updating
Individual acts alone
Individual prompts social process
Collective action
Actors who accomplish the updating



















Key Times in Scenarios and Time Intervals 
 
  
1 2 3 54 6
1. Time when patient stops being responsive (i.e. last time talking or moaning)
2. Time when someone on team first mentions that the patient is unresponsive
3. Time when someone on team begins to take action to deal with unresponsive 
patient (describe what’s happening)
4. Time when someone starts bagging patient
5. Time when bag first questioned or changing bag is first mentioned as solution 
to the problem of ventilating the patient
6. Time when bag actually changed 
Intervals:
a. fix_unresp: time required to update trajectory of care around unresponsive 
patient (time 4 – time 1)
b. fix_bag: time required to update trajectory of care around broken bag valve 



































Key to colors used in diagram
1   2   3    4   5    6   7    8   9  10  11  12 13 14 15  16 17  18 19 20 21  22  23  24 
25 14 12 4 11 5 10 21 23 18 22 19 17 7 3 16 24 1 20 9 8 6 15 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0:00:00 pt unresponsive bag patient bag patient pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive bag patient bag patient pt unresponsive bag patient pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive pt unresponsive bag patient pt unresponsive
0:00:05 notice unresp notice unresp
0:00:10 bag patient question bag question bag bag patient bag patient
0:00:15 bag patient notice unresp act unresp notice unresp act unresp
0:00:20 notice unresp bag patient
0:00:25 notice unresp notice unresp
0:00:30 question bag change bag act unresp
0:00:35 change bag change bag bag patient act unresp
0:00:40 notice unresp
0:00:45
0:00:50 bag patient act unresp notice unresp























































































0:08:10 change bag question bag





















































































































Frequencies of Time Required for Updating 
Mean =  6.13 min
SD












































16/24 teams were able to effectively update
- 14 teams on their own (at varying speeds) and
- 2 teams after clues were given (in red).














Failures of action: Suggestions not followed up on, hypotheses not tested
Failure of interpretation 
i.e. mis-interpreting physical cues
Failure of scanning  - i.e. 
do not consider wide 
enough range
Failure of interpretation:
Mis-attribute cause for 
symptoms
Failures of scanning: 
i.e. do not elicit 
other suggestions







Bids for Attention: A Typology 
 


















In this dissertation, I explored how updating was accomplished as part of complex 
interdependent work. I used a process approach (Weick, 1979) to studying updating and, 
more specifically, I engaged in an inductive qualitative study around two research 
questions: “What does updating look like?” and “When and how does updating occur?” 
in order to develop a rich understanding of updating. I used qualitative data from non-
participant observations and archival video footage from both the ED and the medical 
simulation lab to develop a theory of updating that describes how actors accomplish 
updating in interaction with the environments in which they are embedded through more 
or less generative sequences of interlocked behaviors. 
To briefly recap my findings: in my field study, I generated a rich description of 
updating as it was accomplished by ED healthcare providers. I found that updating did 
occur as part of everyday work – in contrast to the literatures that suggest that updating is 
almost impossible to accomplish – but I also found – in contrast to literature that 
presumes the presence of updating – that updating was a more problematic process than 
is often suggested. I found that ED healthcare providers were highly attuned to the 
challenges of updating and engaged in proactive behaviors to address those challenges. I 
began to develop theory around how updating was accomplished. My findings suggested 
that social interactions were central to the accomplishment of updating as part of complex 




– bids for attention (which I defined as, “an attempt of a team member to share something 
they have noticed (or realized) with other members of the team, with the intent to have 
the team revisit and possibly revise the trajectory of patient care”) – that drew issues of 
concern to the attention of the team and helped manage the flow of attention within the 
team. I found that bids for attention were not simply vehicles for transmitting information 
but rather served to shape the sensemaking and sensegiving within the team. 
In my lab study, I extended and refined the theory that I had developed in my 
field study. I was able to evaluate the efficacy of updating in the more controlled setting 
of the medical simulation lab. I compared and contrasted the performance of 24 teams of 
ED healthcare providers as they participated in an asthma simulation scenario and found 
that most teams were able to update effectively around the central challenge in the 
simulation but that there was significant variation around the speed with which updating 
occurred. My lab study confirmed that social interactions were important for updating but 
also showed that updating emerged through interaction with the physical and cognitive 
environment. Because I was studying updating at the level of the trajectory of care, rather 
than at the level of any one type of actor (i.e. purely individual or purely team level), I 
was able to discern a number of different pathways through which updating was 
accomplished, ranging from an individual acting alone to collective action. I ended by 
elaborating my framework on bids and responses and argued for a return to basic units of 
organizing – sequences of interlocked behaviors in the form of double-interacts – to gain 




I turn now to a discussion of the contributions of my dissertation, the practical 
implications, the limitations of my study, and, finally, suggest avenues for future 
research.  
Contributions 
In both empirical chapters, I have highlighted my contributions to the 
sensemaking, adaptation, and coordination literatures. Rather than repeat myself, in this 
section I will draw some overarching conclusions related to the sensemaking, adaptation, 
and coordination literatures and will consider how my dissertation research speaks to two 
additional literatures: the literature on attention and the literature on error detection and 
correction.  
Sensemaking: In distinguishing updating from naïve sensemaking, I draw 
attention to the idea of trajectories of cognition and action and my literature review and 
empirical investigation emphasized that, once underway, trajectories have their own 
momentum and are difficult to revise. My findings suggest that contextual constraints 
shape the way in which sensemaking unfolds, which is of interest not only to theorists but 
also – importantly – to actors (in this case, ED healthcare providers) who modify their 
workflow and engage in behaviors to manage some of the challenges associated with 
sensemaking in their particular context. My findings also suggest that updating involves 
revisiting a trajectory of care to determine whether revision is necessary but that updating 
is more complicated than its component parts and cannot easily be broken into the 
distinct sub-processes of revisiting and revising. Considering updating holistically allows 
for the consideration of the interplay between sensemaking and sensegiving and the 




Adaptation and coordination: In carefully studying the social interactions that 
form the basis for updating, I also contribute to knowledge around how transitions in 
understanding are coordinated. The research on coordination has primarily focused on the 
management of task interdependencies to the exclusion of other types of 
interdependencies (e.g., Crowston, 1997; Malone & Crowston, 1994). Much of the 
literature on adaptation and coordination presumes that homogeneous understanding is 
necessary for adaptation and coordination. For example, two dominant theories around 
how teams manage unexpected events are transactive memory, the “who knows what” 
division of cognitive labor within a team (Wegner, 1995), and shared mental models, the 
commonly held knowledge about task and team functioning (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
2001), both focus on how individuals have access to shared knowledge.  
However, there remain empirical questions about whether teams really do share a 
mental model (and whether a single shared mental model is ultimately desirable). 
Furthermore, an assumption of homogenous understanding neglects the notion that 
understanding within and ofteams may evolve at different rates. My findings suggest that 
different team members‟ understanding transitions at different times – for example, one 
team member may have updated their understanding (and want to revise the trajectory of 
care) but other team members may still be committed to the previous trajectory of care. 
This notion of heterogeneity around transitions of understanding  is more in line with 
Turner‟s (1978) notion of variable disjunction – the concept that knowledge evolves at 
different rates for different team members and, thus, that they have different 
understandings of the same situation – than the prevailing notion of shared common 




2000). In addition to highlighting differences in understanding, my theory around 
updating suggests possible ways in which understandings transition and reach 
convergence. 
Attention: Attention is a scarce resource within teams, especially in high-risk 
settings (Weick et al., 1999). Just as individuals cannot attend to all stimuli (due to limits 
in information processing), teams also have limits to the number of stimuli to which they 
can attend. The topics of attention and interpretation and information overload are long 
standing organizational questions. Past research has focused more on attention as an 
individual cognitive issue (Posner, 2004; Posner & Rothbart, 2007) or an organizational 
issue (Ocasio, 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006) and, if attention of smaller groups was 
examined, it was usually around what top management teams (as proxies of the 
organization) pay attention to (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Sutcliffe, 1994). It is only 
recently that scholars have begun to investigate the flow of attention within the team or 
group (Rerup, forthcoming) but this seems a promising avenue for future research. 
Error detection and correction: One of the challenges of complex 
interdependent work in high-risk settings is that errors are inevitable and neither the 
prevention approach nor the reliability approach precludes errors (Blatt et al., 2006; 
Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Wildavsky, 1988). In addition, acts often become mistaken over 
time (Paget, 1988). It seems that the best hope for mitigating or minimizing errors is to 
develop the ability of teams to detect and correct errors while errors are still small and 
early in their unfolding (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Error detection and correction requires 
sensitivity to weak signals and the ability to revisit and revise a trajectory of care already 




into the mechanisms that underpin error detection and correction and suggest 
interventions that can improve the ability of teams to minimize the propagation of error. 
Practical Implications 
The nature of my research question and the context for my research mean that my 
findings also contribute to the literature on medical errors. The initial research on medical 
errors was focused on defining (e.g, Hayward & Hofer, 2001), categorizing (e.g, Tamuz, 
Thomas, & Franchois, 2004), and enumerating medical errors (e.g., Kohn et al., 2000; 
Thomas, Lipsitz, Studdert, & Brennan, 2002). It is only in the last few years that scholars 
have examined organizing processes that shape errors (e.g., Carthey, de Leval, & Reason, 
2001; Dixon-Woods, 2003; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Hoff et al., 2004; Luria, Muething, 
Schoettker, & Kotagal, 2006; Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002; Weick, 2002). 
There has a fair amount of attention in the medical errors literature around 
developing regulation and polices to enhance patient safety (Kohn et al., 2000) and 
attention to improving organizational culture within healthcare organizations to be more 
conducive towards organizing for safety (much of this stream of thinking grew out of the 
experience of the aviation industry with crew resource management training, a program 
through which flight crews learned how to improve communication and decision making) 
(Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern, 2005; Malec, Torscher, & Dunn, 2007; Morey et al., 
2002). My study suggests that an interactional focus would be a useful adjunct to the 
focus on culture and regulations.  
One of the most important practical implications of this work is the finding that 
updating requires interactional competence. This study finds that even small interactions 




associated with faster and better updating. In teaching how to improve interactions, it 
would be beneficial to consider both developing skill in making bids and also skill around 
receiving bids. The mere absence of negative interaction is insufficient; rather, teams 
need to learn to engage in generative social interactions with each other.  
The other more sweeping recommendation that I would make relates to the idea 
of keeping an organization in motion. One of the most striking findings from my lab 
study was that even if a team made significant mistakes – i.e. mis-intepreted physical 
cues, failed to consider a wide enough range of possible causes for the patient‟s 
symptoms – much of the time, they were able to recover and eventually effectively 
update if the team kept the trajectory of care going and kept trying to figure out what was 
happening. There seems to be a fair amount of redundancy in the ways in which updating 
can be accomplished – if interacting with the physical environment wasn‟t giving useful 
clues, then sometimes interacting with cognitive tools did. Fundamentally, social 
interactions formed the “last line of defense” so continuing to interact with each other 
was essential to being able to update. In the cases where social interactions ceased – i.e. 
bids were ignored or the team members got fixated on a specific task – action ground to a 
halt.  
Limitations and Future Research 
As mentioned previously, one of the main limitations of this study is that the data 
was collected at one organization. There may be boundary conditions to my theory that 
emerge both from my research site and from the type of data that I collected. The 
research site that I used is a dynamic high-risk setting where stakes for performance are 




the importance of updating. As well, recall that I highlighted that this data was collected 
at a teaching and research hospital, where the norms for questioning a trajectory of care 
may be very different from those at a non-teaching hospital. Last, my data from the 
simulation lab come from a situation where the cue for updating is a physical one (broken 
piece of equipment). It may be that the patterns of updating that I noticed would have 
been different if the cue was different (i.e. more of a diagnostic puzzle).  
There were also limitations around the type of data I was able to collect – I had 
initially hoped to be able to collect survey data to be able to account for some of the 
individual level variation that is hypothesized to be related to updating (for example, 
items related to Kruglanski & Webster, 1996's findings on motivation and updating). Due 
to the length of time that was required to get permission to gather my data, I was unable 
to gather a large enough sample to collect this data. Additionally, I was hoping to be able 
to compare and contrast team performance with supplementary quantitative analysis (log-
linear analysis) but my sample of 24 teams was too small to perform a between -groups 
analysis on my variables of interest. I plan to pursue these lines of inquiry the future.  
Additionally, there are two more specific avenues for research that my 
dissertation has prompted me to consider. First, I feel the potential of the simulation 
laboratory as a site of organizational research has not yet been fully realized and intend to 
pursue future projects in this setting. Second, I am especially intrigued by the idea of 
building upon the theory and methods that I have developed in my dissertation to map the 
flow of attention within teams and to learn more about how transitions in understanding 




More broadly, my findings highlight that an observational approach (whether 
non-participant observations or micro-ethnography) is a rich method for collecting data 
around emergent processes. As many scholars have pointed out (e.g., Barley & Kunda, 
2001), there is a lack of research on work as it is accomplished. I encourage other 
scholars to take seriously the situationally embedded nature of work and return to a study 












B: maybe resident 
C: nurse 
D: recording nurse 
E: nurse 
F: team leader 
G: nurse 
General information: 
Team of 7 people (5 women; 2 men). Team seems to be responding ok but not very good 
at generating other possibilities for why problems exist. Team leader (confederate) 
pushes team to figure out problem with bag (code = 1, confederate solves problem). This 






When patient stops being responsive (talking):  
When someone on team first mentions that the patient is unresponsive:  5:05  
When team begins to take action to deal with unresponsive patient:  5:17 
When someone starts bagging patient:: 5:59 
When changing bag mentioned as solution to problem ventilating patient: 11:22; 13:10  
When bag actually changed: 13:23 (confederate suggests this; code=1) 
When and what alternate diagnoses considered (i.e. pneumothorax, choking, foreign 
body, faulty bag: 2:48 (list of possibilities); 11:14 (DOPE); 12:47 (not pneumo); 13:48 
(fine vfib vs. asystole) 
When summaries or “stepbacks” take place: 0:31, 2:48, 3:30, 13:48 (cause of arrest), 
18:40 Team leader requests summary of patient vitals,19:25 “just to recap,”20:30 “does 
anyone want to do anything else now?” 
 
Updating moments: team has trouble updating. team leader; F seems to get frustrated; 
big separation between head of bed and foot of bed (i.e. completely separate 
conversations – for example, people at head of bed sorting out DOPE mnemonic; people 
at foot of bed ordering bicarb, which people at head of bed are unaware of until later).  
 Update around decreasing respiratory function  
 Update around non-functional bag – team does not arrive at idea to change bag on 
their own, despite big clues from confederate, confederate suggests bag change at 
12:08). 
 
Brief summary timeline 
 
** note times displayed this way: first discussed/ordered/given/+/- results back** 
Purple text = Summary or stepbacks 
Blue text = bids for attention 
 
0:00 team figuring out who will do what role 
0:25 C starts applying monitor leads  
0:31 pt summary (F) 
0:44 O2 rebreather mask applied 
1:12 F requests O2 turned up to max  
1:15 pulse check  
1:26 ?IV started – patient is crying. F requests istat at same time 
1:35 question about whether 2
nd
 line wanted? F answers no. 
1:40 B reads sats ?presumably to recording nurse 
1:52 B asks F if he wants them to start bagging patient  
2:48 patient summary by F including diagnostic possibilities  
3:05 albuterol/atrovent/solumedrol/ and mg sulfate? ordered by F (check to see if said 
earlier) 
3:30 F summarizes thinking about plan of action for team 
4:10 B reads sats again 




5:05 C (who has been shaking patient) taps patient “Hey, little patient… I think that he‟s 
not as responsive” 
5:17 F asks C to do sternal rub; no response 
5:23 F instructs team to assist ventilation (forecasts what is going to happen as sats 
decrease) 
5:39 F orders sub-q epi 
5:40 head of bed down 
5:59 A starts bagging patient 
6:28 solumedrol given 
6:50 question from B about whether other airway aids required (oral airway, nasal 
trumpet) 
7:28 sub-q epi (1:1000) (in at 7:55) 
7:46 F orders 1:10,000 epi to be drawn up in case required (plus atropine) 
7:58 “does ____ help?” 
8:04 B reads sats again 
8:11 F directs team to put board under patient and start compressions for bradycardia 
8:22 B starts compressions 
8:38 epi 1:10,000 
8:40 question about whether intubation meds required 
8:50 F summarizes dx and plan (asystole; chest compressions/epi/chest compressions) 
F is getting tube out during this time 
9:42 question: does he normally have pulses with compressions? 
9:54 F asks, are we still sure we‟re getting good chest rise. Not 100% sure 
10:1210:35 intubation 
10:38 F requests end-tidal. 
10:45 (all this time sensemaking around whether breath sounds present) 
10:53 bagging resumed  
11:05 F instructs A to extubate and start bagging again 
11:14 F stepback: “so, for some reason….” Goes through elements of DOPE 
11:22 (equipment failure mentioned as possible cause; team feels equip OK) 
11:32 F orders 2 14 gauge angio caths for decompression of chest (r/o pneumo) 
11:39 F asks again, “sure equipment is working?” “yes” (A) 
11:47 another dose of IV epi ordered 
11:54 atropine in 
12:07 side discussion at head of bed re: stabilizing airway 
12:17 R chest needled 
12:29 “do you want the epi?” – F refers to recording nurse 
12:44 L chest needled 
12:47 “so, it‟s not a pneumo” i think it‟s equipment. Start with O2 
13:10 F wonders if the bag is broken, requests change 
13:23 bag changed 
13:37 compressions stopped/13:45 compressions restarted (so can listen) 
13:48 another summary (F) bag failure  arrest; fine vfib vs. asystole 
14:09 F orders defibrillation at 2 per kilo (non-sync) 
14:46 G delivers shock 




14:58 F notes rhythm change (attributes it to shock); pulses regained 
15:23 compressions stopped to check pulses 
15:30 compressions resumed 
16:23 atropine? (not sure if they give this) 
16:28 compressions stopped to check pulses 
16:40 bagging resumes? 
16:55 F states they will try and intubate w/o meds but will give if pt gags 
17:03 discussion about mag 
17:1017:23 intubation 
(also a note about discussion re: meds) 
17:40 error detection around mag sulfate (how to give) 
18:00 F notes no end tidal reading 
18:06 B reads vitals off monitor to recording nurse again 
18:34 F requests someone else summarize what‟s happened (“someone besides me”) 
18:40 recording nurse summarizes changes since bag changed 
19:12 F says he‟s going to check tube to make sure through cords 
19:25 summary by F “just to recap” and during recap orders things: 
19:44 F orders CXR 
20:04 F orders inline albuterol through ET tube 
20:28 F orders consult radiology; page unit 
20:30 F asks for input “anybody else think of anything else?” 
20:38 question about xray F explains CXR to r/o pneumonia or pneumothorax 
21:14 B has question about 1
st
 istat  
F orders rpt istat 
21:37 med nurse delivers set of syringes to push fluids 
22:03 F reads CXR aloud to team 
22:17 F summarizes “recap” 
 
Expanded timeline:  
 
0:00 team figuring out who will do what role 
G to A: Do you want airway  
Can‟t hear his response but he walks to the head of the bed and starts getting out airway 
supplies (rebreather mask) 
 
D to E: Do you want to chart? 
E: Yah, I want to chart 
They switch positions so E is on the left and D on the right 
 
SC (J): We have a little eight year old that uh they called the school. Had trouble 
breathing on the on the playground. Went to nurses‟ office. They didn‟t have any uh 
puffers there. 
F: Any history of asthma. 
SC: Yes he does 
F: Did they have to do any intervention on the way in? 





P: I can‟t…I can‟t breathe… 
B comes in, touches patient‟s left arm 
B: you‟ve got airway, Jeff? 
A: yep (looks at B and nods) 
0:25 C starts applying monitor leads  
B starts listening to patient‟s chest with stethoscope 
P: Where‟s…where‟s… my… mom. 
G: Hey buddy are you OK 
P: I I can‟t breathe 
G: Can‟t breathe 
G: I can‟t tell - girl or a boy? 
 
P: What‟re you doin? 
[C: I‟m hookin you up to the EKG… to trace your heart with 
P: What‟re you doin? 
0:44 A applies O2 rebreather mask 
While C is putting on leads by reaching under B‟s left arm (listening to patient chest), B 
points to three monitor positions. “This…” 
C: So, white on the right. Red. ]Physician on top (inaudible) 
  
(overlapping conversation) 
0:31 pt summary (F) 
F: This is an eight year old brought from home. Sounds like he has a history of asthma. 
He has not gotten any albuterol today either at school or by the squad. They just put him 
on oxygen and he‟s been stable en route. So, can we get him on the monitors, and um get 
IV access, and get him on some “O”s… Let me know  what you guys (inaudible) 
 
G to F: 24 OK? (while opening IV cath package) 
 
B to C: Put the physician one on top 
 
B to F: Really not moving too much air 
 
F: On the monitor at least so far all we‟ve got are sats and they‟re 84% 
1:12 F: Can we uh crank up his O2 (looks at A, makes a turning gesture with his left 
hand) as high as it goes? 
B adjusts mask on face 
F: 1:15 How‟s his how are his pulses and stuff? 
B, C, and A all check pulses. 
1:26 patient crying 
G: looks at F and says something I can‟t hear – maybe “line in” 
A: I‟ve got a radial 
B: I‟ve got a brachial 
P: continues to cry, “what‟re you doin?” 




1:30 F: Can you draw an istat offa that? 
G: Yes. 
1:35 B: do you want a second line? 
 F: No not right now um 
G: istat sent – hands pretend istat to SC 
 
1:40 B reads sats ?presumably to D and E “sat of 87, respiration of 7, 126 heartrate, 89 
sat, 6 respirations” (@1:52) to F? “do we want to start bagging?” 
F: naah I mean his sats are 90%  
G: OK (while looking at monitor) 
F: he‟s breathing on his own… 
 
C: Is he movin enough air? 
B (looking at C) Not much 
F: Not much 
Do we want to think about (inaudible – and can‟t tell speaker) 
?: Got good pulses? 
Many people answer, “Yes” 
 
F: So, do you think he‟s wheezing when you listen to him 
B: I can‟t hear much wheezing but I don‟t know if he‟s just… 
F: Can you press on his belly and see if his liver‟s down 
B examines patient‟s abdomen 
(F inaudible….”weird”) 
A: I don‟t hear any wheezing just not a lot of air moving (looking at F, moves hands up 
and down over lungs) 
I don‟t hear any wheezing 
Abdomen‟s soft 
F: Are his heart sounds pretty regular? 
A: I didn‟t listen to that 
B: Sounded regular 
All sounds were present? 
He‟s goin down the list 
laughs 
 
B: 117 over 81 is the blood pressure, Nicole 
 
2:48 patient summary by F including diagnostic possibilities  
F: Alright, so you guys, a kid with asthma… um who has a history of asthma…that‟s 
most likely what he‟s got. Sounds like his heart and his liver exam are normal so it 
doesn‟t sound like this is cardiac. With poor breath sounds this could be pneumonia, 
pneumothorax, um asthma. (3:05) But I would I agree I would give him albuterol, 
atrovent. Um we could give him a dose of solumedrol also. [Yes] Can we draw up some 





During above conversation SC comes unto screen and points out something on monitor 
cart. A picks it up – it looks and sounds like an wrapped IV bag. A takes it to the carts on 
the other side. He gets other things out of a bigger plastic bag. Maybe setting up nebs? 
 
G: You‟re doin OK 
P: I need to sit up…I can‟t breathe 
G: You‟re sittin up 
P: Can I can I sit up further? 
 
G goes over to A;  
 
3:30 F summarizes thinking about plan of action for team 
So the things that I would do…those are pretty standard stuff…beta-agonists, steroids. 
Uh, if he‟s getting worse, then I‟d give him subcutaneous epi…(B looking at F and 
nodding) that would be like the next line. I would try hard not to intubate him um because 
it‟s hard being asthmatic on a vent. We‟ll see if we can make him better instead of worse.  
 
A and G having what appears to be a conversation about how to set up the nebs: 
G: Then the med goes?.... 
 
4:10 B reads sats again: 124 heart rate. 87 sat. 
C cycles BP on monitor 
 
4:20 neb mask applied/nebs started 
G: Gonna switch out the mask, OK? (to patient)….Put it on like 8 (to A) 
E: Is that the standard albuterol? 
G: (looking at E) Yeah 
 
Fairly inaudible conversation about what dose of albuterol it was. 
Confirming it was just one and not a double. People are focused on this conversation – 
joking, laughing, making jittery hands (albuterol makes you jittery). 
 
4:39 A: You‟re on 8 L per minute. 8 L per minute. 
 
Again, a difficult to hear conversation about confirming it was just one albuterol neb and 
not a double. People are focused on this conversation – joking, laughing, making jittery 
hands (albuterol makes you jittery). 
 
4:58 C starts patting patient‟s chest 
5:05 C (who has been shaking patient) taps patient “Hey” (pokes patient‟s chest) (people 
laugh) “I think that…. not as responsive” 
5:17 F asks C to do sternal rub; no response  
F: Take your knuckle (takes right hand and makes a fist with middle knuckle sticking out 
and shows movement as he‟s talking) and shove it into his sternum really hard and see if 
he does anything 




G: patting patien‟t shoulder)You OK? You alright? 
 
 
5:23 F: Yeah, so he‟s (can‟t hear this. It‟s not “not responsive”). Let‟s go ahead and start 
assisting his ventilation…  
A: OK (turns to get bag) 
B is trying to get head of bed to go down 
F: as his sats go down, his heartrate‟s going down. 
 
5:38 F: We‟re gonna give him some sub-q epi (2) also 
? (maybe med nurse or recording nurse D) Sub-q epi 
 
5:40 head of bed down 
5:59 A starts bagging patient 
 
Off-screen med nurse: (very quietly) Alright, solumedrol if you want to give it (then 
inaudible – sounds like 20 mL). (clears throat; new speaking is much louder) I have your 
solumedrol (?per something) 
Solumedrol if you want. I have your solumedrol.  
F picks up syringe from off-screen person and hands it to G 
Off-screen med nurse: It‟s 50 mg  
G: Is it sub-q 
Off-screen: 2.5 
F: No, it‟ll go through the IV. Good question. Go ahead and just just push (makes a 
pushing gesture with hand) the solumedrol. It‟s not going to do anything for hours but at 
least it‟s on board. 
Off-screen: Solumedrol for 50mg IV route. 
 
6:23 B to E: Do you want an oral airway? Nasal trumpet? Anything like that? 
 
6:28 G: Solumedrol is in. 
 
6:28 F: Is is his chest moving when you bag him? 
B: Yep (quietly) (nods head up and down) 
(long pause – maybe 2-3 seconds – as A, B, C, and G look at patient‟s chest. C puts hand 
on chest then B puts hand on patient‟s chest) 
A: I don‟t really notice that↓ 
C (or B): Kinda seems irregular 
B to C: How did he sound? 
C: He sounds more like (hard to hear – maybe really wheezy). I don‟t know what he 
normally sounds like but he sounds more like 
F: When you‟re bagging him? 
G: Radial pulses present…..Femoral pulses present 
F: He‟s bradycardic. So his sats are like 79%. Are we moving his chest when we bag? 




F: So what are what are we worried about when we can‟t get chest rise when we‟re trying 
to assist him? 
B: Reposition him 
F: OK so yup reposition his head. 
 
7:23 sub-q epi (1:1000) (in at 7:55) 
F to G: Do you have the dose of epi? 
G (looks at syringes in hand): I have magnesium sulfate 
Off-screen OK I have the epinephrine, it‟s sub-q 
F: We‟re gonna give the dose of sub-q epi… um but… and then… that‟s gonna be high 
like a 1:1000 dose 
Off-screen: It‟s 1:1000 and it‟s sub-q so here‟s your (inaudible) 
G: Thanks 
7:46 F: [Because he‟s getting more bradycardic can you draw up a 1:10,000 dose that 
we‟re going to give IV if he doesn‟t get better and can you also draw up atropine] 
Off-screen: Yes 
 
[7:40 B to D or E: Nicole, I am still able to hear some wheezing now. He‟s still not 
moving much air 
C: Is that what he sounded like before?  
B: It sounds like I] … I hear more wheezing up here 
 
G: Sub-q epi‟s in 
 
7:58 F to people at head of bed: Does repositioning help? 
A: Yeah, little bit little bit 
 
8:04 B: Nicole, sat is 78.  
 
A: Just had a run of …uh …sort of asystole (doesn‟t address this comment to anyone. 
Says outloud quietly while looking at the monitor) 
B: do we still have pulses? 
F (feeling patient‟s right dp pulse) Naah… 
B: No. (takes off stethoscope to listen to patient) 
F: Go ahead and get a board under him and do chest compressions. 
G: Wait! Now I have pulses 
F: yeah but he‟s still bradycardic  
G: OK. Start C… compressions? 
F: He needs to get compressions. So we need a board under him 
8:22 B starts compressions 
C to B: Just tell me when you‟re ready 
G: Ready 
B stops compressions; G rolls patient toward her; C puts the board under patient 
 
8:38 Off-screen: I have here epinephrine IV 1:10,000 when you need it. 





A: (looking at monitor) (something inaudible, G looks at him as he talks)… basically 
8:40 B: Do you want to pull the intubation meds up 




Off-screen gives syringes to G: Here‟s your epinephrine IV 1:10,000 
G: Epinephrine 1:10,000 
 
8:46 F: I‟ll get… you keep bagging…I‟ll get that stuff set up. So you guys chest 
compressions. Epinephrine. Chest compressions. This is asystole or severe bradycardia. 
Um we don‟t need to do pulse checks until we‟re better on the monitor. Um the only 
thing we would look for is if there‟s any sign of vfib or vtach on the monitor then he 
would need electricity. 
 
G: Epi‟s in 
E: Thank you 
 
?: (maybe D to E or vice versa – there‟s something inaudible before this – I think it‟s 
someone asking the dose of the epi): 1:10,000 
 
F: How old is he guys? 
?: Eight 
F: OK (he‟s getting tubes from the wall) 
 
B to F (she‟s turned to look at F getting tubes off the wall): I think we had to go with the 
5 last time…  
F (maybe, can‟t see): OK 
A: Age. 8 + 16 is 24.  
B: the 5 and a half one was too big  
A: Six …what‟s that? 
B: the five was too big for him last time.  
A: what was it? 
B: the five and a half was too big. 




9:42 C to F: Does he normally have pulses with compressions? 
F: He should, yes 
C or G: No pulses with compressions 
F: OK, continue with compressions 
 
9:54 F: So are we are we still sure that we‟re getting good chest rise „n stuff? 




B: Could someone listen to him? 
G listens to patient‟s chest)  
F: Do you want to intubate him? 
A: I can try 
F: I‟ll go ahead and bag him 
G: I‟m not hearing anything 
B: Hold for a moment 
10:13 B stops chest compressions 
 
10:1210:35 intubation (A intubates patient) 
A: (first word hard to hear: visualize vs there‟s) the cords 
Lots of silence 
B: does someone want to listen? 
10:35 B resumes compressions 
G takes off stethoscope and is listening to patient‟s chest 
10:53 bagging resumed (F has applied the bag to the tube and is bagging) 
 
10:38 F: Can we get the end-tidal? 
C gets end-tidal off monitor cart and hooks it up 
F: Are you hearing breath sounds? 
G: See, I can‟t tell if I‟m hearing that (points at bag) 
E: What size tube is that, (?Jen)? 
B to E: Five 
F: Uh hold onto your tube so it doesn‟t move 
F: OK, I‟m not getting anything on the end-tidal 
G: I think I‟m just hearing that 
11:05 F: OK, so we don‟t have breath sounds. Go ahead and let‟s… go ahead and pull out 
and bag. You may be in but it‟s just not workin‟ 
 
11:14 F: So, for some reasons we‟re just not moving his chest. He‟s not obstructed right? 
You didn‟t see anything in there, in the way.  
A: I didn‟t see. No visual. 
F: Um so… Dislodgement. His tube is out so it shouldn‟t be a problem. He‟s not 
obstructed. Does he have a pneumothorax? And is this an equipment problem? That‟s 
kind of the DOPE mnemonic. So, can we get (@11:32) two 14 gauge angio caths and 
shove it in his chest (points index fingers into both sides of his own chest). Um and are 
we sure that our equipment is working? 
(2 second pause: G and A are looking down to patient‟s chest) 
A: Yeah 
G: Do you want me to get the atropine? 
F: Yes. 
 
11:47 F: And can we get another dose of epinephrine three minutes after the first one? 
Off-screen: Would you like IV, again? 
F: Yes, 1:10,000. Everything from here on out will be IV 1:10,000 





11:59 There‟s the chest. 
The chest. The chest has arrived 
 
12:07 side discussion at head of bed re: stabilizing airway 
B to A: Would you like a towel roll for his head? 
A: What‟s that? What‟s that? 
B: Put him in a C-collar to stabilize or put like a towel-roll under his head……to stabilize 
the airway? 
A: doesn‟t answer with words but waggles his head back and forth no 
 
Off-screen nurse comes on screen and goes over the G and hands her syringes: Additional 
dose of epinephrine 1:10,000. 2.5. 
 
12:17 R chest needled by F 
F: Um, the right chest has been needled with no (checks with SC) no whoosh  
SC: no whoosh 
B: What was he doing at the time? Like? 
12:29 G: “do you want the epi in?”  
F: Yes…  
 
F: well, these guys should know when it‟s time (points to recording nurses) 
G: When did I give the epi last? 
D or E: Now. You can give it now. 
G: Thanks. Epi is in. 
Off-screen. That was 0.25 mg.  
 
12:44 L chest needled 
F: The left chest is in. No whoosh.  
12:47 F: Alright, so it‟s not a pneumothorax. I think guys it‟s our equipment. So can we 
start from where the oxygen comes out and find out if we have a problem.  
SC: I‟ve got the chest tubes ready 
G: Oxygen‟s all the way up 
F to A: Do you feel like you are actually getting? 
A: Do you want to see what you think.. feels a bit resistant 
F comes over and gives the bag a couple of hard squeezes 
13:10 F wonders if the bag is broken, requests change 
I‟m wondering if the bag‟s just not workin. Let‟s switch our bags.  
A: OK 
F: You can start bagging before you ken get it hooked up. 
13:23 bag changed (By A) 
A: Yeah, definitely, much better 
 
B: What was the history? What was he doing? 
F: He was in school 




F: Do you have chest rise now? Stop compressions just for a second 
13:37 compressions stopped/13:45 compressions restarted (so can listen) 
F: Are you getting breath sounds? 
G: Yes, slight 
A: It‟s easier 
F: Continue compressions 
 
13:48 another summary F: Alright so I think our bag was faulty so I think he has not been 
getting good oxygenation for awhile. Um so it‟s probably why he arrested…because his 
sats went down so low. Um the question is do we think this is fine v-fib or asystole? 
? (can‟t see speaker on screen): I would go with vfib..  
A: That‟s what I would say. 
 
14:09 F: Let‟s jolt him up (makes a double thumbs up sign with hand and raises them up 
once) 
 
G (presumably to F): What‟s the number? (turns around and starts to uncover the 
defibrillator) 
F: 2 per kilo of non-synchronized so don‟t hit the sync button 
Off-screen: Defibrillation would be five – zero 
F: OK, so fifty 
G: (getting out leads) We want him on this monitor? 
?: Yep 
F: No, just (points to the main monitor).  
?: (something inaudible)… just defibrillating 
F: I don‟t care yeah we‟re not gonna synchronize him.  
 
G: So what do we want him at? 
Off-screen: Five - zero 
F: So fifty as in greater than forty less than sixty?  
Off-screen: Correct 
F: Not fifteen? 
Off-screen: Five-zero… 
F: OK, OK, alright 
Off-screen: Less than sixty.  
F: I‟m just clarifying (makes a defensive hand‟s up gesture) 
G: Ready ...Clear…. Clear.  
14:46 G delivers shock 
F: „Kay, just do compressions. Just keep doin „em 
14:51 B restarts compressions 
 
Off-screen: The second (inaudible – maybe attempt) would be seven-five 
 
14:58 F: So, so I would agree with you (points at D who is nodding head) that that was 





G: He does have pulses 
 
F: „Kay keep goin we‟re gonna go for a couple of minutes 
 
I feel like (inaudible) 
Are you tired 
C: Do you want me to take over 
B: Oh, it doesn‟t matter 
Inaudible 
G: I‟ll be in charge of juice 
 
F: Do you guys feel pulses?  
G: Yes (feeling right radial pulse) 
C: Yes (feeling left femoral pulse) 
15:23 F: Stop compressions for a second. (pause) You do feel pulses?  
G: Yes 
F: OK because his heart rate is only 40‟s  I would continue compressions. [15:30 B 
resumes compressions]  
Is he still bradycardic? Can we get a dose of atropine? 
Off-screen: Yes. 
B or G: ‟Cause he‟s still hypoxic? That he‟s bradycardic? 
F: Um hm yeah I think that‟s the reason. As his sats come up this should come up but I 
would continue compressions until he‟s a little better perfusion. 
B: Is his belly distended? Does he need an NG or anything? 
F feels patient‟s abdomen 
F: We just weren‟t we weren‟t we weren‟t bagging anything in 
?: So it went to his belly? 
Right  
 
F to A: So, let‟s let‟s get you to intubate him. He obviously needs to be intubated 
(inaudible something about a stylet) 
 
16:23 Off-screen comes onscreen and hands syringes to G: Atropine 0.5 
G: Thank you  
 
F goes to put stylet in tube and drops tube 
F: We‟re gonna assume it‟s sterile. We‟re gonna take the stylet off the floor. We‟re gonna 
assume it‟s sterile 
As he goes to put the stylet in the tube again, F drops the tube again 
G: You did it again. 
?: Just lick it 
G: Do you want atropine? 
F: Uhhh. Actually hold it right now. (laughter) Good question. Awright. Let‟s stop 
compressions. [16:28 compressions stopped to check pulses] 
We‟re in the 70s… do we have better pulses? 





C:… than they were  
F to A: Let‟s go ahead and switch. I will bag him while you get ready.  
16:40 F resumes bagging 
 
Period of silence 
 
16:55 F to foot of bed: We‟re gonna try to intubate him without meds.  
?: OK 
F: If he starts gaggin‟ „n stuff then we‟ll give him other stuff. 
?: Um start with the lidocaine (inaudible) mg 
 
17:40 error detection around mag sulfate (whether given) 
F: So has he gotten his magnesium yet? 
D or E: Um, I don‟t believe he has 
 
(overlaps) 
A: I‟m ready 
F: Ready? 
A: Yeah 
F: I got cricoid pressure 
A: Visualized the cords. Through. 
17:1017:23 intubation 
 
G: I had it. I don‟t think… 
Maybe he has 
G: I had it. Did I give it back to someone? 
D or E: We have albuterol, solumedrol, epi 1:1000, epi 1:10, atropine, another epi 1:10.  
Off-screen: Do you want an additional mag sulfate? 
G: Did I get one already? 
Off-screen: You did 
G: I did push it? 
 
F to A? What did he sound like? 
B listening to patient‟s chest 
 
Did you push it? 
Off-screen: It‟s been handed forward 
What was? 
G: Yeah, I think I gave it. 
Off-screen: Atropine? 
G: Here it is 
Mag sulfate? 
D or E: Mag sulfate. No. We don‟t have it written down 




F: OK. I would go ahead and uh you have to give it over twenty minutes. It‟s not 
something you can push so you need to put it on a pump 
G: It‟s on a pump (pretending to have a pump. Laughter) 
 
F: Do we have…  
B: I‟m startin to hear it now 
 
Off-screen comes on-screen and gives something to G: Here‟s your tubing 
 
18:00 F: We don‟t have an end tidal, though.  
 
18:06 B to D or E: Nicole, vitals: 85 heartrate. It was 18 at first. 89 sat. 123/41.  
 
F hands bag to A: You bag. I‟m gonna look to make sure…  
A: (difficult to hear) The tube? 
F: I think it is. His sats are better. They‟re hearing chest rise. I just don‟t know why we 
don‟t have an end-tidal.  
A: Sats are definitely coming up 
 
18:34 F requests someone else summarize what‟s happened  
F: Right so somebody beside me since you‟ve been kind of globally looking at him. How 
we‟ve been doing overall on the last couple of minutes with our vitals? 
 
18:40 D: Ummmmmm our pressures are lookin OK. Our sats have been comin up. Our 
pulse has been getting better. Pulse was in 70‟s and now we‟re in the low 90‟s. We look 
we look like we‟re improving 
B: I don‟t feel a brachial pulse right now but we do 
 
SC: Are those chest tubes in? 
 
G: I feel brachial. 
B: I don‟t know… 
 
D or E: That‟s still a five-oh tube? 
 
SC: You gonna put those chest tubes in? 
F: Yeah, I‟m not gonna put them in; he didn‟t have a whoosh of air 
 
D or E: What‟s the marker at the lip for the tube? 
F: Fifteen. Yeah, it‟s definitely between the cords. Alright. So, we‟re startin to get a bit of 
an end-tidal.  
19:25 OK so you guys. Just to recap. Clinically he‟s now intubated. I think the reason he 
arrested is because he was so hypoxic because we weren‟t delivering any oxygen because 
we had faulty equipment. Um he‟s intubated with a tube that sounds equal – correct? 
[Mmmhhh]And we can see it going through the cords and we have an endtidal. So we 




doesn‟t have any pneumothoraces that um we‟re not gonna make worse now that we have 
positive pressures. Um from a circulatory standpoint, he‟s still a little bit bradycardic for 
somebody who should be in significant distress. We need to inline some albuterol 
through here (20:04). And I would give him some fluid. Probably give him 10 per kilo 
and push it. So like 250mL and push it. And who votes he should go to the ICU? 
Everyone says “Me” and raise their hands 
G: Especially because he‟s intubated 
B: Take him to the floor (waves right hand in) 
F: Yep so the floor‟s not gonna be too happy 
Maybe C?: Take him back to Area C 
20:28 F: Can we call radiology and page the unit? 20:30 Does anybody want to do 
anything else right now? 
G: So we‟re gonna get the xray now.  
F: We‟re gonna the xray  
G: Confirm placement  
F: Confirm placements. Make sure we don‟t have like a big pneumonia that needs to be 
treated 
G: Or pneumo 
F: Or a pneumothorax needing a chest tube. 
21:14 B: Does the istat look OK? 
F: I haven‟t seen it. But we should probably…. That‟s a great idea. That was before he 
arrested. We should probably get an istat now. So if we can draw up more blood for that. 
Um OK, I‟m gonna wander to the foot of the bed. (moves to foot of bed) 
 
Talking and quiet singing in the background. 
 
SC: Xray‟s been called and is coming 
G: Istat? 
SC puts paper (istat)on table  
D: First istat. Second istat was drawn. 
F: [This was before he arrested. So before he got before we made him worse his pH was 
7, base deficit -15, but his „crit, his glucose, his sodium and his potassium were fine. So it 
was a mixed metabolic and respiratory.] So that‟s his film (points) 
 
[overlapping conversation] 
B: So we decided that‟s not…that‟s not how he always sounded? 
G: I couldn‟t hear anything… (inaudible) 
A: (shakes head)Yeah, but it wasn‟t much 
 
21:37  Off-screen nurse (hands five big 50cc syringes full of fluid to G): We need this 
fluid IV push. We need 250. That‟ll be a bolus for his weight.  
G: She‟s good! (looks down at the handful of syringes laughter) Thanks 
Maybe D or E: That‟s awesome. 
F: That‟s absolutely excellent. 
 




?: If you (something inaudible) those syringes back at me. 
 
22:03 F: You guys, it looks like he‟s hyperinflated. I don‟t see a pneumothorax, although 
it‟s a supine film. With sats of 95 I wouldn‟t do anything else. His ET tube looks in the 
right place. Let‟s give him some fluid.  
22:17 To recap. He‟s gotten his solumedrol? He‟s getting his mag? Is that right 
Off-screen: Yes  
G: Yes 
F: So. Alright. The only other thing I would do for him is titrate a drip. They can do that 















Steps for coding video: 
 
1. Make a timeline of key events, focusing on changes in trajectory or updating 
moments. Please identify and describe: 
a. When patient stops being responsive (talking) 
b. When someone on team first mentions that the patient is unresponsive 
c. When team begins to take action to deal with unresponsive patient 
(describe what‟s happening) 
d. When someone starts bagging patient 
e. When changing bag mentioned as solution to problem ventilating patient 
f. When bag actually changed  
g. When and what alternate diagnoses considered (i.e. pneumothorax, 
choking, foreign body, faulty bag, etc) 
h. When summaries of patient status occur (i.e. “Let‟s take a step back…”) 
i.  
2. Once you have constructed an initial timeline, identify key updating moments 
(where trajectory of care revisited and possibly revised). Work backwards on the 
video from these moments to see when intention or need to revisit trajectory first 
expressed and create an even more detailed timeline of conversations and 
actions leading up to and including the revisiting and (possible) revising. 
 
3. Specifically, flag moments that are bids for attention, which are an attempt of a 
team member to share something they have noticed (or realized) with other 
members of the team, with the intent to have the team revisit (and possibly revise) 
the trajectory of patient care. 
a. Please describe bids for attention and indicate whether they are: 
i.  explicit: i.e. “The patient doesn‟t seem to be responding to our 
treatment – can we take a step back and look at what‟s going on?” 
or “This isn‟t working” 
ii. implicit: i.e. “This lab result seems weird” or “I‟m wondering if…”  
b. In addition, if you can, please describe to whom the bid is made (i.e. 
specific individual(s) or whole team) 
 
4. As we‟ve talked about before, there are various responses to bids: 
a. Responses to bids should be identified as either: 
i. positive: acknowledges bid and builds upon it. This type of 




ii. supportive, asking follow-up questions, taking action in response 
to bid (i.e. “the patient is not breathing” – an appropriate action in 
response to that is to put down the head of the bed and start 
assembling supplies to manage the patient‟s airway). Asking others 
what they think about bid. It can also involve thanking or 
humorous interactions (i.e. joking in a positive not mean way). 
iii. neutral: ignores bid or acknowledges bid (i.e. gazes at speaker or 
nods) but, in contrast to positive responses, there is no building 
upon the bid. 
iv. negative: belittling comments, sarcasm, anger, mean, or aggressive 
comments or actions are all negative responses to a bid for 
attention.  
 
b. As well, there can be variation in who responds to the bid. It‟s helpful if, 
in your rich description, you can indicate whether the response to a bid is 
by an: 
i. individual (especially important to note if the individual is the team 
leader) 
ii. some portion of the team 
iii. whole team 
 
5. It‟s also helpful if you can include in your description your overall impression of 
the team (just as we‟ve done in our conversations i.e. “the team is good at having 
transitions in understanding but not in transitions in action” or “joking around a 
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